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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is an empirical analysis of the application of teacher value-added 
effectiveness to school improvement especially on student academic achievement in the core 
subjects of mathematics, English/language arts, science, and social studies in elementary 
schools. In particular, I am interested in (1) the relationship between teaching effectiveness 
and subject specialization; (2) the impact of subject specialization on student academic 
achievement; and (3) the potential gain in mathematics achievement that could be achieved 
through specialization within schools. This dissertation attempts to find out whether 
teachers who are relatively effective in raising student test scores in a subject have specialized 
fully or partially in teaching that subject and whether subject specialization can raise student 
academic achievement in elementary schools.  
My dissertation comprises three essays presented in Chapters II through IV. The 
first essay investigates whether teachers specialize in the subject(s) where they are relatively 
more effective. The second essay studies whether subject specialization as practiced in 
Tennessee increased student test scores. The third essay explores the maximum potential 
gain in mathematics achievement that could be achieved through specialization. After the 
three essays, Chapter V concludes this dissertation and discusses future research needs 
relating teacher value-added effectiveness to student academic achievement, in general.  
In Chapter II, the first essay raises an empirical question about the personnel 
decision—teacher assignments—in elementary schools. Teacher assignments made within 
schools in my dissertation determine who will teach and what grades and subjects those 
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teachers will teach from one year to the next. Previous research shows that there is a diverse 
set of criteria used by educators and school administrators to make decisions on teacher 
assignments. The most common criteria include principals’ subjective assessments, reports 
from parents, and student test scores. To my best knowledge, I am not aware of any 
literature that describes the application of teacher value-added effectiveness in making 
decisions about job assignments for teachers. In this essay, I test a hypothesis regarding 
whether teachers have specialized in teaching a subject if they are relatively more effective in 
teaching that subject. These findings are important to the debates about the potential of 
using value-added estimates for personnel decisions in schools with the aim to improve 
student learning.  
In Chapter III, the second essay studies the impact of subject specialization on 
student test scores. It is common that in elementary schools, especially in the upper 
elementary grades 4 through 6, some students receive instructions in all core subjects from 
the same teacher (i.e., self-contained classrooms) and other students receive instructions in 
content-specific classrooms where teachers teach the same subject to different classes of 
students. I intend to investigate whether subject specialization in Tennessee’s public 
elementary schools has increased average test performance. Regardless of the findings in the 
first essay, the research question in the second essay is still interesting. Specialization could 
be useful simply because it allows teachers to focus on one subject; therefore they become 
better at teaching that subject than they would if their efforts were spread over several 
subjects. If specialization has not raised student test scores, the reason may be that self-
contained classrooms provide teachers with more flexibility to organize instructions for all 
subjects and better opportunity to integrate all subjects. To date, empirical evidence is 
inconclusive about the effects of organizational structures on student achievement. Prior 
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studies are also limited by the ignorance of variation within a particular organization 
structure, relatively small sample size, relatively short time period of analysis, academic 
subjects available for study, and mean comparison of test scores between different 
organization structures. In this essay, I examine the impact of subject specialization, as 
practiced in Tennessee, on average test performance in schools.  
Finally, the third essay discusses the maximum potential gains in mathematics 
achievement that could be achieved through specialization. It also asks a positive question. If 
teachers’ past value-added estimates are used to make mathematics assignments for teachers, 
what would be the maximum potential gains in mathematics achievement that could be 
achieved through specialization? In this essay, I assume that teachers’ past value-added 
estimates are used to make decisions on teacher assignments of mathematics specialization. I 
then estimate the maximum potential gains in mathematics achievement through such 
specialization. My findings can be particularly important to the schools seeking a way to raise 
student mathematics achievement through managing teacher assignments.  
This dissertation uses data from the Tennessee Department of Education (TDOE). 
The quantitative analysis focuses on students in grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee’s public 
elementary schools. Specifically, the first essay uses teacher effectiveness measures in a 
teacher-level model to predict teacher assignments in three school years 2009-2010 through 
2011-2012; the second essay uses the degree of average specialization in a school-by-grade 
model to predict average test performance in a subject in nine school years 2003-04 through 
2011-2012; and the third essay concentrates on the students and teachers in the 2010-2011 
school year to estimate the maximum gains in mathematics achievement that could be 
achieved through specialization.  
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All essays are related to teacher value-added modeling and each essay uses teacher 
value-added estimates for different purposes. Given the longitudinal student and teacher 
course files, I am able to link students to teachers and courses in Tennessee. This 
dissertation implements the Wooldridge’s dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) model to 
estimate teacher value added. Teacher value-added estimates are then merged to my 
analytical data with student, class, teacher, and school characteristics.  
Overall, the contribution of this dissertation is threefold. First, I provide an empirical 
model that helps understand whether teachers specialize in the subjects where they perform 
relatively well. Second, I provide empirical evidence whether specialization in upper 
elementary grades has been an effective method to raise student test performance in 
Tennessee. Lastly, I estimate the maximum potential gains in mathematics achievement that 
could be achieved through specialization if educators and school administrators use teacher 
value added to make decisions on teacher assignments.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
TEACHERS’ HISTORY OF VALUE ADDED ON FUTURE JOB  
ASSIGNMENTS OF TEACHERS 
 
Introduction 
Decisions on teacher assignments are related to the measures that are used to inform 
teaching effectiveness. The most important criterion for making decisions about teacher 
assignments in elementary schools is an administrator’s subjective evaluation of teachers. 
Often, administrators may have a great deal of information to inform their decisions about 
teacher assignments. According to Jacob and Lefgren (2008), this information comes from 
three main sources: principals’ informal and formal observations, reports and requests from 
parents, and student test scores. Principals may differ with respect to the way they use this 
information to make decisions about teacher assignments.  
Many such measures help educators and school administrators learn teachers and 
teaching effectiveness within schools. Literature indicates that there has been a great deal of 
interest in measuring teacher job performance in schools and a lot of discussion about using 
teacher effectiveness measures to make personnel decisions (e.g., employment, 
compensation, promotion, and assignments). One of the commonly known objective 
measures for teacher job performance is teacher value added.  
As shown in the literature on teaching effectiveness, value-added modeling is one of 
the widely used strategies in building measures for teacher job performance in the United 
States. More recently, this strategy has quickly gained substantial numbers of users for 
evaluating teaching effectiveness. Value-added modeling could become even more 
increasingly dominant in the near future in teacher accountability systems.  
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Value-added studies in education have shown that teachers are important in 
improving student academic performance (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2010; Nye et al., 2004). 
Research has also given attention to the discussions of policies of using teacher value-added 
measures (Braun et al., 2010). Some recent education policies have tied teacher value-added 
measures to personnel decisions at school, such as merit-pay systems, tenure decisions, and 
teacher layoffs (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2010; Goldhaber and Hansen, 2010a; 
Goldhaber and Theobald, 2011; Springer et al., 2010). However, it is entirely unknown 
whether teacher value-added estimates have been used to assign areas of specialty to 
teachers.   
The research most relevant to my study has focused on the relationship between 
teacher value-added measures and various personnel decisions for teachers, such as tenure 
decisions, promotion to administrative positions, and reassignments to high/low-stakes 
positions (Chingos and West, 2011; Goldhaber and Hansen, 2010a). The findings of these 
studies demonstrate the existence of a relationship between teaching effectiveness and job 
transitions and suggest the possibility of using teacher value-added effectiveness in making 
tenure decisions for public school teachers.  
My study concentrates on whether teacher value-added measures can provide 
information for making subject specialization. By subject specialization, I refer to the 
assignment of teachers to specialize fully or partially in particular subjects. I test the 
hypothesis that teachers have tended to specialize in a subject if they have been relatively 
more effective in teaching that subject.  
This study further explores whether the impact of teacher value-added estimates on 
teacher specialization varies depending on teacher and school attributes. Those attributes 
include education level for teachers, years of teaching experience at all schools, years of 
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teaching experience at the current school, teacher mobility, school enrollment, and school 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) accountability. This study tests whether those moderator 
variables influence the relationship between teacher relative effectiveness in a subject and the 
degree of specialization in that subject.  
Data for this study come from Tennessee’s public elementary schools. This study 
only considers elementary school teachers because teachers are fully departmentalized in 
middle and high schools (i.e., in grades 7 through 12) where they provide instructions in one 
or two content areas to different classrooms on a school day in Tennessee. Specialization 
starts in early elementary grades in some Tennessee’s public elementary schools and it 
becomes much more dominant by grade 6.  
This study uses a school-fixed effect model to estimate the effects of teacher relative 
effectiveness in a subject on the degree of specialization in that subject. I find that high 
value-added increase specialization in mathematics and science separately in each upper 
elementary grade. This positive relationship between teaching effectiveness and teacher 
assignments is also found in English/language arts in grade 5 and in social studies in grade 4. 
Furthermore, my findings suggest that the impact of teacher job performance on 
assignments separately in each subject and each grade varies with teacher and school 
characteristics. While those results clearly suggest that teacher value-added estimates are 
associated with teacher assignments (i.e., the percent of students taught in a subject), the size 
of the effects is relatively small in grade 4 compared to the ones in grades 5 and 6. The 
effects of teaching effectiveness on assignments also vary across subjects. Teacher value 
added in mathematics in grade 6 has had the largest impact on mathematics assignments in 
Tennessee’s public elementary schools. Teaching effectiveness in mathematics with one 
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standard deviation above the mean increases 15.48 percent of students taught in 
mathematics (i.e., about four students in a classroom of 25 students).   
There are several possible explanations for the small positive effects and not 
significant effects found in some grades and subjects in this study. First, while teacher value 
added is correlated with teaching effectiveness, teacher assignments are not mostly 
determined by teaching effectiveness. Second, when teachers are effective in teaching one 
subject, it is possible that some teachers are also effective in teaching other subjects; 
therefore, there is no subject specialization that assigns the areas of specialty to those 
teachers. Third, it is more challenging to make teachers to specialize in some schools. Often, 
teachers transfer across schools within districts. If a specialist teacher leaves from her/his 
current school, it is difficult to fill the vacancy. Instead, when a generalist teacher leaves from 
her/his current school, it is much easier to recruit a generalist teacher. Moreover, principals 
have tended to believe that self-contained classrooms are traditionally superior to 
departmentalized classrooms in helping student learning in elementary grades.  
This chapter is organized in the following fashion. The next section reviews the 
literature on whether teacher value added are related to teaching effectiveness and the use of 
value added when making personnel decisions in schools. In Section 3, I introduce my 
research questions. Section 4 presents the data used to answer my research questions. 
Section 5 illustrates my method and analytical samples. Section 6 displays my findings. 
Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.   
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Literature Review  
 A large literature has focused on developing teacher effectiveness measures based on 
student test scores using value-added methods (Aaronson, et al., 2007; Hanushek and Rivkin, 
2010; Nye et al., 2004). As an increasing number of states, districts, and schools that adopt 
value-added models for education purposes, the use of teacher value-added measures 
becomes more important. Prior research has suggested that teacher value-added data are 
used in many areas of education (Gallagher, 2009). Principals rely on these data to make 
decisions about professional development and employee hiring/placement for teachers 
(Tennessee State Board of Education, 2011; Tennessee Department of Education, 2007). 
Teachers use these data to evaluate instructional strategies (Hershberg, 2004). Policy makers 
use these data to make guidelines for principals to identify effective teachers and for teachers 
to improve instruction (Braun et al., 2010; Sanders and Horn, 1998). Furthermore, many 
researchers have seen teacher value-added estimates as important information not only to 
characterize teaching effectiveness but also to make personnel decisions at school (Chingos 
and West, 2011; Goldhaber and Hansen, 2010a).  
1.  Value-Added Estimates and Teaching Effectiveness 
Student-teacher sorting is common at school.1 Some researchers have argued that 
value-added modeling can produce biased estimates of teachers’ causal effects (Koedel and 
Betts, 2009; Rothstein, 2010 and 2009). At the same time, research has shown that value-
added estimates are positively correlated with teaching effectiveness (Goldhaber and 
Hansen, 2010a; Guarino et al., 2011; Kane and Staiger, 2008).  
1 Some teachers are assigned to more motivated students and to students with more engaged parents 
than other teachers.  
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Kane and Staiger (2008) explore whether teacher value-added estimates predict the 
differences in student achievement. They conduct a two-year experiment where students are 
randomly assigned to teachers. They use the pre-experimental estimates of teacher effects 
estimated under non-random assignment using various standard value-added methods to 
predict student achievement under random assignment. Their results suggest that value-
added models generate the accurate and causal impact of a teacher on student test scores. 
They further suggest that using prior year achievement in the value-added model significantly 
reduce the sorting bias and the best prediction of teacher effects can be achieved through 
further controlling mean classroom characteristics.  
Goldhaber and Hansen (2010a) also demonstrate that teacher value-added estimates 
predict teaching effectiveness later in teacher careers. Their study tests the stability of within-
teacher job performance and uses the past teaching effectiveness to predict the teaching 
effectiveness in the future. Their results suggest that the prior-year estimated effectiveness in 
a subject is a good predictor of future estimated effectiveness in the same subject. They also 
find that if teachers have tended to be more effective in teaching mathematics they could be 
more effective in teaching students in reading later in their careers and vice versa.  
The above studies have estimated teacher effectiveness using various value-added 
models. Researchers are then interested in which model can best predict teaching 
effectiveness for teachers. A simulation study done by Guarino at el. (2011) compares the 
estimated teacher effects across different commonly used value-added models. Their 
findings indicate that the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) model provides relatively 
10 
 
more accurate teacher value-added estimates than other value-added models. As a result, my 
study will use the DOLS model to estimate teacher value-added effects on student growth.2   
2.  Teacher Value Added Correlates with other Measures of Teacher Job Performance 
 Research has shown that there is little association or limited evidence between 
teacher observable characteristics (e.g., education degree, years of teaching experience, the 
quality of teachers’ undergraduate institutions, and certification test scores) and teaching 
effectiveness (Clotfelter et al., 2006; Hanushek, 1986 & 1997, Harris and Sass, 2006; 
Rockoff, 2004; Wayne and Youngs, 2003). More importantly, those studies conclude that 
teacher characteristics are not correlated with teacher value added.  
At the same time, some researchers compare principal evaluations and teacher value 
added. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) find that principals’ subjective assessments are good at 
identifying more and less effective teachers at the top and bottom (i.e., 10 through 20 
percent) of teacher value-added distribution, but their assessments are less likely to 
distinguish teachers in the middle of that distribution. Harris and Sass (2009) examine 
whether the past subjective ratings from principals predict teacher value added. They find 
that principals’ ratings are positively correlated with teacher value added.  
Harris and Sass also explore whether teacher personalities, subject matter knowledge, 
and teaching skill are associated with principals’ ratings and teacher value added. Previous 
2 This study does not use teacher effects estimated in Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System 
(TVAAS). Teachers were not mandatory to participate in the TVAAS evaluation system until the 
2008-09 school year and the estimates of teacher value added were available for TVAAS teacher 
participants. If TVAAS participation was associated with whether teaching effectiveness was used to 
make teacher assignments in schools, excluding non-TVAAS teacher participants will overestimate 
the relationship between value added and teacher assignments in this chapter. Appendix A presents 
the average percent students linked to TVAAS teachers over the total number of students with test 
scores by grade and subject over seven schools years 2004-05 through 2010-2011. In order to retain 
all teacher and student data in Tennessee in the school years used for this study, I use the student-
teacher-course records to link students to their teachers in a subject.  
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studies have not considered this set of teacher characteristics. In Harris and Sass (2009), they 
find that those characteristics determine teacher productivity measured by both subjective 
ratings and teacher value added. Overall, if those measures and principals’ ratings have been 
used to make teacher assignments, my study is to test a broader hypothesis whether teaching 
effectiveness determines subject specialization.   
3.  Using Teacher Value-Added Estimates in Making Personnel Decisions at School  
There are number of potential areas where teacher value added can be used (i.e., 
promoting equity in effective teachers across schools, evaluating training programs for 
beginning teachers, determining the effectiveness of teacher instruction, and making 
employment decisions). However, much of the research on using teacher value-added data in 
education has not looked at making personnel decisions at school, with the exception of two 
studies, Goldhaber and Hansen (2010a) and Chingos and West (2011).  
The first study explores the potential of using teacher value-added estimates for 
making tenure decisions using student and teacher data from North Carolina. It finds that 
the teacher effect estimates are reasonably stable within teachers over time and then suggests 
teacher value-added estimates can be used to determine teacher tenure.  
The second study has analyzed the impact of teaching effectiveness on job 
transitions for teachers from high-stakes classroom positions (i.e., reading or math in grades 
3 through 10 or science in grades 5, 8, or 11) to other jobs (i.e., administrative positions, low-
stakes classroom positions, and non-teaching positions). These authors show that promotion 
and job reassignments are associated with teacher value-added estimates using student and 
teacher data in Florida. Besides these two studies, little research has focused on whether 
teacher value added has been used to make decisions about subject specialization.   
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Research Questions  
Research has identified there is a mixed structure of the organization of schooling in 
elementary schools. Some teachers specialize fully or partially in some core subjects and 
other teachers teach self-contained classrooms. My study explores specialization by teachers 
over their career paths in teaching. Particularly, this study aims to determine how subject 
specialization varies with teaching effectiveness in elementary grades.  
I use value added to measure teaching effectiveness. However, the hypothesis I test 
is broader than the hypothesis that teaching assignments respond to measured value added. 
It is possible that value added is correlated with other measures (e.g., principals’ subjective 
ratings, teachers’ subject knowledge, teaching skill, and intelligence) that also reflect teaching 
effectiveness (Harris and Sass, 2009; Jacob and Lefgren, 2008). Those measures probably 
have been used to determine teacher assignments. This study answers one research question 
below:  
Do teachers specialize in a subject if they are relatively more effective in teaching 
that subject in upper elementary grades 4 through 6?   
 
This study measures subject specialization for teachers using the percent of students 
taught in a subject by individual teachers. In upper elementary grades, various combinations 
of four core academic subjects assigned to teachers result in a spectrum of teacher 
assignments in elementary schools. At the one end of the spectrum are teachers who teach 
four core subjects to the same class of students and at the other are teachers who teach one 
subject to different classes of students. Many teachers in between the two extremes teach 
two or three core subjects in one class and/or different classes of students. The higher the 
percent of students taught in a subject by a teacher, the more that teacher concentrates on 
teaching that subject. Depending on the percent of students taught in each subject, 
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individual teachers are considered as being fully or partially specialized in teaching the 
concentrated subject(s) comparing with their counterparts who have taught the same class of 
students in all subjects.  
To measure teaching effectiveness, this study estimates teacher value added in a 
subject over a fixed rolling window of years at each of six geographical locations defined by 
region and urbanicity. All districts in Tennessee are grouped based on three region indicators 
(i.e., west, middle, and east) and three urbanicity indicators (i.e., city, suburb and town, and 
rural). Two purposes of performing DOLS models at each location separately include: (1) 
each location provides a large enough sample to estimate teaching effectiveness since there 
are many small districts in Tennessee; and (2) schools and districts within the same 
geographical location are likely to share many commonalities with each other (e.g., local 
school policies and supports, diverse student bodies and socioeconomic status, and teacher 
recruitment and retention). The list of districts in each geographic location is provided in 
Appendix B.   
My DOLS model for teachers in a subject over a fixed number of years is expressed 
as follows:  
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝜋𝜋 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                                (1) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 are the standardized test scores for student i in a subject in years t and t 
– 1, respectively; 3 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 is the indicator of teacher k for student i within a fixed number of 
years; 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a set of time-invariant and time-variant characteristics of student i in year t; 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is 
a set of time-invariant and time-variant characteristics of student peers in year t; 𝜋𝜋 is a matrix 
of grade and year effects; and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a random error. The error terms are not correlated over 
3 For details about the test scores used in this study, see the data section below.  
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time. While certain teachers have taught a subject in multiple grades, my DOLS model 
estimates teacher value-added effects across grades 4 through 8 taught by individual 
teachers.4  
In addition to learn teaching effectiveness, this study further estimates teacher 
absolute advantage in teaching a subject. The absolute advantage measure informs teacher 
relative effectiveness within a group of teachers. This study is interested in whether some 
teachers are relatively more effective than other teachers in teaching a subject and whether 
the more effective teachers specialize fully and partially in that subject. I compare teaching 
effectiveness among teachers at the same school because this study only considers 
specialization within schools. Often, teacher assignments are locally made decisions. 
Teaching effectiveness for the teachers from one school does not matter to the assignment 
decisions for the teachers from another school.  
Teacher absolute advantage in teaching a subject is equal to the differences between 
a teacher’s effectiveness measure and the average of all teachers’ effectiveness measure in 
that subject at a given school. The teacher’s absolute advantage measure is expressed as 
follows:  
𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
𝑠𝑠 = 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 − 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 ,                                                                                                  (2) 
where A represents an effectiveness measure, k is a teacher, s is a subject, and n is a set of 
teachers who taught subject s in a school; 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠  is an effectiveness measure in subject s for 
teacher k in year t; 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠  is an average of effectiveness measures in subject s among all teachers 
n in year t.  
4 This study uses all students who have attended a teacher’s classroom for at least 150 calendar days 
and who have valid test scores, and all teachers with more than five such students in grades 4 
through 8 to estimate teacher value added. The calendar days do not include weekends, holidays, and 
enrollment gaps for individual students. For detailed about the student and peer-level variables used 
in DOLS, see the data section below.  
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 The effectiveness measure (𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 ) in subject s for teacher k in year t refers to teachers’ 
history of value added.5 This measure is an average of teacher DOLS effects in a subject 
over multiple years. As Ballou (2005) states, it is possible that a substantial improvement in 
precision in a subject can occur if one averages multiple years of teacher effects estimates. 
This study then uses a three-year average of past teacher DOLS effects to compute teachers’ 
history of value added.6 The number of years of teacher value-added effects used to calculate 
a teacher’s history of value added depends on the availability of data used to estimate 
teaching effectiveness.  
Data 
This study uses school, teacher, and student data from Tennessee’s public elementary 
schools. These data include student test scores from the Tennessee Comprehensive 
Assessment Program (TCAP) in school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012; teacher and 
administrator personnel information from the Personnel Information Reporting System 
(PIRS) from the 2004-05 school year through 2011-2012; and the report card results on the 
NCLB accountability status for Tennessee’s public elementary schools from the Tennessee 
State Library and Archives (TSLA) in school years 2008-09 through 2010-2011. I also receive 
course file records that contain information about teacher-student links in school years 2003-
04 through 2011-2012.  
1.  Variables Available from Different Data Sources 
The TCAP file contains the student background information and student test scores. 
The TCAP achievement tests are administered to all students in grades 3 through 8 each 
5 The details on the estimation of 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠  is addressed in Section 4.3.  
6 Not all teachers have value added in a subject in three years prior to their current school year. Some 
teachers have two years and other teachers have one year of value-added data. The average of past 
teacher effects uses the data available to individual teachers in three school years prior to their 
current school year.  
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spring in Tennessee. The tests measure student achievement in four content areas, 
mathematics, English/language arts, science, and social studies. This study uses the scale 
scores derived from the norm-referenced component of the TCAP. I standardize the scale 
scores within grade and year in a subject to set all test scores to a common scale with a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
The TCAP data also contain information on demographic and program 
characteristics of each student, including sex, race/ethnicity, English language learner, 
free/reduced-price lunch eligibility, special education status, gifted status, and migrant status. 
This study further aggregates those student-level variables to build a set of the school-level 
variables (i.e., student peers). Both student and peer-level variables are used in the DOLS 
model to isolate the teacher value-added effects on student test performance.  
The teacher and administrator personnel data include all certified employees in 
Tennessee’s public K-8 schools, their education levels, and years of teaching experience in 
the teaching profession (i.e., at all schools). I create a set of variables using the longitudinal 
teacher data file: (1) years of teaching experience at the current schools; and (2) a set of 
mobility variables that indicate teacher stayers and movers.7 The movers include transfer 
teachers who were new to the current schools and the returned teachers who had left from 
the current schools for some years. Teacher transfers and returners are mutually exclusive. 
The movers also include teachers who temporarily left the teaching profession. Those 
temporary leavers taught in a school in a current school year, but they have been not 
observed in my data in a year or two prior to the current school year.     
7 Since the teacher data are restricted to one and only one state and in nine school years, it is not 
known whether veteran teachers transferred from a school in another state and whether those 
teachers have taught in their current schools prior to the 2003-04 school year in Tennessee.  
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This study links teachers to their students using longitudinal student-course records 
prepared by the Tennessee Consortium on Research, Evaluation, and Development 
(TNCRED). Those files contain teacher, student, and course information. These data are 
collected annually for every course offered in Tennessee’s public elementary schools and 
every certified teacher who was assigned to a class. The raw data are maintained by TDOE 
and, by far, are the most important piece of student-teacher records to link students to 
courses, to link courses to teachers, and eventually to link students to their teachers in 
Tennessee.  
Finally, the school NCLB accountability data come from TSLA. Under the federal 
NCLB Act, all public schools should be held accountable for how much improvement their 
students at select grades in mathematics and English/language arts have made over each 
year. If the minimum requirements are not made, schools are placed in one of the sanction 
categories based on their accountability history. A school in “good standing” is not subject 
to NCLB sanctions. A “target” school receives no penalties, but this school has not made 
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for at least one target goal for one school year. The NCLB 
sanctions include “school improvement”, “corrective action/restructuring”, and “state/LEA 
reconstitution” in which schools are under pressure to boost academic achievement.  
2. Teacher Assignments in Tennessee’s Public Elementary Schools 
Teacher assignments in elementary schools play an important role in my study. It is 
necessary to discuss teacher assignments in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in 
Tennessee’s public elementary schools to show why my proposed question is answerable 
given the Tennessee’s student and teacher data.  
Teachers teach a number of subjects in elementary schools, four core academic 
subjects and other non-core academic subjects that include computer technology, 
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health/safety, Art (major/minor), and physical education (PE). Often, the non-core 
academic subjects are fully specialized (i.e., one music teacher or one PE teacher) in some 
schools. If not, it is also possible that every teacher is responsible to teach non-academic 
subjects to their own classes in other schools.   
This study excludes students in non-core academic subjects when estimating the 
degree of specialization for individual teachers. This is perhaps not surprising since there are 
no value-added estimates for teachers who taught non-academic subjects. In Tennessee, no 
standardized tests were administrated for non-core academic subjects and some of them 
have never been tested to learn teacher job performance in schools. Decisions on assigning 
teachers to teach core academic subjects over non-core academic subjects (or vice versa) are 
perhaps not determined by teaching effectiveness. Furthermore, the focus of this study is to 
explore changes of assignments within four core academic subjects over time given teaching 
effectiveness in those subjects.  
The specialization measures then range from 0 to 100 percent. If a teacher 
completely specializes and teaches mathematics only, the degree of specialization measure is 
equal to 100 percent; if this teacher has half her/his students in mathematics and half in 
other subjects, this measure is equal to 50 percent; if this teacher taught in a self-contained 
classroom (i.e., with equal numbers of students in all four core subjects), this measure is 
equal to 25 percent; and if this teacher did not teach mathematics but taught other subjects, 
this measure is equal to zero.   
To answer my research question, this study relies on three important facts about 
teacher assignments. First, there are a variety of different assignments that determines who 
will teach and what subject(s) those teachers will teach across teachers. Second, lots of those 
teachers have taken different assignments from one year to the next. Third, while teachers 
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are taking different assignments over time, they tend to have taught fewer subjects and more 
students in those subjects during the course of their teaching career.  
Table 1 presents the number of teachers who taught in three school years 2009-2010 
through 2011-2012 by job assignments in grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee’s public 
elementary schools.8 Those teachers taught one and only one grade. Job assignments are 
described by a set of single-subject (4) and multiple subject (11) schemes. In the 2011-2012 
school year for teachers in grade 4, 90 percent (2,509) taught all four core subjects, 1.6 
percent (45) taught three subjects, 4.1 percent (115) taught two subjects, and 4.7 percent 
(132) taught only one subject. The number of teachers who teach four subjects decreased 
dramatically from grades 4 (90 percent) through 6 (18 percent). Conversely, roughly 63 
percent of teachers in grade 6 taught one subject compared to the 4.7 percent of teachers in 
grade 4. The number of teachers who taught two/three subjects also increases in grades 5 
and 6. In the 2011-2012 school year, there were 16 (or 19) percent of teachers in grade 5 (or 
6) teaching two or three subjects.  
8 In this study, MTH represents mathematics; ELA represents English/language arts; SCI represents 
science; and SOC represents social studies.  
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Table 1
School year
Grade level 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 5 6
Single-subject schemes
SOC 3 28 274 5 25 317 8 28 342
SCI 5 29 292 7 28 318 8 28 338
ELA 66 134 703 70 164 817 79 166 742
MTH 15 43 361 21 65 444 37 91 490
Multiple-subject schemes
SCI-SOC 8 22 79 13 33 106 22 62 137
ELA-SOC 15 94 195 25 122 185 32 129 156
ELA-SCI 12 35 92 10 44 105 13 36 76
ELA-SCI-SOC 15 28 23 22 28 10 11 18 15
MTH-SOC 5 13 45 3 11 51 6 28 44
MTH-SCI 7 19 55 9 49 59 14 68 69
MTH-SCI-SOC 6 89 45 7 77 35 7 20 7
MTH-ELA 24 39 113 23 50 106 28 41 68
MTH-ELA-SOC 18 27 21 22 23 12 10 19 4
MTH-ELA-SCI 24 19 9 18 24 11 17 17 8
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 2,594 2,075 715 2,765 2,169 613 2,509 1,934 546
Total number of teachers 2,817 2,694 3,022 3,020 2,912 3,189 2,801 2,685 3,042
Notes: Sample includes all teachers who have lagged value-added estimates over a four-year span prior to their current school year, 
who have taught in grades 4 through 6 in three school years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012 at Tennessee's public elementary schools, 
and who have taught more than five students in at least one subject in their current school year. Sample excludes teachers who 
taught in multiple grades. Each of the six students attended their teacher's class in a subject for at least 150 calendar days. The 
calendar days do not include weekends, holidays, and enrollment gaps for individual students. 
Number of elementary school teachers by grade and subject scheme in school years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012
2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
Percent of teachers who taught 
four subjects
92.08% 77.02% 23.66% 91.56% 74.48% 19.22% 89.58% 72.03% 17.95%
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The number of teachers who taught in multiple grades in three school years is 
presented in Appendix C. This table presents various subject schemes assigned to individual 
teachers in a given grade. In the 2011-2012 school year, there were 5.7 percent of teachers 
(511) who taught in two or three grades. About 302 (41 percent) out of those 511 teachers 
taught the same subject schemes across grades. At the same time, there were 209 teachers 
who taught different subject schemes across grades. For example, a teacher taught social 
studies in grade 6 and English/language arts in grades 5 and 6.9 
Secondly, a great number of teachers are assigned to different assignments from one 
year to the next. I first focus on whether teachers have taught the same subject(s) in the 
same grade in the same school in two adjacent years. Using teachers in grade 4 in the 2010-
2011 and 2011-2012 school years, I find there are 8.3 percent of teachers (177) assigned to 
different assignments in two school years based on the subject schemes they taught.10 
Although 91 percent of those teachers are assigned to teach the same number of subjects in 
the same grade at the same school in two school years, it is possible that they may not be 
assigned to the same percent of students in each subject within a subject scheme taught from 
one year to the next.   
For those teachers, I then identify the changes on assignments as the difference of 
the percent of students taught at the same subject in the same grade for individual teachers 
9 There are several possible reasons not to use the grade-specific specialization assignment measures. 
It is no such thing that teachers should only teach one grade. Often, teachers have taught one grade 
in one year and a different grade in another year. For example, teachers follow their students in 
grades 4 through 6 over three years. It is reasonable to believe that teachers are effective in teaching a 
subject in one grade and can also be effective in other grades especially in elementary schools. 
Furthermore, instead of estimating a grade-specific value-added effect for teachers, the effectiveness 
measures used in this study have also taken into consideration the possible differences in 
performance across grades for teachers who have taught the same subject in different grades. 
10 For details on subjects taught by a teacher in two adjacent years in the same grade at the same 
school, see Appendix D. These tables present the number of teachers by teacher assignment (i.e., 
subject schemes). For example, there are 82 teachers who taught English/language arts in the 2010-
2011 school year and 12 of those taught four academic subjects in the 2011-2012 school year.  
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in two adjacent years. Among the teachers who have taught the same subject in the same 
grade in two years (e.g., 91 percent of teachers in grade 4 in the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 
school years), I show how many of them have taught the same percent of students in two 
years and how many of them have taught a larger or smaller percent of students in year t+1 
compared with the ones taught in year t. Figure 1 presents the distribution of changes in the 
percent of students taught at the same subject at the same school by individual teachers in 
two school years 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. On average, there are about 46 percent of 
teachers who taught a different percent of students in two adjacent years in a given subject. 
In short, many teachers are normally assigned to different jobs and the percent of students 
taught in a subject also may be changed from one year to the next.  
Figure 1 
Changes in the percent of students taught in grade 4 in two adjacent school years 2010-2011 
and 2011-2012 by subject  
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Notes: Sample includes teachers who taught the same subjects in two school years 2010-
2011 and 2011-2012 and who taught in grade 4 in Tennessee’s public elementary schools. 
Students attended their teacher's class in a subject for at least 150 calendar days. The 
calendar days do not include weekends, holidays, and enrollment gaps for individual 
students.     
 
Lastly, I consider whether teachers tend to specialize in some subjects as they 
progress in their career. One can measure whether teachers concentrate on fewer subjects 
using the Herfindahl index. In business, the Herfindahl index is a measure that describes 
competition or monopoly conditions within an industry among a set of firms (Bailey and 
Boyle, 1971). My Herfindahl index measures the sum of the proportion of student share in 
each of four subjects taught by a teacher in a school year. The formula is expressed as 
follows 
𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠2𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠=1  ,                                                                                                  (3) 
where 𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the student share of teacher k in year t; 𝑆𝑆 is the total number of subjects taught 
by teacher k in year t; and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠2 is a square of the percent of students in subject s. For 
example, if a teacher has taught four core subjects and the same number of students in each 
subject, that teacher’s Herfindahl index is .25; if a teacher has only taught one subject, that 
teacher’s Herfindahl index is one. Figure 2 presents Herfindahl index for teachers who 
taught in grades 5 and 6 in Tennessee’s public elementary schools.  
To examine whether teachers specialize more over time, I estimate whether years of 
teaching experience are positively associated with teachers’ Herfindahl indexes. If an upward 
trend of the Herfindahl index predominates among teachers, teachers specialize more over 
time. In regression analyses, teachers’ Herfindahl indexes regress on dummy variables for 
years of teaching experience (i.e., how long she or he has been a teacher), education levels, 
grades, and school years. Teachers are assigned to each of the following experience 
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categories, 0 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 20, and 21 or more.11 The omitted category for 
experience dummy variables is the teachers in the 0 to 5 category. The models then control 
for teacher fixed effects. This rules out confounding effects from teaching effectiveness that 
influences specialization and correlates with teaching experience over time. The models 
further control for interaction terms between dummy variables for years of teaching 
experience and grades.12 I consider the potential variation of the impact of teaching 
experience on subject specialization across grades since teacher assignments in grade 6 are 
dramatically different from the ones in grades 4 and 5. The grade dummy variables indicate 
where teachers taught in a subject. I include grade dummy variables in my model because, as 
the grade level goes up in grades 4 through 6, it is known that teachers are more likely to 
specialize fully or partially in one subject or some subjects.  
Using teachers’ assignment data in nine school years 2003-2004 through 2011-2012, I 
show that teachers tend to specialize as they stay longer in teaching. Appendix E presents 
marginal effects of teaching experience on specialization. Model (2) controls for the 
interaction terms but not in Model (1). The lower panel also controls for teacher fixed 
effects. Both OLS and SCH-FE models report quantitatively similar findings and the results 
from the fixed-effect models are slightly smaller. The coefficient estimates on experience 
11 I also run regressions using a continuous variable measuring the total number of years of teaching 
experience and a set of dummy variables for each year of teaching experience. All results suggest a 
positive relationship between teachers’ Herfindahl indexes and teaching experience. There is no 
previous research that suggests additional teaching experience significantly changes the share of a 
teacher’s students separately in each subject after a number of years of teaching experience. Based on 
the results using dummy variables for each year of teaching experience (the beginning teacher is the 
omitted category), teachers with 16 or more years of teaching experience have specialized more than 
the beginning teachers. I then use a set of five-year periods over 20 years to define dummy variables 
for years of teaching experience as well as a dummy variable for teachers who have taught 21 years or 
more.  
12 I provide F-test statistics to estimate the joint significance of those interaction effects. The test 
results show that the effects of teaching experience on specialization are not different across grades 
at p < 0.05.   
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dummy variables are positive and statistically significant at p < .05. Those results suggest 
that teachers tend to specialize in teaching some subjects as they stay longer in teaching in 
elementary schools.  
 
Figure 2 
Histogram of teachers’ Herfindahl index by grade in the 2011-2012 school year 
 
Notes: Sample includes teachers in grades 5 and 6 who have lagged value-added estimates 
over four years prior to the 2011-2012 school year. Students attended their teacher’s class in 
a subject for at least 150 calendar days. The calendar days do not include weekends, holidays, 
and enrollment gaps for individual students.  
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available for this study. The more school years used to estimate teacher DOLS effects, the 
fewer school years available for this chapter to estimate teachers’ history of value added. The 
more school years used to estimate teachers’ history of value added, the fewer school years 
available for this chapter to answer the research question. The current design presented 
below is to ensure there are three school years for my analysis.13  
This study estimates teacher fixed effects in a subject over a four-year window using 
the DOLS model. Given a total of nine-year student achievement data, this study uses six 
rolling four-year spans to estimate fixed effects for teachers who taught in grades 4 through 
8 separately in each of four subjects.14 Teacher DOLS fixed effects are reported in school 
years 2006-07 through 2011-2012. I then compute a weighted average of teacher effects over 
three school years. These estimates refer to teachers’ history of value added (𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 ). The 
weights are the proportion of students taught by a teacher in a school year in a subject. 
Those weighted teacher effects are then used to estimate teachers’ absolute advantages (𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 ) 
relative to other teachers of the same subject at a given school in a school year. This study 
then uses the lagged absolute advantage measure to predict subject specialization for 
teachers in the current school years from 2009-2010 through 2011-2012.  
Empirical Methodology  
1.  Analytical Model of Subject Specialization for Teachers 
My estimation strategy intends to estimate whether a teacher has taught more 
students in a subject where that teacher is relatively more effective compared to other 
13 Two school years are considered to be too short to analyze my research question. If this study uses 
four years, the data panel has to reduce one year to estimate either teacher DOLS effects or teachers’ 
history of value added. Both estimates are also required to be not too short. A three-year analysis for 
my research question gives enough school years used to estimate teacher effectiveness measures.  
14 The test data in the first school year 2003-04 are served as the lagged test scores for students in 
grades 4 through 8 in the 2004-05 school year.  
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teachers who taught the same subject at the same school. This study uses an Ordinary Least 
Square model where teacher assignments in a subject in a grade in year t + 1 depend on 
teacher absolute advantages in teaching each subject in year t, a set of dummy variables for 
the number of years taught in each subject prior to the year t + 1, dummy variables for year 
effects, and school fixed effects.  
The equation for the analysis of mathematics assignments in one grade is presented 
below:  
 TA𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘+1𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘ℎ = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘ℎ + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑊𝑊𝑘𝑘 (𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘−1,𝑘𝑘−2,𝑘𝑘−3)S  +𝛽𝛽6𝜋𝜋 + 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 + 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘ℎ,                (4) 
where TA𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘+1𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘ℎ  is the percent of students taught in mathematics by teacher k in year t + 1; 
the explanatory variables include a set of absolute advantages in teaching mathematics 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘ℎ, 
English/language arts 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, science 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, and social studies 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 for teacher k in year t; a 
matrix 𝑊𝑊 of dummy variables for the number of years taught separately in each subject 𝑆𝑆 ∈(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) over a four year-window prior to the current school year t + 1; and 
a matrix 𝜋𝜋 of year effects; fixed effects 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 for school m; and a random error term 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘ℎ. I 
run the same regression separately in each grade since Table 1 has shown that teacher 
assignments in one grade are very different from the ones in another grade. The coefficient 
estimates indicate the grade-specific effects on teacher assignments in a subject and they are 
likely to be significantly different by grade. Furthermore, there are three more models for 
other non-mathematics subjects, respectively.  
This mathematics model controls for absolute advantages in teaching non-
mathematics subjects since it is not certain that teaching effectiveness in other subjects 
influences subject specialization in mathematics. Goldhaber and Hansen (2010a) find that an 
effective mathematics teacher have tended to be effective in teaching English/language arts. 
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Consider a case in which two teachers are equally effective in teaching mathematics; 
however, the first teacher is more effective in teaching English/language arts than the 
second teacher. Controlling the absolute advantage in English/language arts is to test 
whether being effective in English/language arts makes teachers less likely to increase the 
percent of students taught in mathematics.  
This study further controls for dummy variables for the number of school years 
taught separately in each subject over a four-year window prior to the current school year, 
the matrix 𝑊𝑊. Some teachers have not taught a subject for four school years and/or taught a 
subject for fewer than four school years. The absolute advantages in the subjects those 
teachers have not taught for four school years are set to zero. The omitted category of the 
matrix 𝑊𝑊 is the dummy variable for not teaching a subject in any school years over a four-
year span. I test whether the number of school years taught in mathematics makes teachers 
more likely to increase their students in mathematics compared to the ones who have not 
taught mathematics over a four year span; and whether the number of school years taught in 
each of other subjects make teachers less likely to increase their students in mathematics 
compared to the ones who have not taught in each of other subjects over the same year 
span.  
In addition, the matrix 𝜋𝜋 of year effects captures any time-specific factors that may 
have influenced the percent of students taught in mathematics. Those factors may be 
common to all schools. One of those factors is changes on managerial efforts to manage 
teacher assignments under the pressure of school improvement. Others include teachers’ 
own preferences for teaching particular subjects,15 the difficulty to recruit teachers with 
15 In schools, some teachers have received pressure from school leaders to raise student test scores in 
the subject(s) they were not effective in teaching; and they probably have built their own preference 
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teaching effectiveness in mathematics, teacher retention and attrition, and changes on 
student enrollment. The dummy variable for year effects in the 2009-2010 school year is the 
omitted category.  
In the model, school fixed effects capture any differences of teacher assignments that 
vary systematically by school as well as school fixed characteristics. I focus on the within-
school teacher assignments. The school-specific characteristics include school average test 
performance, school size, school locale, school policy on teacher assignments, and 
administrative efforts for school improvement.16 I also estimate similar regressions without 
school fixed effects and these estimates are quantitatively similar to the ones with school 
fixed effects while those estimates are slightly smaller.    
2.  Analytical Sample 
The analytical sample includes teachers who taught core academic subjects in grades 
4 through 6 in school years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012. Those teachers have taught a 
subject to at least six students who have been to their teachers’ classrooms for at least 150 
calendar days. I focus on teachers in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 since it is rare that 
elementary school teachers in grades 1 through 3 become content-specific teachers and there 
are no value-added data for teachers in these grades, either, in Tennessee. New teachers with 
zero year of teaching experience are excluded from this analysis since those teachers again do 
not have teacher effectiveness measures.  
  
in teaching some subjects over other subjects over time. It is possible that they use their own 
influence to affect their own assignments in schools.  
16 Some may argue that those factors are not completely fixed; however, they have been rarely 
changed over time in schools.  
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3.  Teacher and School Moderator Variables  
 In addition to the baseline model presented above, this study is further interested in 
whether some teacher and school characteristics influence the relationship between teachers’ 
history of relatively effectiveness in a subject and the degree of specialization in that subject. 
My mathematics model then controls for a vector 𝑄𝑄 of teacher and school characteristics 
and the interaction terms between 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘ℎ and 𝑄𝑄. The teacher characteristics contain 
education levels (i.e., Bachelors, Masters, and Education Doctoral and above), years of 
teaching experience at all schools, a set of dummy variables for the number of school years 
taught at the current schools, and teacher mobility status. The school characteristics contain 
school size of tested students in a grade and a set of dummy variables for prior school 
NCLB accountability status levels. This set of analysis is also tested for subject specialization 
in other subjects.  
The focus of this set of regressions is on the role of teacher and school 
characteristics to impact the percent of students assigned to individual teachers in a subject. 
Teachers with advanced degrees receive extra training in college which teachers with 
Bachelor’s degree have not experienced. It is possible that the focus of such training is not 
on subject-specific information to enhance a teacher’s productivity, but receiving an 
advanced degree at least signifies a higher human capital for teachers. Such difference in 
education levels leverages the possibility of assigning more students to the teachers with 
advanced degrees than the ones with Bachelor’s degree.   
 The number of years of teaching experience is also associated with the probability of 
becoming specialist teachers in a subject. The more years a teacher has taught in her/his 
career, the more likely that teacher has acquired a specialty in one or some subject areas. It is 
possible that those teachers already have specialized in one of the four subjects for years. In 
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addition, the longer a teacher has taught at the current school, the more information about 
that teacher’s performance in teaching each of the four subjects can be revealed. This study 
then tests whether students are likely to be assigned to the teachers who have identified how 
effectively they have raised student test scores in a subject at the current schools.   
This study also tests whether teacher mobility is associated with the percent of 
students assigned to individual teachers in a subject. One of the important differences 
between teacher stayers and movers is that teaching effectiveness for the former is usually 
available for use to determine teacher assignments, but teaching effectiveness for the latter is 
likely to be uncertain, although it is possible to ask how teacher movers have performed in 
schools where they have taught before. Furthermore, teachers move to a new school because 
they want to become specialist teachers and another possibility is that specialist teachers 
transfer to a new school because they want to become generalist teachers. In addition, some 
teachers do not change their teacher assignments in their new schools because they just want 
to be relocated to some other schools. Since assignments between teacher stayers and 
movers are less likely to be on an equal footing, I test a hypothesis regarding how schools 
operate assignments based on teacher mobility.    
There are more teachers in schools with large student populations compared to small 
schools. It is possible that large schools have more specialist teachers and have more than 
one subjects specialized by those teachers. Another possibility is that there are more students 
with special needs of improvement in a subject in large schools. Usually, no such scale of 
specialization and needs occur in small schools mainly because of teacher mobility and 
school size. In a small school with four or five teachers, the likelihood of assigning most of 
students to one teacher in a subject may be low, but the cost of finding a replacement is 
definitely high if that teacher leaves from his/her current school. Instead, if a generalist 
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teacher leaves from a small school, it is easy to recruit a teacher to teach all subjects or allow 
the rest teachers to take a share of the students who were taught by that teacher mover. This 
study intends to test whether school size increases the probability of assigning more students 
to some teachers in a subject.  
Lastly, the schools placed in the target and/or sanction status levels in a previous 
year have more incentives to manage teacher assignments with the aim to improve student 
test scores. Receiving pressure from school NCLB accountability also leads to more teachers 
to specialize if specialization is the way to boost school performance in mathematics and 
English/language arts.  
In summary, I use mathematics teachers to further illustrate the correlation between 
the degree of specialization and teacher/school characteristics. For two given mathematics 
teachers with the same relative effectiveness at the same school, this study explores whether 
either the teacher with the advanced degree, or the veteran teacher, or the teacher who has 
taught in the teaching profession (or at the current school) for a longer time is more likely to 
specialize in mathematics; and whether transfer/returned teacher is likely to be assigned 
fewer students in mathematics than teacher stayers. For such two mathematics teachers at 
two different schools, this study further considers whether the teacher at the school with 
large enrollment and/or under NCLB accountability pressure to boost school performance 
is likely to be assigned more students in mathematics.  
Results 
1.  Teachers, Absolute Advantages, and Assignments in Tennessee 
In school years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012, there are a total number of 30,654 
teachers who taught in grades 4 through 6 and who have lagged absolute advantage 
measures in teaching some subjects or at least one subject. Among those teachers, a total 
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number of 14,500 teachers have taught for at least four school years prior to their current 
school years and have not transferred to a different school over those years (i.e., teacher 
stayers). Most of those teacher stayers (95.9 percent) taught one grade (i.e., a single-grade 
scheme) in a school year, but a few teachers (4.1 percent and n = 594) were assigned to teach 
multiple grades. Some of the 4.1 percent teachers taught different subjects in different 
grades. Overall, a large proportion of teacher stayers in grades 4 and 5 taught in self-
contained classrooms ranging from 71 to 92 percent across all school years while more than 
86 percent of teacher stayers specialized in teaching one or two subjects in grade 6.   
This study first offers a general and rough understanding about the potential 
influences of prior absolute advantages in teaching each subject separately on teacher 
assignments. I average absolute advantages in teaching a subject based on teachers’ history 
of value added (𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 ) in that subject by assignment scheme in a grade in a current school 
year. By doing so, teachers are grouped within their assignment schemes and the average 
absolute advantages for those teachers are reported separately within each assignment 
scheme. I then examine whether teachers have continued teaching a subject they taught prior 
to a current school year based on their past average absolute advantages in teaching that 
subject and what other subjects they also taught in a current school year.  
These average absolute advantages are reported separately in each of three analytical 
school years and further aggregated over all school years. Table 2 presents the average of 
past average absolute advantages in teaching a subject for all teachers over three school years 
by teachers’ current assignment (i.e., assignment scheme) separately in each grade. The 
average absolute advantages based on 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠  in a subject in a given assignment scheme are 
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averaged over three current school years, 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2011-2012.17 This table 
also reports the total number of teachers over three school years in a given assignment 
scheme. The list of assignment schemes is sorted in an ascending order of the average of 
past average absolute advantages in teaching a subject. The mixed subject-by-grade scheme 
labeled as “Others” includes all teachers who taught in more than one grades.  
This table provides descriptive statistics of absolute advantages in teaching a subject 
by assignment scheme over three analytical school years. Many teachers with higher past 
absolute advantages in teaching a subject not only have continued teaching that subject but 
also taught alternate subjects in all grades. In particular, this table reveals that the specialist 
teachers who taught one and only one subject in all grades in a current school year always 
had higher past average absolute advantages in teaching that subject than self-contained 
classroom teachers who taught all four core academic subjects except the science specialists 
in grade 5. In addition, all complete specialists in a grade have had prior absolute advantages 
in the subject they fully specialized higher than the average absolute advantages of all 
teachers in the same grade except the science specialist in grade 5.  
 
 
 
 
17 The first average is estimated within assignment schemes in a grade in a year; and the second 
average is estimated over three school years. Instead of reporting the average absolute advantages by 
assignment scheme in a current school year, I report the averages of average absolute advantages 
over three school years. The average absolute advantages by assignment scheme are quantitatively 
similar across school years.  
35 
 
                                                            
Table 2
Averages 
absolute 
advantages
Total # 
of 
teachers
Averages 
absolute 
advantages
Total # 
of 
teachers
Averages 
absolute 
advantages
Total # 
of 
teachers
Averages 
absolute 
advantages
Total # 
of 
teachers
H -0.1308 8 H -0.1018 8 H -0.1098 9 S -0.1644 6
SH -0.1079 14 SH -0.0659 20 MH -0.0702 4 ES -0.1124 13
ES -0.0759 15 MH -0.0409 6 ES -0.0467 29 MSH -0.0818 11
S -0.0732 5 ES -0.0370 29 ME -0.0248 20 SH -0.0482 34
MEH -0.0434 31 ESH -0.0107 36 EH -0.0211 19 MEH -0.0225 36
ESH -0.0429 12 MES 0.0018 48 ESH -0.0184 30 ME -0.0142 19
MH -0.0428 11 MESH 0.0035 6,502 MES -0.0140 45 MES -0.0113 20
MES -0.0279 48 MSH 0.0065 8 SH -0.0049 36 EH 0.0035 51
E -0.0275 29 EH 0.0143 58 MESH 0.0008 6,406 MESH 0.0101 6,424
EH -0.0164 27 MEH 0.0184 36 E 0.0013 35 ESH 0.0159 31
ME -0.0053 58 E 0.0266 162 MS 0.0323 21 E 0.0213 37
MESH -0.0030 6,432 S 0.0283 7 MEH 0.0341 15 H 0.0265 13
M 0.0315 50 ME 0.0284 58 S 0.0515 14 M 0.0341 20
MS 0.0464 25 MS 0.0524 15 MSH 0.0731 9 MS 0.0418 11
MSH 0.0810 9 M 0.0635 21 M 0.1010 18 MH 0.1062 11
ESH -0.1038 20 MES -0.0132 46 ME -0.0900 30 ES -0.0514 27
SH -0.0488 41 ESH -0.0105 53 MES -0.0346 43 S -0.0264 22
ES -0.0125 28 SH -0.0005 48 MEH -0.0311 16 ME -0.0145 37
E -0.0092 70 H 0.0007 25 H -0.0252 14 MS -0.0131 65
MSH -0.0052 144 ME 0.0059 95 EH -0.0240 72 M -0.0068 58
S -0.0022 21 MESH 0.0070 5,161 S -0.0221 75 SH -0.0025 83
EH 0.0050 76 S 0.0096 21 MH -0.0125 10 MSH -0.0019 139
MES 0.0058 47 MEH 0.0108 50 ESH -0.0054 47 ESH 0.0113 43
MH 0.0158 39 MSH 0.0128 40 E -0.0049 77 MESH 0.0116 5,087
MESH 0.0211 5,085 EH 0.0174 289 SH 0.0073 79 MEH 0.0153 46
H 0.0253 16 M 0.0181 48 MESH 0.0079 5,069 MH 0.0218 34
ME 0.0311 101 E 0.0200 387 MSH 0.0222 140 E 0.0243 116
MS 0.0348 97 MH 0.0269 17 ES 0.0313 80 EH 0.0248 247
MEH 0.0427 48 ES 0.0344 84 M 0.0461 52 H 0.0328 69
M 0.0548 156 MS 0.0493 33 MS 0.0502 95 MES 0.0443 17
S -0.0376 126 MS -0.0400 34 EH -0.1089 50 ES -0.0363 42
MEH -0.0316 25 MES -0.0324 24 MEH -0.1050 4 SH -0.0248 215
ESH -0.0189 9 S -0.0293 182 ME -0.0650 36 MSH -0.0210 66
E -0.0188 220 SH -0.0276 74 H -0.0307 97 MESH -0.0185 1,048
H -0.0171 102 H -0.0110 199 MESH -0.0157 1,008 MES -0.0135 11
EH -0.0156 51 ME -0.0094 201 SH -0.0117 230 ESH -0.0006 30
SH -0.0010 53 ES -0.0051 199 E -0.0110 227 E 0.0006 316
ME 0.0019 226 ESH -0.0029 36 M 0.0022 198 M 0.0014 216
MS 0.0045 139 MESH -0.0013 1,216 MES 0.0052 20 MH 0.0124 82
MESH 0.0047 1,027 EH -0.0005 398 MH 0.0065 21 EH 0.0146 348
MSH 0.0168 70 M 0.0044 254 ES 0.0135 212 S 0.0166 148
ES 0.0233 33 E 0.0092 2,069 ESH 0.0178 25 H 0.0193 808
M 0.0257 1,181 MEH 0.0190 28 MS 0.0189 133 MEH 0.0241 25
MH 0.0260 100 MH 0.0497 34 MSH 0.0327 66 MS 0.0329 50
MES 0.0398 22 MSH 0.1090 19 S 0.0330 868 ME 0.0943 35
Grade 4 -0.0037 6,774 0.0041 7,014 0.0007 6,710 0.0093 6,737
(0.1973) (0.1521) (0.1821) (0.2069)
Grade 5 0.0201 5,989 0.0086 6,397 0.0075 5,899 0.0112 6,090
(0.1805) (0.1456) (0.1767) (0.2007)
Grade 6 0.0086 3,384 0.0016 4,967 0.0016 3,195 0.0007 3,440
(0.1992) (0.1815) (0.2045) (0.2032)
Mixed grades 0.0051 559 0.0049 830 0.0038 528 -0.0022 536
(0.1798) (0.1642) (0.1672) (0.1974)
All grades 0.0077 16,706 0.0050 19,208 0.0034 16,332 0.0082 16,803
(0.1915) (0.1587) (0.1844) (0.2036)
All schemes taught in all grades
Assignment schemes in grade 4
Assignment schemes in grade 5
Assignment schemes in grade 6
All schemes taught in multiple grades
All schemes taught in a grade
Notes: Assignment schemes are notified using four upper letters and each letter represents a subject taught by individual teachers in a current 
school year, mathematics (M), English/language arts (E), science (S), and social studies (H). Sample includes teachers who have had prior absolute 
advantages separately in each subject and who taught in school years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012. Absolute advantages are averaged over three 
school years in a scheme in a grade and assignment schemes are sorted in an ascending order of average absolute advantages separately in each 
subject in a grade. In the bottom of this table, absolute advantages are further averaged over all schemes in a grade (and across all grades). The 
scheme for self-contained classrooms is highlighted as gray. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Science (S)English/language arts (E)Mathematics (M) Social studies (H)
Descriptive statistics of average absolute advantages separately in each subject over three school years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012 based on 
teachers' history of value added by assignment scheme
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A second finding in Table 2 is that some teachers with high past absolute advantages 
in teaching a subject they did not continue to teach that subject. I then ask how many 
teachers who have been “good enough” at teaching one subject over time did not teach that 
subject in their current school years. To define “good enough”, I focus on the teachers with 
positive average absolute advantages in teaching a subject within assignment schemes that 
are also higher than the average absolute advantages across all assignment schemes. I use 
teachers who taught English/language arts in grade 5 as an example because their average 
absolute advantage is the highest among all other subjects separately in each grade. There are 
12 schemes of teachers with positive average absolute advantages. Teachers in the first five 
assignment schemes have their average absolute advantages lower than the average over all 
assignment schemes (i.e., 0.0126); therefore, teachers in the other seven groups are labeled as 
“good enough” at teaching English/language arts. Teachers in four out of seven schemes, 
however, have not continued to teach English/language arts over three analytical school 
years. They all taught mathematics and 48 (35 percent) of them fully specialized in teaching 
mathematics. One possible explanation for this specific fact is that those teachers are good at 
teaching English/language arts and also good at teaching mathematics in schools where 
mathematics is one of the hard-to-staff subjects in schools.   
2.  Specialization and Teaching Effectiveness 
Table 3 presents the marginal effect of teacher absolute advantages in a subject on 
the percent of students taught in that subject separately in each grade. A positive and 
statistically significant marginal effect indicates more students in a subject would be assigned 
to the teachers with an increases in absolute advantages in teaching the same subject. 
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Regressions in Table 3 control for school fixed effects. Those results are quantitatively 
similar but slightly larger to the ones without school fixed effects.18  
Separately in each grade, I find that the relatively more effective teachers in 
mathematics and science specialize more in teaching those subjects, respectively. Instead, the 
positive and statistically significant effects are only found in grade 5 for teachers who teach 
English/language arts (6.60 percent at p < 0.05) and in grade 4 for teachers who teach social 
studies (1.23 percent at p < 0.05).  
These findings suggest that teachers have been assigned to teach more students in 
the subjects where they are relatively effective, but the effects vary dramatically across grades 
within and across subjects. In grade 4, a mathematics teacher with one standard deviation 
increase in absolute advantage raises the percent of students taught in mathematics by 3.1 
percent (i.e., less than one student if the average class size is 25) at p < 0.01; instead, this 
effect increases to 11.03 percent in grade 5 (i.e., more than two students) at p < 0.001 and 
15.47 percent in grade 6 (i.e., more than three students) at p < 0.001. Similar results are also 
found for science teachers, but the effects are somewhat smaller in grade 5 (7.18 percent) 
and 6 (14.64 percent) compared to the ones for mathematics teachers.  
 
 
 
 
18 For results without school fixed effects, see Appendix F.   
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Table 3
Outcomes
Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social studies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 4
3.102** -0.981 -1.628† -0.493
(1.141) (1.386) (0.981) (0.864)
-1.433 2.981 -1.046 -0.502
(1.295) (1.979) (1.080) (1.033)
0.622 -1.725 2.973* -1.870†
(1.157) (1.624) (1.173) (1.052)
0.093 0.476 -1.684** 1.115†
(0.703) (0.859) (0.629) (0.591)
Observations 8,471 8,471 8,471 8,471
R-squared 0.336 0.416 0.331 0.316
Grade 5
11.023*** -4.736* -5.581*** -0.705
(1.988) (1.967) (1.580) (1.552)
-4.574* 6.869* -1.217 -1.077
(1.955) (2.764) (2.126) (2.097)
-2.055 -5.026* 7.176*** -0.095
(1.983) (2.320) (1.984) (1.867)
-0.642 2.633 -2.129† 0.138
(1.203) (1.675) (1.103) (1.276)
Observations 8,952 8,952 8,952 8,952
R-squared 0.387 0.437 0.391 0.317
Grade 6
15.479*** -3.164 -7.687** -4.629*
(3.776) (3.321) (2.360) (2.255)
1.181 5.770 -6.207** -0.743
(2.078) (3.620) (2.140) (1.865)
-7.321* -8.348* 14.499*** 1.170
(2.889) (3.355) (3.788) (2.332)
1.124 -2.069 0.214 0.731
(2.437) (2.727) (2.533) (3.128)
Observations 9,955 9,955 9,955 9,955
R-squared 0.529 0.502 0.520 0.468
Percent of students taught in the school year (t )
Marginal effects of teachers' absolute advantages on teacher assignments separately in each grade in three school 
years
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Models control for school 
fixed effects and dummy variables for the number of years taught separately in each subject and school year. 
Samples include teachers who are assigned to teach at least one subject to six and more students who have been 
to their teachers' classrooms for at least 150 calendar days in their current school years. Samples exclude four 
teachers from schools that were subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" under the NCLB accountability system 
(two teachers from the 2009-2010 school year and the other two from the 2010-2011 school year).  
English/
language arts
Marginal effects of absolute 
advantages in school year t  - 1
Mathematics
English/
language arts
Science
Social studies
Mathematics
Social studies
Science
English/language arts
Mathematics
Science
Social studies
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These models also control for absolute advantages in teaching alternate subjects. 
Table 3 shows that all of the statistically significant cross-subject effects are negative. The 
absolute advantage in teaching mathematics is negatively associated with the percent of 
students taught in all alternate subjects, ranging from 4.74 percent in English/language arts 
in grade 5 (p < 0.05) to 7.69 percent in science in grade 6 (p < 0.01). The absolute advantage 
in teaching English/language arts is negatively associated with the percent of student taught 
in mathematics in grade 5 (4.57 percent at p < 0.05) and science in grade 6 (6.21 percent at p 
< 0.01). The absolute advantage in teaching science is negatively associated with the percent 
of students taught in mathematics in grade 6 (7.32 percent at p < 0.05) and English/language 
arts in grades 5 and 6 (5.03 and 8.35 percent, respectively). In addition, the percent of 
students taught in science is also negatively influenced by absolute advantages in teaching 
social studies in grade 4 and 5 (1.68 and 2.13 percent, respectively). These results suggest that 
the stronger cross-subject effects, the fewer percent of students in the subject where teachers 
are relatively more effective in teaching. In particular, being effective in mathematics makes 
teachers less likely to increase the students in all other subjects in different grades.  
This study further considers the potential effects of teacher and school 
characteristics on the percent of students taught in a subject. Table 4 displays the descriptive 
statistics on a set of teacher and school characteristics for teachers by grade and year. My 
analytical sample of teachers in grades 4 through 6 separately in each year contains a 43 to 46 
percent of teachers with Bachelors, a 47 to 49 percent of teachers with Masters, and a 5 to 8 
percent of teachers with education doctoral and above. On average, those teachers have had 
11 to 12 years of teaching experience in all schools.  
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics on teacher and school characteristics by grade and school years in Tennessee's public elementary schools
2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
Education degree
Bachelors 1,237 1,281 1,331 1,259 1,377 1,353 1,374 1,503 1,507
Masters 1,310 1,360 1,380 1,323 1,417 1,480 1,564 1,626 1,608
Education doctoral and above 147 177 207 212 226 251 223 243 269
11.86 11.58 10.90 11.43 11.14 10.93 11.60 11.52 11.26
(10.08) (9.76) (9.34) (9.58) (9.41) (9.04) (9.79) (9.71) (9.41)
Zero and one year 737 791 902 741 810 908 936 1,104 1,132
Two years 415 412 444 424 428 375 502 399 424
Three years 433 325 315 447 346 370 472 412 317
Four and more years 1,110 1,291 1,296 1,187 1,437 1,479 1,251 1,457 1,549
Mobility status
Teacher stayers 2,403 2,423 2,549 2,453 2,566 2,725 2,877 2,983 3,140
Teacher movers 292 396 408 346 455 407 413 492 382
Teacher transfers 115 159 178 141 202 193 183 228 188
Returned teachers 5 9 14 8 7 13 9 7 8
Temporary leavers 172 228 216 197 246 201 221 257 186
83 82 83 93 93 94 167 168 171
(43) (42) (42) (58) (56) (57) (106) (107) (112)
Good standing 2,349 2,377 2,475 2,399 2,437 2,477 2,550 2,484 2,082
Target 256 269 233 255 328 309 278 545 730
Under sanctions 29 97 177 87 146 243 227 197 479
Grade 4
Number of teachers in schools by NCLB accountability in school year t  - 1
Grade 5 Grade 6
Average school size of tested students
Years of teaching experience in all schools
Number of years taught in a current school since the 2003-04 school year
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Samples include teachers who are assigned to teach at least one subject to six and more students who have 
been to their teachers' classrooms for at least 150 calendar days in their current school years. Samples exclude four teachers from schools that were 
subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" under the NCLB accountability system (two teachers from the 2009-2010 school year and the other two from 
the 2010-2011 school year).  
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I further measure the number of school years teachers have taught at the same 
schools. Schools can be traced back to the 2003-04 school year. I count the number of years 
in which a teacher has taught at the same school from the earliest year observable to the year 
prior to a current school year. This estimate varies from zero to eight in my sample, but the 
actual number of years some teachers have taught at the same school is larger than my 
estimates due to the limited number of years available for me to observe those teachers and 
their schools before the 2003-04 school year.  
Over three years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012, there have been 85 to 89 percent of 
teacher stayers and 11 to 15 percent of teacher movers. Teachers are grouped as stayers if 
they teach in a school where they taught last year. Those movers include teacher transfers, 
teachers who returned to the schools they have taught before, and temporary leavers. 
Teacher transfers refer to the ones who transferred to a new school they have not taught 
before in a current school year. Teachers may not always move to schools new to them. A 
few teacher movers (80 in three years) have returned to the schools they had taught before. 
Those teachers are labeled as returned teachers. Lastly, teachers temporarily left teaching 
profession for purposes of education, baby birth, and sickness. Those teachers after one or 
two years of leaving start their teaching career again. Some of them returned to the same 
schools at the time they left the teaching profession; and the others went to a new school. 
Those teachers are grouped as temporary leavers in this study. In my analytical sample, I 
observe those temporary leavers in year t + 1 (i.e., the current school year) in schools, but 
they did not teach in year t. I further keep tracking those teachers in recent years prior to the 
year t and I have observed those teachers teaching in Tennessee’s public elementary schools.   
The average number of tested students over three analytical school years in grades 4, 
5, and 6 is about 83, 94, and 169, respectively. There are more teachers teaching in grade 6 
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than in grades 4 and 5. Majority of those teachers have taught in the schools in good 
standing based on NCLB accountability status. Over three school years 2008-09 through 
2010-2011, Tennessee’s public elementary schools have not been performing well. More 
schools have been placed under the target and sanction status levels. The number of teachers 
in good standing schools have dropped from 86 percent in the 2008-09 school year to 76 
percent in the 2010-2011 school year. The omitted category for school NLCB dummy 
variables is the schools under NCLB sanctions.    
To test changes on the percent of students taught by individual teachers, the 
equation (4) further controls for observable teacher and school characteristics and the 
interaction terms between the absolute advantage and all those additional control variables. 
In mathematics equation, the interactions are with the absolute advantage in teaching 
mathematics; likewise with the absolute advantage in teaching English/language arts in the 
English/language arts equation and so does in each of the equations in science and social 
studies.  
Table 5a through 5c present coefficient estimates for teachers’ absolute advantages 
and their interaction effects with a set of teacher and school characteristics. In each table, 
regression analyses use a sample of teachers who taught separately in each subject in a grade. 
Before interpreting the effects of teachers’ absolute advantage on teacher assignments, I first 
preform a set of F-tests to determine the joint strength of the interaction terms. A majority 
of p-values from the F-test statistics are above the significance level 0.1 except the 
mathematics (p-value = 0.045) and English/language arts (p-value = 0.093) models in grade 5 
and the social studies (p-value == 0.014) model in grade 6.  
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Table 5a
Outcomes
Mathematics
English/
language arts
Science Social studies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3.507** 2.792 2.622* 1.088
(1.253) (2.167) (1.210) (0.637)
Coefficient estimates
-0.438 5.075 1.442 -0.449
(2.948) (5.769) (2.322) (1.865)
1.355 -1.443 -0.539 -1.853
(1.522) (2.984) (1.689) (1.380)
3.798 -0.822 1.721 -3.987
(5.146) (4.763) (4.312) (2.896)
-0.018 -0.230 0.006 0.083
(0.090) (0.148) (0.069) (0.077)
1.897 0.781 -0.970 0.017
(1.638) (2.585) (1.633) (1.506)
2.188 -3.293 2.333 0.527
(1.927) (4.054) (1.985) (1.787)
4.875* -1.546 2.445 0.450
(2.096) (3.468) (1.809) (1.834)
1.807 -3.681 -2.784 -0.099
(3.654) (10.487) (3.028) (2.438)
-0.011 -0.035 0.001 0.013
(0.014) (0.040) (0.013) (0.011)
-0.115 5.806 0.299 0.594
(0.740) (3.449) (1.559) (1.435)
-0.479 3.392 -0.207 -1.488
(0.609) (4.731) (1.747) (2.241)
Observations 8,222 8,222 8,222 8,222
R-squared 0.344 0.429 0.346 0.326
Absolute advantages 
in school year t  - 1
Marginal effects of absolute advantages on percent of students taught in a subject in grade 4 interacting with 
observed teacher and school characteristics in three school years
Percent of students taught in grade 4 in school year (t )
School size of tested students in grade 4
Education degree (Omitted: Bachelors)
Masters
Education doctoral and above
Years of teaching experience in all schools
Number of years taught in a current school since the 2003-04 school year (Omitted: Zero and one year)
Two years
Three years
Four and more years
Teacher mobility (Omitted: Teacher stayers)
Teacher movers
School NCLB accountability in school year t  - 1 (Omitted: Under sanction)
Good standing
Target
F-test
H0: Interactions terms are jointly 
equal to zero
p -value =
0.3363
p -value =
0.5418
p -value =
0.7242
p -value =
0.6081
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Models control for school 
fixed effects and dummy variables for school year and the number of years taught by subject. Additional 
teacher and school controls include dummy variables for education degree, school NCLB status in year t  - 1, 
and mobility status; years of teaching experience at all schools and dummy variables for the number of years 
taught at the current school; school size of tested students in grade 4; and their interaction terms with absolute 
advantages in the subject under study. Samples include teachers who are assigned to teach at least one subject to 
six and more students who have been to their teachers' classrooms for at least 150 calendar days in their current 
school years. Samples exclude four teachers from schools that were subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" 
under the NCLB accountability system (two teachers from the 2009-2010 school year and the other two from 
the 2010-2011 school year).  
Marginal effects of Absolute 
advantages in school year t - 1
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Table 5b
Outcomes
Mathematics
English/
language arts
Science Social studies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
11.316*** 6.268* 6.855** 0.721
(2.080) (2.090) (2.069) (1.318)
Coefficient estimates
0.741 -6.616 8.291 -4.120
(8.789) (8.659) (7.377) (5.329)
1.105 8.137† -3.539 -0.740
(3.001) (4.402) (2.787) (2.329)
2.575 8.314 -5.929 -4.931
(5.424) (7.481) (5.506) (4.423)
0.131 -0.236 -0.116 -0.103
(0.147) (0.244) (0.151) (0.138)
10.338** -4.787 -1.787 6.604*
(3.563) (5.079) (3.476) (3.298)
5.321 0.900 0.713 6.791*
(3.937) (5.741) (3.732) (3.364)
10.133** -7.686 5.471 8.067*
(3.406) (5.393) (3.451) (3.238)
3.166 0.345 -10.737† -1.308
(5.610) (10.208) (6.234) (4.583)
0.022 -0.022 -0.023 -0.045
(0.026) (0.037) (0.049) (0.029)
-1.590 17.747* 4.027 5.917
(8.396) (7.002) (4.235) (4.513)
2.834 22.024** -3.839 3.807
(9.259) (7.188) (4.651) (4.852)
Observations 8,629 8,629 8,629 8,629
R-squared 0.397 0.454 0.405 0.331
Percent of students taught in grade 5 in school year (t )
Marginal effects of absolute advantages on percent of students taught in a subject in grade 5 interacting with 
observed teacher and school characteristics in three school years
F-test
Teacher movers
Absolute advantages 
in school year t  - 1
Education degree (Omitted: Bachelors)
Masters
Education doctoral and above
Years of teaching experience in all schools
Number of years taught in a current school since the 2003-04 school year (Omitted: Zero and one year)
Two years
Three years
Four and more years
Teacher mobility (Omitted: Teacher stayers)
School size of tested students in grade 5
School NCLB accountability in school year t  - 1 (Omitted: Under sanction)
Good standing
Target
H0: Interactions terms are jointly 
equal to zero
p -value = 
0.045
p -value =
0.0931
p -value =
0.2334
p -value =
0.2844
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Models control for school 
fixed effects and dummy variables for school year and the number of years taught by subject. Additional 
teacher and school controls include dummy variables for education degree, school NCLB status in year t  - 1, 
and mobility status; years of teaching experience at all schools and dummy variables for the number of years 
taught at the current school; school size of tested students in grade 5; and their interaction terms with absolute 
advantages in the subject under study. Samples include teachers who are assigned to teach at least one subject to 
six and more students who have been to their teachers' classrooms for at least 150 calendar days in their current 
school years. Samples exclude four teachers from schools that were subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" 
under the NCLB accountability system (two teachers from the 2009-2010 school year and the other two from 
the 2010-2011 school year).  
Marginal effects of Absolute 
advantages in school year t - 1
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Table 5c
Outcomes
Mathematics
English/
language arts
Science Social studies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
17.674*** 8.955* 12.627*** 2.841
(3.982) (4.260) (3.647) (3.121)
Coefficient estimates
1.986 5.577 16.740* 14.689
(11.059) (10.264) (8.251) (9.968)
3.805 -1.645 -4.334 2.232
(8.718) (7.411) (7.101) (6.423)
7.821 -6.602 8.690 15.412
(16.021) (10.374) (14.176) (13.804)
-0.312 -0.024 -0.416 -0.416
(0.463) (0.361) (0.412) (0.386)
3.064 1.088 -5.787 -6.909
(8.270) (6.382) (7.077) (8.060)
10.602 5.222 -2.983 30.418**
(10.934) (9.430) (10.367) (9.895)
16.541 15.106* 3.289 13.325
(10.534) (7.472) (8.590) (8.436)
2.277 9.318 -22.351† 24.264*
(13.662) (17.127) (12.326) (11.560)
0.035 0.008 0.032 -0.058†
(0.028) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032)
0.526 -5.545 -1.232 -11.200
(8.592) (8.692) (6.786) (7.865)
8.045 -5.137 -0.442 -15.906†
(10.564) (10.227) (8.243) (8.842)
Observations 9,538 9,538 9,538 9,538
R-squared 0.546 0.520 0.535 0.485
Marginal effects of absolute advantages on percent of students taught in a subject in grade 6 interacting with 
observed teacher and school characteristics in three school years
Percent of students taught in grade 6 in school year (t )
Four and more years
Absolute advantages 
in school year t  - 1
Teacher mobility (Omitted: Teacher stayers)
Teacher movers
School size of tested students in grade 6
Education degree (Omitted: Bachelors)
Masters
Education doctoral and above
Years of teaching experience in all schools
Number of years taught in a current school since the 2003-04 school year (Omitted: Zero and one year)
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Models control for school 
fixed effects and dummy variables for school year and the number of years taught by subject. Additional 
teacher and school controls include dummy variables for education degree, school NCLB status in year t  - 1, 
and mobility status; years of teaching experience at all schools and dummy variables for the number of years 
taught at the current school; school size of tested students in grade 6; and their interaction terms with absolute 
advantages in the subject under study. Samples include teachers who are assigned to teach at least one subject to 
six and more students who have been to their teachers' classrooms for at least 150 calendar days in their current 
school years. Samples exclude four teachers from schools that were subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" 
under the NCLB accountability system (two teachers from the 2009-2010 school year and the other two from 
the 2010-2011 school year).  
Marginal effects of Absolute 
advantages in school year t - 1
School NCLB accountability in school year t  - 1 (Omitted: Under sanction)
Good standing
Target
F-test
H0: Interactions terms are jointly 
equal to zero
p -value =
0.6569
p -value =
0.8802
p -value =
0.4092
p -value =
0.0142
Two years
Three years
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Although those test statistics show that the effects of teachers’ absolute advantage on 
teacher assignments appear to be different between the models with and without interaction 
terms, there is no systematic patterns where coefficient estimates are significant across 
models separately in each subject and each grade. For all interaction terms but prior school 
NCLB accountability status, it is unlikely to believe that teacher and school characteristics 
affect the effects of teachers’ absolute advantage on teacher assignments in different 
manners across subject and grades. In addition, the significant effects on prior school NCLB 
accountability interaction terms are different from what are normally expected. Test scores 
in social studies are not used to determine the annual school accountability status while I 
find a large but negative effect (-15.91 percent at p < 0.1) in the social studies model in grade 
6. Moreover, the positive effects of school accountability found in the English/language arts 
model in grade 5 suggest a reversed relationship between receiving more pressure to 
improve school performance and the variation in teacher assignments. It is likely to be true 
that, when schools receive more pressures to raise student test scores in mathematics and 
English/language arts, rearranging assignments to take the advantage of relatively more 
effective teachers through specialization would be practiced in schools that were subject to 
NCLB sanctions (i.e., a negative effect on the dummy variables for schools in good standing 
and target under NCLB).  
Overall, there are only 15 out of 120 interaction terms that are statistically significant 
across all models; and three out of 12 F-test statistics that indicate the coefficient estimates 
of interaction terms are not jointly equal to zero. These findings suggest that the select 
teacher and school characteristics do not strongly affect the effects of teachers’ absolute 
advantage on teacher assignments in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee. The 
marginal effects reported in Tables 5a through 5c are roughly consistent with the ones in 
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Table 3, but slightly larger (smaller) in the regression analyses in mathematics (science).19 The 
difference in the mathematics analyses is due to the weights used to estimate the overall 
marginal effects but not the changes in sample size and covariates.20 Instead, the difference 
in the science analyses is mostly due to the changes in the sample and the inclusion of 
additional covariates.21 The largest differences between models with and without controlling 
teacher and school characteristics happen in the equations in grade 6. For example, the 
effects of mathematics absolute advantage on mathematics assignment increase 12.4 percent 
from 15.48 percent in Table 3 to 17.67 percent in Table 5c. The two coefficient estimates are 
not statistically different from each other and this increase is only equivalent to an extra 0.5 
student based a class of 25 students.  
3.  Additional Analyses Using Shrinkage Teacher Estimates 
While teacher value added is subject to any kind of imprecision, literature has shown 
that researchers have adopted the empirical Bayesian estimator (also called “shrinkage 
estimators”) to provide the best linear unbiased teacher estimates (Sander, 2000). This essay 
takes a step further where I use shrinkage teacher estimates to construct teacher absolute 
19 I discuss the results in mathematics and science analyses because the regression coefficients 
separately in each grade in those subjects are statistically significant. The regression coefficients are 
not always statistically significant in other subjects.   
20 To make this interpretation clear, suppose that the absolute advantage in teaching mathematics is 
interacted with a dummy variable and the impact on teacher assignments is higher when that dummy 
variable is equal to one. The overall marginal effects will increase when the analytical sample contains 
proportionally more records with ones in that dummy variable. Furthermore, I find that the 
regression coefficients are quite stable with and without controlling teacher and school 
characteristics.  
21 I find that the joint F-test statistics for all additional variables (including interaction terms) rejects 
the null hypothesis at p < 0.01. This indicates that at least one of additional covariates and their 
interactions with the absolute advantage in teaching science is not equal to zero. In fact, I find that 
teachers with Master degree are less likely to teach more percent of students in science than the ones 
with Bachelor degree (e.g., p < 0.001 in grade 4). It is likely that teachers with advanced degree have 
more influence to decide which subject they prefer to teach. The analyses in English/language arts 
show that the advanced degree is positively correlated with teacher assignments in English/language 
arts.  
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advantage and then re-estimate the impact of teacher relative effectiveness on subject 
specialization.22  
Appendix G provides regression results using shrinkage estimates with and without 
school fixed effects. Tables G – 1 and G – 2 use the same three-year sample as shown in 
Table 3; instead, Table G – 3 and G – 4 use a sample of teachers in school years 2007-08 
through 2011-2012. Since those analyses use shrinkage teacher estimates, it is not necessary 
to construct an average of teaching effectiveness over three years. This change allows me to 
use two more years of data for this study. These results are similar to the ones presented in 
Table 3, but they are significantly larger. For example, the impact of teacher absolute 
advantage in teaching mathematics on mathematics assignments increases by 10 percent for 
mathematics teachers in grade 6 in Table G – 1 compared to the one in Table 3. In addition, 
the six-year analyses suggest that teacher value added separately in each subject and in each 
grade is significantly and positively correlated with teacher assignments in each 
corresponding subject.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between teacher value 
added and the share of a teacher’s students in a subject in elementary schools. While 
researchers and statisticians have spent a great deal of effort to empirically develop measures 
for teaching effectiveness, few educators and policy-makers have paid attention to how those 
measures can be and why they should be used to improve teaching and learning in schools. 
This study fills this gap by considering whether teacher value-added estimates are useful for 
schools.  
22 For details on the model of shrinkage estimation for teaching effectiveness, see Chapter IV.  
49 
 
                                                            
Overall, this study provides some empirical evidence that teacher value-added 
estimates are positively associated with specialization in four core academic subjects, 
mathematics, English/language arts, science, and social studies in all upper elementary 
grades or some grades. The findings suggest that teachers specialize in teaching those 
subjects where they are relatively more effective in grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee’s public 
elementary schools.  
These positive effects are small in grade 4, but large in grades 5 and 6 in mathematics 
and science. However, those effects are not statistically changed when considering the 
variation of teacher and school characteristics. The teaching effectiveness of mathematics 
teachers has the largest effects on subject specialization. The difference between the highest 
and the lowest impacts of teaching effectiveness is 12.38 percent (i.e., 15.48 – 3.1) between 
two grades 4 and 6. This suggests that, taking the 15.48 percent and a class of 25 students as 
an example, teachers who were one standard deviation above the average absolute advantage 
in teaching mathematics will teach roughly eight more students compared to the ones with 
one standard deviation below the average.23  
Policy implications of this study are related to the potential of using teacher value-
added data to make school personnel decisions. My findings indicate a positive relationship 
between teacher assignments and teaching effectiveness. Teachers do teach more students in 
the subject(s) where they are relatively more effective. The use of teacher value-added data in 
my analyses confirms this relationship regardless whether teacher value-added estimates have 
actually been used to make teacher assignments in Tennessee’s public elementary schools. It 
is possible that the criteria used to make teacher assignments do not include teacher value-
23 25*(1+15.48%) – 25*(1-15.48%) = 7.74 ≈ 8 
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added data, but some of these criteria may be positively correlated with teaching 
effectiveness measured by teacher value-added estimates using my DOLS model.  
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Appendix A
Table A - 1
# schools
% 
schools # schools
% 
schools # schools
% 
schools # schools
% 
schools
Grade 4
90 - 100% 27 2.73% 27 2.73% 27 2.73% 29 2.93%
80 - 90% 125 12.63% 125 12.63% 122 12.32% 121 12.22%
70 - 80% 67 6.77% 71 7.17% 70 7.07% 70 7.07%
60 - 70% 85 8.59% 77 7.78% 80 8.08% 81 8.18%
50 - 60% 74 7.47% 77 7.78% 79 7.98% 76 7.68%
40 - 50% 104 10.51% 106 10.71% 100 10.10% 103 10.40%
30 - 40% 157 15.86% 158 15.96% 161 16.26% 156 15.76%
20 - 30% 310 31.31% 309 31.21% 309 31.21% 310 31.31%
10 - 20% 34 3.43% 33 3.33% 35 3.54% 37 3.74%
0 - 10% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Total 983 100% 983 100% 983 100% 983 100%
Grade 5
90 - 100% 49 5.31% 51 5.53% 49 5.31% 47 5.10%
80 - 90% 247 26.79% 248 26.90% 248 26.90% 246 26.68%
70 - 80% 107 11.61% 109 11.82% 107 11.61% 109 11.82%
60 - 70% 81 8.79% 81 8.79% 80 8.68% 78 8.46%
50 - 60% 75 8.13% 72 7.81% 72 7.81% 75 8.13%
40 - 50% 74 8.03% 71 7.70% 76 8.24% 75 8.13%
30 - 40% 82 8.89% 84 9.11% 85 9.22% 84 9.11%
20 - 30% 183 19.85% 182 19.74% 179 19.41% 184 19.96%
10 - 20% 19 2.06% 19 2.06% 21 2.28% 19 2.06%
0 - 10% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Total 917 100% 917 100% 917 100% 917 100%
Grade 6
90 - 100% 65 10.82% 67 11.15% 69 11.48% 66 10.98%
80 - 90% 364 60.57% 375 62.40% 353 58.74% 359 59.73%
70 - 80% 89 14.81% 80 13.31% 95 15.81% 91 15.14%
60 - 70% 27 4.49% 23 3.83% 28 4.66% 28 4.66%
50 - 60% 6 1.00% 8 1.33% 8 1.33% 9 1.50%
40 - 50% 11 1.83% 9 1.50% 9 1.50% 9 1.50%
30 - 40% 13 2.16% 13 2.16% 13 2.16% 13 2.16%
20 - 30% 16 2.66% 16 2.66% 16 2.66% 16 2.66%
10 - 20% 5 0.83% 5 0.83% 5 0.83% 5 0.83%
0 - 10% 1 0.17% 1 0.17% 1 0.17% 0 0.00%
Total 597 100% 597 100% 597 100% 596 100%
Appendix
Notes: The reported number and percent of schools are placed into 10 quintiles of the average 
participation rates. The TVAAS student participation rate is equal to the ratio between the number 
of students linked to TVAAS teachers and the students with test scores at a given grade in a school. 
This study averages the participation rates over seven school years in a grade in a school (when 
available). 
Number and percent of schools by grade, subject, and the average of TVAAS student participation 
rates over seven school years 2004-05 through 2010-2011
Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social studies
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Appendix B
Table B - 1
District names by region and urbanicity category
City
(1) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
West Tennessee Madison County Dyersburg McKenzie Alamo Fayette County McNairy County
Memphis Hardeman County Paris Bells Gibson Co Sp Dist Milan
Haywood County Shelby County Benton County H Rock Bruceton Obion County
Humboldt Trenton Bradford Hardin County South Carroll
Lauderdale County Union City Chester County Henderson County Tipton County
Lexington Crockett County Henry County Weakley County
Decatur County Huntingdon West Carroll
Dyer County Lake County
Middle Tennessee Davidson County Dickson County Maury County Bedford County Humphreys County Rutherford County
Franklin SSD Fayetteville Putnam County Cannon County Jackson County Sequatchie County
Montgomery County Franklin County Sumner County Cheatham County Lawrence County Smith County
Murfreesboro Lebanon Tullahoma Clay County Lincoln County Stewart County
Lewis County White County Coffee County Macon County Trousdale County
Manchester DeKalb County Marshall County Van Buren County
Fentress County Moore County Warren County
Giles County Overton County Wayne County
Grundy County Perry County Williamson County
Hickman County Pickett County Wilson County
Houston County Robertson County
East Tennessee Bristol Alcoa Knox County Anderson County Greene County Morgan County
Cleveland Athens Maryville Bledsoe County Hancock County Polk County
Hamblen County Carter County Newport Blount County Jefferson County Rhea County
Johnson City Clinton Oak Ridge Bradley County Lenoir City Richard City
Kingsport Dayton Oneida Campbell County Loudon County Scott County
Elizabethton Roane County Claiborne County Marion County Sweetwater
Etowah Rogersville Cocke County McMinn County Union County
Greeneville Sevier County Cumberland County Meigs County Washington County
Hamilton County Sullivan County Grainger County Monroe County
Hawkins County Unicoi County
Johnson County
RuralSuburb and Town
Notes: Special school districts are not included in this study. 
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Appendix C
Table C - 1
4 5 6 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
--- SOC SOC 11 18 26
--- SOC ELA 0 1 1
--- SOC ELA-SOC 0 5 3
--- SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 1 1 2
--- SCI SOC 0 0 2
--- SCI SCI 12 21 26
--- SCI SCI-SOC 2 0 0
--- SCI ELA-SCI 0 1 1
--- SCI ELA-SCI-SOC 0 1 0
--- SCI MTH 0 0 1
--- SCI MTH-SCI 0 0 1
--- SCI MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 6 2 6
--- SCI-SOC SOC 0 0 1
--- SCI-SOC SCI 0 0 1
--- SCI-SOC SCI-SOC 1 2 4
--- SCI-SOC ELA 1 0 0
--- SCI-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 2 0 0
--- ELA SOC 1 1 0
--- ELA SCI-SOC 1 0 0
--- ELA ELA 48 65 67
--- ELA ELA-SOC 2 0 5
--- ELA ELA-SCI 1 0 0
--- ELA ELA-SCI-SOC 0 0 1
--- ELA MTH-ELA 2 0 0
--- ELA MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 15 7 7
--- ELA-SOC SOC 2 1 1
--- ELA-SOC ELA 1 3 3
--- ELA-SOC ELA-SOC 2 1 2
--- ELA-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 0 1 1
--- ELA-SCI SCI 2 1 1
--- ELA-SCI ELA 0 3 0
--- ELA-SCI ELA-SCI 0 1 0
--- ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SCI-SOC 1 0 0
--- MTH SCI 1 0 0
--- MTH ELA 1 0 1
--- MTH MTH 13 18 28
--- MTH MTH-SOC 0 1 1
--- MTH MTH-ELA 2 2 1
--- MTH MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 6 9 6
--- MTH-SOC SOC 0 0 1
--- MTH-SOC MTH 1 1 3
--- MTH-SOC MTH-SOC 0 1 0
--- MTH-SCI MTH 1 1 2
--- MTH-SCI MTH-SCI 1 3 0
--- MTH-SCI MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 0 1 1
--- MTH-SCI-SOC MTH-SCI-SOC 2 1 0
--- MTH-ELA ELA 2 1 0
--- MTH-ELA MTH 1 1 3
--- MTH-ELA MTH-ELA 6 2 1
--- MTH-ELA MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 0 1 0
--- MTH-ELA-SOC ELA 0 1 1
--- MTH-ELA-SCI MTH-ELA-SCI 2 0 1
--- MTH-ELA-SCI MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 0 1 0
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC SOC 4 5 2
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC SCI 3 4 4
Number of elementary school teachers who taught multiple grades by subject scheme in school years 2009-2010 
through 2011-2012
Grade level School year
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4 5 6 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
Grade level School year
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC SCI-SOC 1 4 3
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC ELA 8 13 13
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SOC 1 2 0
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SCI 0 1 0
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SCI-SOC 1 0 0
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH 6 2 3
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-SCI 0 0 1
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-ELA 1 0 1
--- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 10 16 4
SOC --- SOC 0 0 1
SOC SOC --- 0 4 2
SOC SOC SOC 1 1 0
SOC SCI SCI 0 0 1
SOC SCI-SOC SCI-SOC 0 0 1
SOC ELA-SOC --- 1 1 5
SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 1 1 2
SCI --- SCI 0 0 1
SCI SCI --- 3 7 3
SCI SCI-SOC --- 0 1 0
SCI ELA-SCI --- 2 0 2
SCI ELA-SCI SCI 1 1 0
SCI MTH-ELA-SCI --- 0 0 1
SCI MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 2 5 7
SCI-SOC --- SCI 1 0 0
SCI-SOC SCI-SOC --- 3 2 2
SCI-SOC ELA --- 1 0 0
SCI-SOC ELA-SCI-SOC --- 1 1 0
SCI-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 1 0 4
ELA --- SOC 0 0 1
ELA --- SCI-SOC 0 0 1
ELA --- ELA 0 1 4
ELA SOC --- 1 0 0
ELA ELA --- 57 64 78
ELA ELA ELA 11 6 4
ELA ELA-SOC --- 0 1 0
ELA ELA-SOC ELA-SOC 0 0 1
ELA MTH-ELA --- 0 0 1
ELA MTH-ELA-SOC --- 1 0 0
ELA MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 9 7 12
ELA-SOC SOC --- 4 2 2
ELA-SOC ELA --- 1 0 0
ELA-SOC ELA-SOC --- 1 4 0
ELA-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 1 2 6
ELA-SCI SCI --- 3 3 4
ELA-SCI ELA-SCI --- 2 4 1
ELA-SCI MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 0 0 1
ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SOC --- 0 0 1
ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SCI-SOC --- 0 1 1
MTH --- SCI 1 0 0
MTH --- MTH 0 0 2
MTH MTH --- 11 16 10
MTH MTH MTH 1 1 1
MTH MTH-SCI --- 1 0 0
MTH MTH-ELA --- 2 3 4
MTH MTH-ELA ELA 1 0 0
MTH MTH-ELA MTH 1 0 0
MTH MTH-ELA-SCI --- 0 1 0
MTH MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 1 4 8
MTH-SOC MTH-SOC --- 1 0 1
MTH-SCI MTH-SCI-SOC --- 0 1 0
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4 5 6 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
Grade level School year
MTH-SCI MTH-ELA-SCI --- 1 0 0
MTH-SCI MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 1 0 4
MTH-SCI-SOC --- SCI 0 1 0
MTH-SCI-SOC --- MTH-ELA-SOC 0 0 1
MTH-SCI-SOC MTH-SCI-SOC --- 0 0 1
MTH-ELA --- MTH-ELA 0 0 1
MTH-ELA MTH --- 2 2 1
MTH-ELA MTH ELA 1 0 0
MTH-ELA MTH-ELA --- 10 9 4
MTH-ELA MTH-ELA ELA 0 1 0
MTH-ELA MTH-ELA MTH-ELA 2 0 0
MTH-ELA MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 1 0 0
MTH-ELA-SOC SOC --- 0 1 0
MTH-ELA-SOC MTH-ELA-SOC --- 1 0 0
MTH-ELA-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 1 0 0
MTH-ELA-SCI SCI --- 1 1 0
MTH-ELA-SCI MTH-ELA-SCI --- 0 1 0
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- ELA 1 0 0
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 1 1 1
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC SOC --- 3 5 4
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC SCI --- 3 1 3
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC SCI SCI 0 0 1
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC SCI-SOC --- 0 1 2
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC ELA --- 5 2 16
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SOC --- 0 2 4
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SCI --- 1 0 0
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC ELA-SCI-SOC --- 0 1 2
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH --- 3 2 8
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-SOC --- 0 0 1
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-SCI --- 2 2 4
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-SCI-SOC --- 0 1 2
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-ELA --- 0 1 1
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-ELA --- 0 0 1
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI --- 0 1 0
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC --- 15 33 24
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 5 5 5
Total number of teachers 377 447 511
Notes: Sample includes teachers who taught at multiple grades, who have lagged value-added estimates over a four-year 
span prior to their current school year, who have taught at grades 4 through 6 in three school years 2009-2010 through 
2011-2012 in Tennessee's public elementary schools, and who have taught more than six students in at least one subject 
in their current school year. Each of the six students attended their teacher's class in a subject for at least 150 calendar 
days. The calendar days do not include weekends, holidays, and enrollment gaps for individual students. 
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Appendix D
Table D - 1
Number of elementary school teachers who taught in grade 4 at the same school in the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 school years by subject scheme
Grade 4 SOC SCI
SCI-
SOC
ELA
ELA-
SOC
ELA-
SCI
ELA-
SCI-
SOC
MTH
MTH-
SOC
MTH-
SCI
MTH-
SCI-
SOC
MTH-
ELA
MTH-
ELA-
SOC
MTH-
ELA-
SCI
MTH-
ELA-
SCI-
SOC
School year 2011-2012
SOC 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
SCI 0 5 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
SCI-SOC 1 3 7 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
ELA 0 1 0 67 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 14
ELA-SOC 0 0 0 0 11 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 11
ELA-SCI 0 1 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
ELA-SCI-SOC 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
MTH 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 1 6 0 0 8
MTH-SOC 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
MTH-SCI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 0 1 0 1 2
MTH-SCI-SOC 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
MTH-ELA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 10 0 1 9
MTH-ELA-SOC 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 2
MTH-ELA-SCI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 1 0 1 12 3 4 3 3 0 1 0 4 5 7 1,813
Total number of teachers 8 10 12 82 22 12 14 24 2 5 6 23 13 16 1,887
School year 2010-2011
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Table D - 2
Number of elementary school teachers who taught in grade 5 at the same school in the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 school years by subject scheme
Grade 5 SOC SCI
SCI-
SOC
ELA
ELA-
SOC
ELA-
SCI
ELA-
SCI-
SOC
MTH
MTH-
SOC
MTH-
SCI
MTH-
SCI-
SOC
MTH-
ELA
MTH-
ELA-
SOC
MTH-
ELA-
SCI
MTH-
ELA-
SCI-
SOC
School year 2011-2012
SOC 25 0 1 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5
SCI 0 27 1 0 0 5 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 5
SCI-SOC 2 3 19 1 8 2 2 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 10
ELA 2 1 0 158 24 5 0 2 1 0 0 4 0 2 20
ELA-SOC 3 0 0 13 55 2 2 2 1 1 0 4 0 0 21
ELA-SCI 0 3 1 1 0 19 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 6
ELA-SCI-SOC 0 0 1 2 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
MTH 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 54 2 8 14 6 1 0 11
MTH-SOC 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 2 0 2 1 6 0 7
MTH-SCI 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 17 18 1 1 1 10
MTH-SCI-SOC 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 1 0 3
MTH-ELA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 25 0 1 9
MTH-ELA-SOC 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 5 0 6
MTH-ELA-SCI 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 3
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 2 7 2 11 7 4 6 6 1 1 6 2 3 6 1,449
Total number of teachers 36 44 29 188 102 40 15 78 10 32 58 48 17 22 1,569
School year 2010-2011
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Table D - 3
Number of elementary school teachers who taught in grade 6 at the same school in the 2010-2011 and 2011-2012 school years by subject scheme
Grade 6 SOC SCI
SCI-
SOC
ELA
ELA-
SOC
ELA-
SCI
ELA-
SCI-
SOC
MTH
MTH-
SOC
MTH-
SCI
MTH-
SCI-
SOC
MTH-
ELA
MTH-
ELA-
SOC
MTH-
ELA-
SCI
MTH-
ELA-
SCI-
SOC
School year 2011-2012
SOC 203 1 7 9 31 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 20
SCI 1 203 11 5 1 21 1 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 36
SCI-SOC 6 11 51 2 6 1 1 1 0 3 4 0 0 0 8
ELA 6 1 3 506 24 7 0 3 0 0 0 5 1 0 59
ELA-SOC 13 0 1 31 56 0 3 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 12
ELA-SCI 0 7 2 7 2 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
ELA-SCI-SOC 0 0 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
MTH 2 1 2 6 2 1 0 266 14 17 6 24 2 2 40
MTH-SOC 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 4 12 0 2 2 1 0 5
MTH-SCI 1 3 0 1 0 2 0 6 1 27 11 2 0 0 3
MTH-SCI-SOC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
MTH-ELA 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 9 0 1 0 27 0 1 10
MTH-ELA-SOC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
MTH-ELA-SCI 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
MTH-ELA-SCI-SOC 19 18 4 56 16 7 0 23 3 0 1 9 0 1 270
Total number of teachers 252 246 82 629 144 80 5 324 36 49 26 74 6 6 477
School year 2010-2011
Notes: Sample includes teachers who taught at two adjacent school years at the same school, who have lagged value-added estimates over a four-year span prior to 
their current school year, and who have taught more than five students in at least one subject in their current school year. Each of the six students attended their 
teacher's class in a subject for at least 150 calendar days. The calendar days do not include weekends, holidays, and enrollment gaps for individual students. 
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Appendix E
Table E - 1
Outcomes
Model (1)
OLS Specification Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6
Years of teaching experience (Omitted: Zero to 5)
6 to 10 0.000 0.0039 -0.0010 -0.0022
(0.004) (0.0049) (0.0061) (0.0061)
11 to 15 0.005 0.0070 -0.0023 0.0115
(0.005) (0.0062) (0.0082) (0.0079)
16 to 20 0.021*** 0.0228** 0.0347** 0.0060
(0.006) (0.0077) (0.0108) (0.0089)
≥ 21 0.019*** 0.0163* 0.0196* 0.0207*
(0.006) (0.0066) (0.0093) (0.0083)
Observations 96,597
R-square 0.328
Model (1)
TCH-FE Specification Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6
Years of teaching experience (Omitted: Zero to 5)
6 to 10 0.003 0.0023 0.0036 0.0022
(0.003) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0046)
11 to 15 0.008* 0.0070 0.0019 0.0159**
(0.004) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0059)
16 to 20 0.015** 0.0174* 0.0174* 0.0099
(0.005) (0.0071) (0.0079) (0.0068)
≥ 21 0.014*** 0.0085 0.0105† 0.0225***
(0.004) (0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0058)
Observations 96,597
R-square 0.545
Marginal effects of teaching experience on the share of a teacher's students in Tennessee's public elementary 
schools in nine school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001; sample includes all teachers who 
have taught in grades 4 through 6 in nine school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012 in Tennessee's public 
elementary schools and who have taught more than five students in at least one subject in a school year. Models 
control for dummy variables for education levels, grades, and years. The models labeled as "TCH-FE" control 
for teacher fixed effects. 
0.545
0.328
Herfindahl index: Sum of square of
the share of a teacher's students in each subject
Model (2)
Model (2)
F-test statistics: df  = 8; p -value: 0.0748
F-test statistics: df  = 8; p -value: 0.1845
96,597
96,597
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Appendix F
Table F - 1
Outcomes
Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social studies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 4
2.543** -0.126 -1.504† -0.913
(0.947) (1.050) (0.801) (0.707)
-0.722 1.993 -0.811 -0.460
(1.047) (1.631) (0.886) (0.883)
0.350 -1.377 2.325* -1.297†
(0.873) (1.256) (0.908) (0.825)
-0.125 0.055 -1.249* 1.319**
(0.547) (0.636) (0.497) (0.500)
Observations 8,471 8,471 8,471 8,471
R-squared 0.275 0.324 0.266 0.242
Grade 5
8.788*** -5.656*** -3.738** 0.606
(1.507) (1.505) (1.183) (1.188)
-3.911* 6.884** -1.332 -1.640
(1.660) (2.368) (1.737) (1.762)
-1.267 -4.124* 5.976*** -0.585
(1.554) (1.934) (1.585) (1.535)
-1.081 2.435† -2.062* 0.707
(0.913) (1.324) (0.835) (1.051)
Observations 8,952 8,952 8,952 8,952
R-squared 0.338 0.367 0.349 0.259
Grade 6
14.370*** -3.103 -7.319*** -3.948*
(3.377) (2.873) (2.129) (1.963)
0.997 5.826 -5.817** -1.007
(1.892) (3.406) (1.947) (1.714)
-7.269** -8.344** 14.096*** 1.517
(2.529) (2.971) (3.335) (2.015)
1.393 -2.226 0.370 0.463
(2.203) (2.458) (2.229) (2.802)
Observations 9,955 9,955 9,955 9,955
R-squared 0.503 0.462 0.496 0.437
Mathematics
Science
Social studies
Social studies
Science
English/
language arts
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Models control for dummy 
variables for the number of years taught separately in each subject and school year. Samples include teachers who 
are assigned to teach at least one subject to six and more students who have been to their teachers' classrooms 
for at least 150 calendar days in their current school years. Samples exclude four teachers from schools that were 
subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" under the NCLB accountability system (two teachers from the 2009-
2010 school year and the other two from the 2010-2011 school year).  
English/
language arts
Marginal effects of absolute 
advantages in school year t  - 1
Mathematics
English/
language arts
Science
Social studies
Mathematics
Percent of students taught in the school year (t )
Marginal effects of teachers' absolute advantages on teacher assignments separately in each grade in three school 
years without school fixed effects
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Appendix G
Table G - 1 Table G - 2
Outcomes Outcomes
Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social studies Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social studies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 4 Grade 4
4.659** -1.191 -2.688 -0.780 3.603** 0.441 -2.506* -1.538
(1.544) (1.839) (1.412) (1.243) (1.277) (1.441) (1.150) (1.031)
-3.627 5.854† -0.772 -1.455 -2.441 3.939 -0.621 -0.877
(2.190) (3.022) (1.971) (1.956) (1.770) (2.511) (1.625) (1.632)
1.153 -3.981 4.583* -1.755 1.097 -3.345 3.612* -1.364
(1.624) (2.299) (1.804) (1.600) (1.223) (1.750) (1.404) (1.252)
-0.016 0.716 -2.495** 1.795* -0.287 0.019 -1.923** 2.191**
(1.004) (1.218) (0.897) (0.883) (0.812) (0.909) (0.726) (0.755)
Observations 8,471 8,471 8,471 8,471 Observations 8,471 8,471 8,471 8,471
R-squared 0.3362 0.4166 0.3314 0.3161 R-squared 0.275 0.324 0.266 0.242
Grade 5 Grade 5
18.305*** -7.376** -7.623** -3.306 14.489*** -7.550*** -5.407** -1.533
(2.913) (2.749) (2.364) (2.162) (2.216) (2.087) (1.777) (1.647)
-10.984*** 14.764** -4.529 0.749 -10.278*** 14.288*** -3.734 -0.275
(3.202) (4.974) (3.564) (3.316) (2.657) (4.236) (2.921) (2.750)
-3.863 -9.212** 13.571*** -0.496 -1.944 -7.679** 11.058*** -1.435
(2.896) (3.355) (3.125) (2.496) (2.262) (2.794) (2.488) (2.020)
0.131 1.396 -3.905* 2.378 -0.758 1.202 -3.398** 2.954†
(1.848) (2.194) (1.579) (1.909) (1.377) (1.717) (1.182) (1.547)
Observations 8,952 8,952 8,952 8,952 Observations 8,952 8,952 8,952 8,952
R-squared 0.3878 0.4375 0.3922 0.3169 R-squared 0.340 0.368 0.350 0.260
Grade 6 Grade 6
25.924*** -4.551 -11.055** -10.318** 23.991*** -5.360 -9.696** -8.935**
(5.530) (4.246) (3.489) (3.241) (4.946) (3.813) (3.110) (2.880)
-0.503 13.328* -10.942** -1.883 -0.576 13.520* -10.340** -2.605
(3.546) (6.196) (3.840) (3.681) (3.246) (5.796) (3.526) (3.381)
-8.737* -16.004*** 24.718*** 0.023 -9.237** -15.621*** 23.916*** 0.943
(3.950) (4.353) (5.139) (3.586) (3.475) (4.004) (4.576) (3.102)
2.658 -3.567 -3.160 4.069 2.898 -2.804 -2.927 2.833
(3.722) (4.137) (3.304) (5.068) (3.378) (3.730) (2.894) (4.570)
Observations 9,955 9,955 9,955 9,955 Observations 9,955 9,955 9,955 9,955
R-squared 0.5301 0.5024 0.5210 0.4685 R-squared 0.504 0.463 0.497 0.437
Science Science
Social studies Social studies
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Shrinkage estimates for 
teachers are used to estimate absolute advantages in teaching separatel each subject. Models control for dummy 
variables for the number of years taught separately in each subject and school year. Samples include teachers who 
are assigned to teach at least one subject to six and more students who have been to their teachers' classrooms 
for at least 150 calendar days in their current school years. Samples exclude four teachers from schools that were 
subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" under the NCLB accountability system (two teachers from the 2009-
2010 school year and the other two from the 2010-2011 school year).  
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Shrinkage estimates for 
teachers are used to estimate absolute advantages in teaching separatel each subject. Models control for school 
fixed effects and dummy variables for the number of years taught separately in each subject and school year. 
Samples include teachers who are assigned to teach at least one subject to six and more students who have been 
to their teachers' classrooms for at least 150 calendar days in their current school years. Samples exclude four 
teachers from schools that were subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" under the NCLB accountability 
system (two teachers from the 2009-2010 school year and the other two from the 2010-2011 school year).  
Social studies Social studies
Mathematics Mathematics
English/language arts English/
language arts
Mathematics Mathematics
English/
language arts
English/
language arts
Science Science
English/
language arts
English/
language arts
Science Science
Social studies Social studies
Marginal effects of absolute 
advantages in school year t  - 1
Marginal effects of absolute 
advantages in school year t  - 1
Mathematics Mathematics
Percent of students taught in the school year (t ) Percent of students taught in the school year (t )
Marginal effects of teachers' absolute advantages on teacher assignments separately in each grade in three 
school years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012
Marginal effects of teachers' absolute advantages on teacher assignments separately in each grade in three school 
years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012 without school fixed effects
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Table G - 3 Table G - 4
Outcomes Outcomes
Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social studies Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social studies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 4 Grade 4
3.107** -0.554 -1.499 -1.054 2.751** 0.538 -1.630* -1.659**
(0.996) (1.131) (0.780) (0.722) (0.842) (0.948) (0.662) (0.618)
-2.233 4.068† -0.331 -1.505 -1.618 2.975 -0.213 -1.144
(1.449) (2.202) (1.306) (1.312) (1.238) (1.933) (1.117) (1.140)
0.526 -1.729 2.778** -1.574 0.402 -1.670 2.321** -1.053
(1.052) (1.393) (1.040) (0.932) (0.852) (1.154) (0.870) (0.773)
-0.072 -0.340 -1.734* 2.145** -0.321 -0.841 -1.174 2.337***
(0.746) (0.936) (0.680) (0.698) (0.646) (0.800) (0.600) (0.626)
Observations 13,963 13,963 13,963 13,963 Observations 13,963 13,963 13,963 13,963
R-squared 0.3462 0.4041 0.3281 0.3271 R-squared 0.300 0.335 0.278 0.270
Grade 5 Grade 5
11.751*** -4.875** -4.388** -2.488 10.008*** -5.145*** -3.277** -1.586
(1.702) (1.832) (1.443) (1.448) (1.389) (1.474) (1.136) (1.152)
-7.407*** 11.388** -2.023 -1.958 -6.557*** 10.842*** -2.247 -2.038
(2.114) (3.685) (2.321) (2.065) (1.922) (3.281) (2.072) (1.837)
-2.369 -6.916** 9.634*** -0.350 -1.974 -5.965** 8.809*** -0.870
(1.692) (2.315) (2.245) (1.642) (1.449) (2.080) (1.934) (1.419)
-1.147 0.976 -4.110** 4.281** -1.249 0.791 -4.007*** 4.465**
(1.338) (1.714) (1.294) (1.654) (1.097) (1.472) (1.072) (1.429)
Observations 14,701 14,701 14,701 14,701 Observations 14,701 14,701 14,701 14,701
R-squared 0.3876 0.4244 0.3742 0.3158 R-squared 0.350 0.374 0.345 0.272
Grade 6 Grade 6
21.069*** -4.375 -8.652*** -8.041** 19.691*** -4.983 -7.303** -7.405**
(4.137) (3.225) (2.536) (2.575) (3.821) (2.944) (2.386) (2.384)
-2.557 12.503* -7.715* -2.232 -2.614 12.185** -6.951* -2.620
(3.065) (4.898) (3.114) (3.011) (2.881) (4.715) (2.939) (2.882)
-7.541** -6.954* 16.441*** -1.946 -8.137** -7.410* 16.146*** -0.599
(2.667) (3.222) (3.795) (2.451) (2.505) (3.081) (3.475) (2.213)
0.238 -2.301 -5.351* 7.414† 0.538 -2.011 -4.561 6.035
(2.567) (3.046) (2.656) (4.018) (2.408) (2.955) (2.404) (3.727)
Observations 16,325 16,325 16,325 16,325 Observations 16,325 16,325 16,325 16,325
R-squared 0.5222 0.4891 0.5112 0.4579 R-squared 0.503 0.456 0.493 0.433
Science Science
Social studies Social studies
Mathematics Mathematics
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Shrinkage estimates for 
teachers are used to estimate absolute advantages in teaching separatel each subject. Models control for dummy 
variables for the number of years taught separately in each subject and school year. Samples include teachers who 
are assigned to teach at least one subject to six and more students who have been to their teachers' classrooms 
for at least 150 calendar days in their current school years. Samples exclude four teachers from schools that were 
subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" under the NCLB accountability system (two teachers from the 2009-
2010 school year and the other two from the 2010-2011 school year).  
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school 
level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Shrinkage estimates for 
teachers are used to estimate absolute advantages in teaching separatel each subject. Models control for school 
fixed effects and dummy variables for the number of years taught separately in each subject and school year. 
Samples include teachers who are assigned to teach at least one subject to six and more students who have been 
to their teachers' classrooms for at least 150 calendar days in their current school years. Samples exclude four 
teachers from schools that were subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" under the NCLB accountability 
system (two teachers from the 2009-2010 school year and the other two from the 2010-2011 school year).  
English/language arts English/
language arts
Science Science
Social studies Social studies
Social studies Social studies
Mathematics Mathematics
English/
language arts
English/
language arts
Mathematics Mathematics
English/
language arts
English/
language arts
Science Science
Percent of students taught in the school year (t ) Percent of students taught in the school year (t )
Marginal effects of absolute 
advantages in school year t  - 1
Marginal effects of absolute 
advantages in school year t  - 1
Marginal effects of teachers' absolute advantages on teacher assignments separately in each grade in five school 
years 2007-08 through 2011-2012
Marginal effects of teachers' absolute advantages on teacher assignments separately in each grade in five school 
years 2007-08 through 2011-2012 without school fixed effects
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
EFFECTS OF SUBJECT SPECIALZIATION ON STUDENT 
 ACHIEVEMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
Elementary school teacher certification is for generalists prepared to teach in self-
contained classrooms, where students receive instructions in all subjects from the same 
teacher. Although such certifications allow elementary school teachers to teach a wide range 
of subjects, those generalist teachers are not equally effective in teaching all subjects 
(Anderson, 1962). The research literature on teaching effectiveness has also shown that 
teacher job performance may often differ substantially across subjects.  
Researchers have found that some elementary school teachers teach in self-contained 
classrooms while other elementary school teachers teach different classes of students, and 
have done so since the 1920s. The latter group comprises content-specific teachers who 
specialize fully or partially in teaching one subject or some subjects in elementary schools. 
The observed specialization in elementary schools, to some extent, may result in some 
structural changes in the organization of schooling where teachers teach in their area of 
specialization and move from one classroom to another for instruction (i.e., a typical 
departmentalized organization which is widely operated in middle and high schools).  
Many studies have documented mixed school organization structures (i.e., both self-
contained classrooms and departmentalized organizations) in upper elementary grades 4 
through 6. Specialization becomes increasingly widespread as the grade level goes up. The 
degree of specialization for teachers in elementary schools varies not only with grade levels 
but also across school districts.  
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To date, empirical evidence is inconclusive about the effects of organization 
structures on student achievement (Contreras, 2009; Garrigan, 1992; Des Moines Public 
Schools, 1989). There have been no definitive studies of the advantages of specialization 
classroom structure over the self-contained classroom structure in elementary schools.  
Recently, education reform has turned to the question whether departmentalized 
elementary schools will increase student achievement (Jacob and Rockoff, 2011). Given the 
purpose of specialization to improve student test scores in elementary schools, there is a 
need for some empirical evidence of managing teacher assignments in order to see if subject 
specialization is associated with an increase in student test performance. In this study, I 
analyze the impact of specialization on student academic performance in elementary schools. 
This study compares students in schools where teachers are highly specialized to students in 
schools where teachers are mildly specialized.  
The impact of specialization on student test performance may be related to how 
specialization has been practiced within schools. One important concern on who should 
specialize is the effectiveness of specialist teachers in teaching their specialized subject(s). 
The effects of specialization may largely depend on whether the high-performing or low-
performing teachers specialize. One possibility of subject specialization that aims to raise 
student test scores is to allow relatively more effective teachers in a subject to specialize in 
teaching that subject. This study then concentrates on whether student test performance is 
associated with how specialization has been practiced within schools.  
To describe subject specialization based on teaching effectiveness within schools, 
this study estimates teacher value added. There is a long history of research that focuses on 
measuring teacher job performance. Researchers have developed value-added models to 
measure teaching effectiveness based on student achievement. Some states have 
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implemented a state-wide value-added system that aims to evaluate teacher job performance 
and to hold teachers accountable for student learning. This study uses teacher value-added 
estimates to identify teaching effectiveness and then constructs a specialization measure 
weighted by teachers’ value added to indicate whether the high-performing teachers have 
specialized and taught more students in that subject in a school.  
This study uses a longitudinal teacher-student database from the state of Tennessee 
in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012.1 I 
implement the Wooldridge’s dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) model to estimate 
teacher value added. The teacher effectiveness data are available in school years 2006-07 
through 2011-2012.2  
This study finds that specialization has not raised average test scores in mathematics, 
English/language arts, and social studies in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in 
Tennessee. Instead, specialization by teachers in science in grade 6 has had a positive effect 
on average science scores. This study then explores a variety of potential factors that affect 
the relationship between specialization and average test performance. In particular, my 
findings suggest that specialization based on teacher value added is positive and statistically 
significant in predicting average scores in mathematics, English/language arts, science, and 
social studies in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee. This specialization 
measure based on teacher value added is constructed as the sum of the weighted 
specialization for individual teachers multiplied by teachers’ value added in the same subject 
1 In Tennessee, not all middle schools begin in grade 6, where some schools departmentalize subjects 
with several teachers but other schools continue running self-contained classrooms until grade 7. 
Since schools in grade 6 are not fully departmentalized in Tennessee, I include grade 6 in my study. 
Furthermore, instead of separating grades by elementary and middle schools, I use the phrase “upper 
elementary grades 4 through 6” in this Chapter.  
2 For details on the value-added model used to estimate teacher effects, see Section 3 in Chapter II 
(pages 14 through 15).  
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separately in each grade within schools. I refer this measure as subject specialization 
weighted by value added. The impact of subject specialization weighted by value added on 
average test scores is substantially large at p < 0.001. One standard deviation increase in 
specialization weighted by value added raises average test scores by more than one standard 
deviation across grades 4 through 6 ranging from 1.04 through 1.40.     
This study is organized in the following fashion. In Section 2, I review literature on 
patterns of organization structures in elementary schools and the impact of both 
departmentalization in elementary schools and self-contained classroom on student test 
performance. Section 3 introduces my research questions. Section 4 illustrates my method, 
variables, and analytical samples. Section 5 presents the data used to answer my research 
questions. Section 6 presents my findings and section 7 concludes this chapter.  
Literature Review 
Research indicates that departmentalization has increased in upper elementary grades 
4 through 6, and many elementary schools have adopted alternative classroom structure 
models to facilitate student learning (i.e., variations of departmentalization).3 The effects of 
elementary school organization on student achievement have been examined in many 
empirical studies from 1920s to 1980s. The key research questions are centered on the 
relative advantages of departmentalized and self-contained organization structures and their 
effects on student achievement in elementary schools. The results of those studies have 
shown no evidence that one organizational structure is more effective than the other in 
improving students’ academic achievement (Des Moines Public Schools, 1989). To date, a 
summary of available studies published after the 1990s still has not supported the beliefs that 
departmentalization (or content specialization) improves the learning process of students.  
3 For details on classroom structures see Appendix A. 
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In the following sections, I first review the school organizational patterns used to 
organize elementary schools. Second, I summarize the results of recent studies on the 
relationship between elementary school organization (i.e., departmentalized and self-contain 
classrooms) and student test scores.  
1. Elementary School Organization Structures 
A survey conducted among 41 elementary schools in the Des Moines School District 
asked principals to describe the organization structures in their schools. Self-contained 
structures were mainly used at the primary grade levels while both semi-departmentalized 
and departmentalized structures occurred at the upper elementary grade levels. Results of 
this survey indicated that departmentalization was gradually introduced at the upper 
elementary grade levels (Des Moines Public Schools, 1989). Table 1 reproduced from the 
results of this survey displays the percentage of elementary schools at each grade level for 
three organization structures, respectively. Other findings of this survey indicate that, in the 
opinion of principals, (1) larger schools would prefer using a departmentalized structure and 
(2) the organizational structure in a school should depend on student needs and the expertise 
of their teachers.  
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Table 1 
Percentages for 41 elementary schools at each grade level by three organization structures 
 
  Elementary school organization structures 
Grade levels Self-contained Semi-departmentalized Departmentalized 
1 87% 13% --- 
2 90% 10% --- 
3 64% 23% 13% 
4 33% 28% 39% 
5 33% 26% 41% 
 
Source: Des Moines Public Schools, 1989. 
 
 
Results from another survey conducted among 125 randomly selected schools in 
each of six southeastern states also reveal a similar tendency for schools to have semi-
departmentalized and total departmentalized structures in each elementary grade (Roger and 
Palardy, 1987).4 Different from the prior survey study, Roger and Palardy analyze the 
organizational patterns in grades, Kindergarten (K) to 6, and they also include a partial self-
contained structure as one of the organization structures.5 The percentage of the surveyed 
schools to have self-contained classrooms remarkably decreases from grades 3 through 4 
(i.e., a 17 percent decrease). The major increase in the number of semi-departmentalized and 
total departmentalized classrooms at those surveyed schools happens in grades 4 and 6, 
respectively. There are nine percent more semi-departmentalized and total departmentalized 
classrooms in grade 4 compared to grade 3; and 10 percent more in grade 6 compared to 
grade 5.  
4 Six states include Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee.  
5 “Partial self-contained children remain with the same teacher for most instruction, but are leveled in 
one or more of the basic curriculum areas and move to another teacher or teachers for such 
instruction” (Roger and Palardy, 1987, p. 115). 
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McPartland et al. (1987) survey principals in the schools that participated in the 
Educational Quality Assessment administrated by Pennsylvania’s State Department of 
Education. Results of their study for schools in Pennsylvania show that mixed teacher 
assignments between self-contained and departmentalized assignments are found at all 
elementary grade levels and that the fully departmentalized assignment does not occur until 
grade 4.  
One way to describe the degree of specialization within schools is to count the 
number of different teachers who provide academic instruction in major academic subjects 
for a student within grades. When all teachers have self-contained classrooms, the number of 
different teachers per student is one; when a school is fully departmentalized (i.e., one 
teacher only teaches one subject), the number of different teachers per student is the number 
of academic subjects students have. McPartland et al. (1987) compute the percentage of 
schools within grades with one, two, and three (or more) different teachers per student. 
Their results suggest that the number of surveyed schools where students have three and 
more teachers in the four core academic subjects increases from 20 percent in grade 4 
through 48 percent in grade 6. In addition, the percentage of schools with one teacher per 
student drops from 48 percent in grade 4 through 22 percent in grade 6. There are no 
schools where students are taught by one and only one teacher in all academic subjects in 
grade 7 and higher.  
2.  Organization Structures and Student Test Scores 
Early investigations of the impact of elementary organization structures on student 
achievement are based on both results of research studies and educators’ opinions and 
observations. With the limitations and contradictory results of these prior studies as well as 
sometimes inconsistent definitions about departmentalization used in those published 
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studies, the literature does not establish the superiority of either self-contained or 
departmentalized structures in delivering effective instruction (Des Moines Public Schools, 
1989). In recent decades, more attention has been paid to school organization structures at 
upper elementary grade levels. My review of the literature focuses on comparing student 
achievement in grades 4 through 6 in self-contained and departmentalized classrooms.  
In 1990, Harris compared student achievement in mathematics and reading in grades 
5 and 6 between self-contained and departmentalized classrooms. This study focuses on 
students in three K-6 elementary schools in a small suburban school district over a five-year 
span (i.e., 1985 to 1989). In grades 5 and 6, two schools have self-contained classrooms and 
the third school (i.e., the largest of the three schools) has departmentalized classrooms. 
There are a total of 396 fifth graders and 449 sixth graders in five years in all schools. The 
student test data are analyzed using a multivariate analysis of covariance with multiple 
mathematics/reading tests as dependent variables and grade levels, organization structures, 
year dummies as independent variables. The findings of this study indicate that there is no 
significant effect on student test scores at either grade levels of either organizational 
structure.  
Harris’ study suffers from some weaknesses. He only focused on two of many 
organization structures.6 The analytical sample is limited to a small student population at two 
grade levels. His study only examined the effects of instructional organizations on student 
test scores in mathematics and language arts. Instead, my study includes students from more 
than one hundred districts and analyzes the effects of organization structure in four core 
6 This issue is also present in the recent studies when comparing student achievement between 
different organization structures.  
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academic subjects.7 More important, I consider hybrid structures since not all elementary 
teachers/schools are fully either self-contained or departmentalized.  
Harris (1996) uses a cross-sectional pre-post-test design to study the growth of the 
reading achievement for two randomly selected samples of 30 sixth graders. One sample of 
30 students as a control group receives instructions in self-contained classrooms; the other 
sample of 30 students as an experimental group receives instructions in a departmental 
program. All of those students attend the same school located in a predominantly lower 
socioeconomic area. Harris first shows that there is no significant difference in the pretest 
scores for two groups. Using a two-sample T-test based on the mean test scores, this study 
then reports that the students in the control group perform better in the posttest than the 
ones in the experimental group.   
This experimental study focuses on a small group of students at one school in grade 
6 in reading scores. It is interesting to know whether the similar results can be found when 
other researchers can expand Harris’ study to examine test score changes between self-
contained and departmentalized instruction programs in other subjects and other elementary 
grades using a large number of students. Although it is difficult to replicate this experiment 
on a large scale, it is possible to use non-experimental designs to answer whether 
departmentalization (or subject specialization) in elementary schools raise student test scores. 
Instead of comparing the mean difference, an application of regression analysis can also be 
used to evaluate the effects of specialization on student test scores in a large-scale study.  
More studies that find support for the self-contained structure are found in Garner 
and Rust (1992) and McGrath and Rust (2002). The first study examines 96 fifth graders’ test 
scores in departmentalized and self-contained rural schools in a lower middle socioeconomic 
7 Student test scores in science and social studies were not studied in Harris (1990).  
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county in Tennessee. The second study uses a slightly bigger sample (i.e., 197 fifth and sixth 
graders) in one school district in Tennessee. Both studies use the same analytical method, 
analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
In Garner and Rust (1992), all students attend self-contained classrooms in grade 4. 
In grade 5, there are 45 students attending four departmentalized classrooms and 51 students 
in three self-contained classrooms. Garner and Rust find that (1) there is no significant 
difference in terms of test scores in grade 4 and (2) observable student characteristics are 
balanced in two organization structures in grade 5 except that there are more boys in the 
self-contained classrooms than in the departmentalized classrooms. They analyze percentile 
scores using analysis of variances by organization structure, grade level, and gender. The 
results of their study show that percentile scores in all subject areas are significantly higher 
for the self-contained groups than the ones for the departmentalized groups at < 0.05 
significance level. The differences of the group means in two structures are 15.14 for 
reading, 12.87 for mathematics, 24.83 for science, and 12.39 for social studies.  
These findings support those of McGrath and Rust (2002). However, the significant 
effect of self-contained classrooms may not be consistent across all subjects studied. 
McGrath and Rust (2002) indicates that students in self-contained classrooms perform better 
than the ones in departmentalized classrooms in language and science, but no differences are 
found in reading, mathematics, and social studies.   
Those two studies further extend the existing literature by examining the effects of 
school organization structure in other upper elementary grades (i.e., grades 4 and 5) and all 
other academic subjects (i.e., science and socials studies). The scale of those studies are still 
considered as small, they focus on students at rural schools, and none of those studies 
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consider variation within self-contained and departmentalized categories (i.e., partially self-
contained and semi-departmentalized structures).  
Contreras (2009) conducts a critical review of literature studying the benefits of 
departmentalization on student achievement in elementary schools. Those studies used in 
Contreras’ research span over 50 years (i.e., from 1956 to 2008). The finding of Contreras’ 
study indicates that departmentalization does not appear to significantly improve student 
academic achievement in elementary schools.  
Building upon Contreras’ review and prior research, I summarize a number of 
studies that address the effects of departmentalized and self-contained structures on student 
achievement over 90 years. Table 2, reproduced from three studies, displays the results of 33 
articles on the relationship between elementary organization structures and student 
achievement. The result shows that few studies provide clear support for either elementary 
organizational structure on student achievement.  
The mixed findings regarding the effects of self-contained and departmentalized 
elementary schools in the literature may be due to the contradictory views about 
specialization. Specialization could be useful simply because it allows teachers to focus on 
one subject; therefore, they become better at teaching that subject than they would if their 
efforts were spread over several subjects. If specialization has not raised student test scores, 
the reason may be that self-contained classrooms provide teachers with more flexibility to 
organize instruction across subjects and better opportunity to integrate all subjects.  
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Table 2 
Comparative studies of student achievement in self-contained and departmentalized 
classrooms 
 
Study by Year Favorite structure Grade and/or subject area studied 
Otto 1923 Self-contained Grades 5-8 (Otto, 1950) 
Stewart 1927 Self-contained Grades 5-8 
Miller and 
Otto 
1930 No significant difference Grades 4-6 
Gerberich 
and Prall 
1931 Departmentalized Grades 4 and 6, Math 
  Grade 4, English 
  Self-contained Grade 4, Reading 
   Grades 4 and 5, Geography 
    No significant difference Grades 4-6, All other comparisons 
Woods 1949 Non-departmentalized Grade 8, Stanford Achievement Test 
Jackson 1953 No significant difference Grades 5, 7, and 8 (Morrison, 1967) 
Hosley 1954 No significant difference Grade 6 (Morrison, 1967) 
    Self-contained Grade 6 (Slavin, 1988) 
Spivak 1956 Self-contained Grades 7 and 8 
Snyder 1957 Self-contained Grade 6 
Woods 1959 Self-contained Grades 8 and 9 
Coffin 1961 Departmentalized Grades 5 and 6, All except Math 
  No significant difference Grade 4 
    No significant difference Grades 4-6, Math 
Stoddard 1961 No significant difference Grades 1-5 
Gibb and 
Matala 
1962 No significant difference Grades 5 and 6 Math, All ability levels 
  Departmentalized Grades 5 and 6, Science, All ability 
levels 
Zimmerman 1962 No significant difference Grade 7, English and Social studies 
Coffin 1963 No significant difference Grades 4-6, All areas 
Elseroad 1965 Self-contained Grades 4 and 6, Math and Reading 
  No significant difference Grades 4 and 6, All other subjects 
    Self-contained Grades 4 and 6, Pupils with IQs 75-89 
Gibb and 
Matala 
1967 Departmentalized Grade 5, Social Studies 
  No significant difference Grade 6 
Grooms 1967 No significant difference Grades 4 and 6 Reading and Science 
  No significant difference Grade 4, Math 
    Self-contained Grades 4 and 6, All other comparisons 
Morrison 1967 Self-contained Grades 6 and 7,  
Middle socioeconomic, Math 
  No significant difference Grades 6 and 7,  
Lower socioeconomic, Math 
    Contradictory Grades 6 and 7,  
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High socioeconomic, Math 
Cleavinger 1968 Departmentalized Grade 6, Word meaning 
  Self-contained Grade 5 Social studies and Language 
      Grade 6, Social studies and Math 
Ward 1970 Self-contained Grades 4-6, Reading and Science 
    No significant difference Grades 4-6, Social Science and Math 
Case 1972 Departmentalized Grade 5, Reading and Math 
Gould 1973 No significant difference Grades 4-6, Work-study section 
  Departmentalized Grade 6 Social studies composite score 
Caliste 1975 No significant difference Grades 7 and 8, Grade point average 
(GPA) 
Bowser 1984 Self-contained Grade 4, Social studies 
  No significant difference Grade 4, Science 
    No significant difference Grade 5, Social studies 
Becker 1987 Departmentalized Grade 6, High socioeconomic levels 
    Self-contained Grade 6, Low socioeconomic levels 
(Slavin, 1988) 
Harris 1990 No significant difference Grades 5 and 6, Math and Language 
arts 
Walker 1990 Departmentalized Grades 1, 2, and 5, Stanford Diagnostic 
Math 
Garner and 
Rust  
1992 Self-contained Grade 5, Stanford Achievement Test 
Harris 1996 Self-contained Grade 6, Reading 
McGrath 
and Rust 
2002 Self-contained Grades 5 and 6, Language and Science 
  No significant difference Grades 5 and 6, Reading, Math, and 
Social studies 
Patton 2003 No significant difference Grade 5, Math 
Butzin et al. 2006 Non-self-contained Grades 3 to 5, All standardized tests 
 
Sources: Des Moines Public Schools, 1989; Garrigan, 1992; Contreras, 2009. 
 
Overall, there are a couple of limitations in those studies that examine the benefits of 
departmentalized and self-contained elementary schools. They include ignoring variation 
within a particular organization structure, relatively small sample size, relatively short time 
period of analysis, and a limited set of academic subjects available for study. In addition, 
none of the recent studies discuss the importance of teacher job performance when 
comparing self-contained to departmentalized classrooms/schools.  
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Clearly, there is a need for some evidence about how teacher assignments in upper 
elementary grades raise student test scores. My study revisits the question relating to the 
effects of various degrees of departmentalization on student test performance in elementary 
schools and overcomes the limitations mentioned above. In particular, it may be that the 
benefits of specialization largely depend on the criteria used to make decisions on subject 
specialization. Specialization may not have been made on a manner associated with higher 
student test scores. I further extend this analysis to determine whether subject specialization 
based on teaching effectiveness affects the effects of subject specialization on student test 
performance.  
Research Questions 
This study examines the impacts of specialization of elementary school teachers on 
student test performance but with some substantial differences compared to the existing 
literature on the impact of school organization structures on student learning. This study is 
the first to empirically test whether specialization in upper elementary grades is associated 
with increasing student test performance in the all core academic subjects of mathematics, 
English/language arts, science, and social studies, using student- and teacher-level data from 
an entire state of Tennessee over nine school years. Secondly, this study differs from any 
available studies because of my specialization measure that describes hybrid structures of 
classrooms/schools. Thirdly, this study considers whether subject specialization based on 
teaching effectiveness affects student test performance. This study asks two research 
questions:  
Research question 1: Has specialization, in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in 
Tennessee, raised student test performance in the core subjects of mathematics, 
English/language arts, science, and social studies, respectively?  
 
Research question 2: Does subject specialization based on teaching effectiveness in a 
subject raise student test performance in that subject?  
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 Many prior studies have compared achievement outcomes between those students 
who are taught in self-contained classrooms and those who are taught in departmentalized 
classrooms in elementary schools. This may be due to the fact that those studies only focus 
on a handful group of schools. The organization structure can be predetermined in a grade 
in the selected schools for study. Unfortunately, when looking at school organization 
structures across more than one hundred districts in a state, it is likely that there is a great 
variation in school organization structures in elementary schools.   
As noted above, some teachers could teach more students in some subjects while 
they teach fewer students and/or do not teach in other subject(s) in upper elementary grades 
4 through 6. The description of teacher assignments in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 
is presented in Section 4 in Chapter II on page 18 – 24. The complex pattern of teacher 
assignments across different subjects often involves elements of self-contained and 
departmentalized classrooms.   
Instead of identifying self-contained and departmentalized classrooms for students, I 
use a continuous measure qualifying the degrees of specialization in a subject for elementary 
school teachers. Often, teachers are not fully departmentalized in elementary schools. For 
example, they teach different classes of students in one subject and the same class of 
students in other subjects. In this study, subject specialization is measured as the percent of 
students in a subject taught by a teacher in a grade.8 This measure describes teacher 
assignments in elementary schools that are not limited only to self-contained and 
departmentalized classrooms. To the best of my awareness, my measure of subject 
8 The majority of teachers (about 95 percent) in grades 4 through 6 taught in one and only one grade; 
some (2.6 to 3.34 percent) taught the same subject(s) in multiple grades; and others (1.5 to 2.31 
percent) taught different subjects in multiple grades in each year.  
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specialization has not been implemented in any existing literature on the effects of school 
organization structures on student achievement in elementary schools. This measure is also 
used in Chapter II as the dependent variable that describes teacher assignments in a subject.  
Different from Chapter II, I further average this measure to form the school-grade 
average share of students in a subject for all teachers in that subject. The weighted average 
share of a teacher’s students in a subject in a grade in a school describes whether that school 
is highly specialized or mildly specialized in that subject in that grade. The weight is the ratio 
of the number of students taught by a teacher in a subject to all the students in that subject 
in a grade in a school (i.e., 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘⁄ ). This study then uses the weighted average share of a 
teacher’s students in a subject to predict average student performance in that subject.  
My regression analyses examine the impact of the weighted average share of students 
in a subject on average test scores in that subject at the school-grade level. While teaching 
effectiveness in a subject is correlated with student test scores in that subject, it is not certain 
that increasing the share of a teacher’s students in a subject would also raise student test 
scores. There are two reasons that explain whether there is a possible effect of specialization 
by teachers in a subject on average test performance in that subject. First, teachers improve 
their own effectiveness through specialization. Specialization allows teachers to concentrate 
on fewer subjects instead of spreading their efforts to all subjects. Such change on teaching 
effectiveness may quickly plateau. Second, specialization based on teaching effectiveness in a 
subject allows relatively more effective teachers in that subject to teach students rather than 
the less effective teachers within schools.  
In short, this chapter first examines the relationship between specialization by 
teachers in a subject and average test scores in that subject at the school-grade level; and 
then considers a variety of issues related to specialization in a subject in schools that also 
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influence average test scores in that subject. More important, I consider prior value-added 
among teachers who specialize as a factor determining the gains from specialization in 
Tennessee’s public elementary schools.   
Empirical Methodology  
1.  The School-Grade Level Achievement Model 
 The average of student test scores in a subject is a function of specialization by 
teachers who taught in that subject in a school, a set of school characteristics, and dummy 
variables for grade, school year, and the interaction terms between grades and school years. 
My analyses use schools with tested students in all grades 4 through 6 (Model 1). I also 
consider the possible difference of specialization effects on average test scores separately in 
each grade (Model 2). The concern for the second set of analyses is with the fact that 
specialization has become widespread and broadly accepted in grade 6 over time and there is 
still a great deal of controversy over the consequences of specialization in grades 4 and 5 in 
most elementary schools. It is possible that self-contained classrooms provide teachers with 
more flexibility to response specific needs for students when learning focuses mostly on 
literacy development across different subjects. This specific advantage of self-contained 
classrooms gradually disappears with increasing skill sets and competencies required for 
teaching and learning non-verbal subjects. The effects of subject specialization are likely to 
be different on average test performance as the grade level goes up. This study further tests 
the difference of specialization effects on average test performance between Models 1 and 2. 
I use the analysis of specialization by mathematics teachers on average mathematics scores as 
an example to discuss my school achievement models. My model 1 for the mathematics 
analysis in grades 4 through 6 is presented below:  
?̅?𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1?̅?𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝜋𝜋 + 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 + 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,                                                     (1) 
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where ?̅?𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the average of student test scores in mathematics in school m in school year t; 
?̅?𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is specialization by mathematics teachers in school m in school year t; 𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is a vector of 
time-variant school-level characteristics; 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 is school fixed effects for school m; 𝜋𝜋 is a 
matrix of dummy variables for grades, school years, and the interaction terms between 
grades and school years; and 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the error term clustered at the school level.9  
This study controls for school fixed effects and time-variant school characteristics. 
The fixed effects capture the effects of time-invariant and unobservable characteristics that 
are correlated with school average performance. Those factors refer to the quality of 
principals and school contexts such as school size, location, and teachers’ attitudes on 
students (e.g., motivation and expectation). The time-variant school characteristics include 
the percentage of students who are female; the percentage of minority students in each 
race/ethnicity category (e.g., Black, Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian); and a set of 
percentages of students who receive free/reduced-price school lunch (FRL) and special 
education service (SPED), and who are English language learner (ELL), gifted students, and 
migrant students. Research has shown that students with specific characteristics (i.e., sex, 
race/ethnicity, FRL, SPED, and gifted and migrant status) perform differently on their tests 
in schools and those student characteristics variables are often used to predict student test 
scores. In this study, the average of student test scores is then influenced by student 
composition within a school. Controlling time-variant school characteristics also increases 
the precision of the estimates and reduces the potential of omitted variable bias.10  
9 The superscripts for subject and grade are omitted for notation clarity.   
10 For instance, the degree of specialization in a subject may be relatively high in affluent and high 
achieving schools than their counterparts or vice versa.   
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My mathematics model further includes dummy variables for grades, school years, 
and the interaction terms between grades and school years. Those dummy variables capture 
changes on the test contents, concentration of teaching and practice in a subject, and test 
difficulty across grades and school years.  
I standardize student test scores within subject, grade, and year, and then average the 
standardized scores separately in each subject and each grade within schools. All students 
with valid test scores in all Tennessee’s public elementary schools are used to estimate the 
standardized scores. The coefficient on ?̅?𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 can be interpreted as changes on average 
performance in a subject by 𝛽𝛽1 standard deviation points with one standard deviation 
increase in the weighted average percent of students taught by teachers in that subject.  
To estimate the effects of subject specialization separately in each grade, I further 
control for the interaction terms between subject specialization and grade dummy variables. 
This study then reports the marginal effects of subject specialization on average test scores 
separately in each grade. I perform F-test on the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between specialization and grade dummy variables to learn whether the grade-specific effects 
are different from the pooled effects across all grades.   
This study uses a sample of average test scores in grades 4 through 6 separately in 
each subject in Tennessee’s public elementary schools over nine school years 2003-04 
through 2011-2012. In each analysis, the analytical sample includes all schools with average 
student test scores in a subject. When estimating average test scores within schools, I restrict 
the sample to students who attended a teacher’s classroom for at least 150 calendar days. My 
analytical sample does not include the same number of schools in a subject. The different 
number of schools across subject-specific models is due to the fact that the student-teacher 
links are not available for all four core academic subjects in some schools. For example, 
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students’ teachers in mathematics, English/language arts, and science are identifiable in a 
grade in a school but not the students’ teachers in social studies.11  
2.  Threats to Validity 
While my analytical model controls for time-variant school characteristics, it is 
possible that some factors kept in the error term not only influence average test scores but 
also are correlated with subject specialization within schools. The effects of specialization on 
average test scores may be biased depending on the correlation between specialization by 
teachers in a subject in a school and the omitted variables. To explore such bias on subject 
specialization, this study compares the coefficient estimates before and after controlling for 
some potential omitted variables.  
This study considers whether specialization might be a response to a negative trend 
of average school performance in a subject. I test a hypothesis whether the increase in 
subject specialization in a school results from the increase in the pressure to raise average 
school performance in that school. If this trend continues but is not controlled in the model, 
specialization appears to be ineffective.  
I use school NCLB accountability status levels in a prior year to control for this 
negative trend. Under NCLB, school status levels are determined by Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) and schools’ history of NCLB accountability status levels. Schools were 
subject to a variety of NCLB sanctions depending on how many years those schools have 
failed to meet AYP. To achieve AYP every year, one of important criteria is that schools 
11 This is a data quality concern where the student-teacher links are not available in a subject in a 
grade for all students in a school. For the number of schools with no student-teacher links separately 
in each subject, see Appendix C. Overall, there are 1.7 percent of schools where all students in a 
grade are not linked to teachers in a subject over nine school years.   
87 
 
                                                            
meet the performance benchmarks or make sufficient progress to the benchmarks in tested 
grades and subjects (i.e., mathematics and English/language arts).  
Schools have continuously faced accountability pressures due to the fact that student 
test performance has not met AYP over time. Managing teacher assignments could have 
been used for school improvement. Specialization may be one of the managerial strategies 
implemented either at the sanctioned schools (i.e., low achieving schools) to boost student 
test performance or in good standing schools to sustain student test performance.  
This study controls for a matrix of dummy variables for one-year lagged NCLB 
status levels in the model. Schools are grouped in three NCLB status levels, good standing, 
target, and sanction as well as an indicator for schools without NCLB accountability status.12 
The omitted category for NCLB dummy variables is the schools that were subject to NCLB 
sanctions in a prior year.    
Data 
This study uses longitudinal data on students and teachers in grades 4 through 6 in 
Tennessee’s public elementary schools in nine school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012. 
Students are linked to their teachers through student-course records extracted from 
Tennessee’s Oracle Education Information System. This course-record data file is prepared 
by Tennessee Consortium Research, Evaluation, and Development (TNCRED). A total 
number of three million students in nine school years are included in this study.13 Table 3 
displays descriptive statistics of standardized test scores and subject specialization by 
teachers separately in each subject and each grade in Tennessee’s public elementary schools 
in schools years 2003-04 through 2011-2012.  
12 For detail on school NCLB accountability measure, see Section 4 in Chapter II on page 18.  
13 For detail information on the data used in this study, see Section 4 in Chapter II on page 16 
through 18.  
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In Panel 1 of Table 3, the average of standardized test scores separately in each 
subject and each grade in my analytical samples are slightly above zero varying from 0.01 to 
0.05. This is because my analytical sample excludes students who are not linked to any 
teachers in a subject and who have not attended their schools for at least 150 calendar days. 
It is likely that those students (mostly transfer students) appear to have lower test scores 
than the ones used in the regression analysis. The exclusion of those students is less than 
two percent of the overall students separately in each subject in my data and does not likely 
alter the effect of subject specialization on average test scores.14  
In Panel 2 of Table 3, I present descriptive statistics of specialization by teachers 
separately in each subject and each grade at the school level. The average percent of students 
taught by teachers in a subject gradually increases over time. These averages of subject 
specialization are quantitatively similar in grade 4 and 5 but the ones in grade 5 are always 
slightly higher with roughly twice large of standard deviations. In the opposite, subject 
specialization is much higher in grade 6 compared to other grades across all subjects. Those 
facts suggest that schools have paid more attention to subject specialization in recent years 
than before and specialization has been made more frequently in grade 6 than in other 
elementary grades.    
 
 
 
 
14 Appendix D presents the percent of students not included in my sample separately in each grade in 
school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012. The number of omitted students is trivial compared to the 
overall number of students in nine school years in three grades; moreover, I average test scores for 
individual students to the grade by school level.   
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Table 3
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
Grade 4
Mathematics 0.0376 0.0261 0.0416 0.0417 0.0405 0.0379 0.0195 0.0200 0.0213
(0.9931) (0.9934) (0.9896) (0.9897) (0.9891) (0.9918) (0.9962) (0.9903) (0.9842)
0.0352 0.0248 0.0436 0.0408 0.0392 0.0372 0.0188 0.0186 0.0211
(0.9930) (0.9933) (0.9809) (0.9908) (0.9867) (0.9850) (0.9955) (0.9902) (0.9855)
Science 0.0311 0.0236 0.0423 0.0447 0.0444 0.0393 0.0201 0.0192 0.0215
(0.9906) (0.9951) (0.9890) (0.9902) (0.9864) (0.9892) (0.9964) (0.9911) (0.9852)
Social studies 0.0340 0.0272 0.0442 0.0419 0.0434 0.0391 0.0329 0.0241 0.0168
(0.9908) (0.9854) (0.9856) (0.9851) (0.9868) (0.9858) (0.9879) (0.9890) (0.9839)
Grade 5
Mathematics 0.0404 0.0338 0.0427 0.0401 0.0413 0.0380 0.0230 0.0216 0.0250
(0.9933) (0.9904) (0.9875) (0.9849) (0.9921) (0.9959) (0.9922) (0.9848) (0.9791)
0.0405 0.0300 0.0454 0.0403 0.0422 0.0376 0.0207 0.0207 0.0232
(0.9898) (0.9884) (0.9789) (0.9782) (0.9818) (0.9905) (0.9911) (0.9860) (0.9811)
Science 0.0346 0.0280 0.0412 0.0384 0.0448 0.0403 0.0231 0.0217 0.0242
(0.9950) (0.9919) (0.9850) (0.9888) (0.9875) (0.9887) (0.9927) (0.9861) (0.9808)
Social studies 0.0402 0.0331 0.0432 0.0399 0.0438 0.0411 0.0341 0.0210 0.0159
(0.9882) (0.9844) (0.9791) (0.9886) (0.9876) (0.9840) (0.9874) (0.9872) (0.9838)
Grade 6
Mathematics 0.0424 0.0473 0.0445 0.0470 0.0423 0.0425 0.0287 0.0261 0.0239
(0.9893) (0.9863) (0.9832) (0.9839) (0.9861) (0.9866) (0.9824) (0.9785) (0.9814)
0.0403 0.0431 0.0435 0.0467 0.0408 0.0405 0.0262 0.0234 0.0219
(0.9909) (0.9833) (0.9852) (0.9840) (0.9818) (0.9835) (0.9836) (0.9799) (0.9827)
Science 0.0373 0.0397 0.0362 0.0447 0.0431 0.0391 0.0279 0.0252 0.0233
(0.9834) (0.9816) (0.9822) (0.9806) (0.9819) (0.9859) (0.9837) (0.9795) (0.9827)
Social studies 0.0401 0.0411 0.0380 0.0429 0.0405 0.0396 0.0305 0.0128 0.0133
(0.9792) (0.9728) (0.9813) (0.9749) (0.9779) (0.9803) (0.9812) (0.9843) (0.9878)
Panel 2: Subject specialization
Grade 4
Percent of students taught in
Mathematics 26.01 27.19 26.93 26.63 26.57 26.80 26.75 27.08 27.47
(8.32) (11.71) (10.99) (9.91) (9.66) (10.89) (10.61) (11.89) (13.68)
29.85 30.38 29.75 30.54 31.11 31.53 32.11 31.71 33.19
(17.82) (18.86) (17.40) (18.57) (19.56) (20.53) (21.46) (20.79) (22.70)
Science 26.04 26.64 26.19 25.58 25.70 25.73 25.90 26.08 26.09
(8.43) (10.90) (9.74) (7.26) (8.35) (7.95) (8.26) (9.21) (9.90)
Social studies 25.37 26.09 25.72 25.22 25.12 25.47 25.60 25.82 25.84
(5.03) (8.86) (7.81) (5.74) (6.19) (7.17) (7.30) (8.77) (9.48)
Grade 5
Percent of students taught in
Mathematics 28.10 29.39 28.51 28.81 28.97 29.22 29.46 30.54 32.30
(14.57) (16.91) (14.92) (15.42) (15.36) (16.65) (17.04) (19.08) (22.18)
34.94 36.11 34.09 36.10 35.74 36.93 37.75 37.03 39.42
(24.14) (25.52) (23.10) (25.33) (25.07) (26.60) (27.10) (26.49) (28.59)
Science 28.35 28.95 28.35 28.01 28.17 27.96 28.31 28.72 30.09
(14.45) (16.70) (14.36) (14.04) (14.34) (14.36) (14.87) (15.77) (18.21)
Social studies 27.19 27.82 27.40 27.23 27.45 27.48 27.61 28.43 29.17
(12.22) (14.19) (12.57) (13.24) (13.37) (13.74) (13.88) (15.65) (16.82)
Grade 6
Percent of students taught in
Mathematics 41.14 45.47 46.56 47.24 49.67 51.18 51.57 56.19 59.00
(34.21) (35.07) (34.90) (35.21) (35.99) (37.53) (37.40) (38.28) (39.44)
49.35 53.35 54.39 56.91 59.13 61.69 61.40 65.06 65.98
(36.17) (36.57) (36.60) (36.75) (37.04) (37.43) (37.55) (37.49) (37.87)
Science 39.68 43.61 44.34 44.36 46.10 47.24 47.99 51.30 51.64
(32.86) (33.58) (33.39) (33.41) (34.10) (35.27) (36.23) (36.54) (36.97)
Social studies 37.84 39.70 41.36 40.97 43.17 44.65 44.70 48.89 50.25
(31.82) (31.32) (31.83) (31.74) (33.09) (34.45) (34.78) (35.76) (36.63)
English/
language arts
English/
language arts
English/
language arts
English/
language arts
Descriptive statistics of standardized test scores and subject specialization in school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012 in upper 
elementary grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee
Panel 1: Standardized test scores
School year
English/
language arts
English/
language arts
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Results 
1. Key Findings 
The effects of specialization by teachers within schools on average test performance 
are reported in Table 4 separately for each subject. Those analyses use schools in nine years 
from 2003-04 through 2011-2012. The upper panel presents the effects of subject 
specialization in a sample of pooling all grades; and the lower panel presents the effects 
separately in each grade.  
For each set of model specifications, I present two sets of regression coefficients 
using the models with and without controlling for school fixed effects, respectively. For 
example, in mathematics in the upper panel, the effect of specialization is positive and 
insignificant (i.e., 0.011) in the school fixed-effect (SCH-FE) model but negative (i.e., -0.018) 
in the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model.15 The OLS models are likely to suffer from an 
omitted variable bias which is specific to a school and fixed over time. The omitted variables 
may include principal managerial efforts and their knowledge about teaching effectiveness 
for individual teachers that not only influence school performance but also positively 
correlates with teacher assignments.16 Unfortunately, this type of variables are not observable 
for this study.17 By controlling school fixed effects, the models may substantially reduce the 
omitted variable bias from the time-invariant unobserved influence. The results reported 
below are from the school fixed-effect models.   
15 A significant difference can be found in the lower panel for the grade-specific effects in the models 
of science and social studies where the fixed-effect model reports significant effects but not the OLS 
models.  
16 A good leader knows which teachers can effectively raise student test scores in a subject and keeps 
those teachers in the classrooms for that subject.   
17 Teaching effectiveness measured by teacher value added is estimable in this study. The discussion 
about controlling teachers’ value-added in school-achievement models is addressed after reporting 
the main results.  
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Table 4
OLS SCH-FE OLS SCH-FE OLS SCH-FE OLS SCH-FE
-0.0175 0.0109 -0.0227 0.0135 0.0162 0.0199 -0.0054 -0.0077
(0.0181) (0.0173) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0179) (0.0191) (0.0193) (0.0199)
Observations 20,353 20,353 20,421 20,421 20,352 20,352 20,341 20,341
R-squared 0.4521 0.6281 0.5451 0.6848 0.5778 0.7077 0.5308 0.6842
Adjusted R-squared 0.4511 0.6000 0.5442 0.6610 0.5770 0.6856 0.5299 0.6602
0.0730 0.0233 0.0538 0.0427 -0.0043 -0.0822† -0.1170 -0.1670*
(0.0496) (0.0528) (0.0331) (0.0307) (0.0477) (0.0434) (0.0720) (0.0730)
-0.0320 -0.0080 -0.0159 0.0049 0.0255 0.0092 0.0341 -0.0059
(0.0247) (0.0226) (0.0195) (0.0189) (0.0276) (0.0285) (0.0295) (0.0293)
-0.0305 0.0198 -0.0540** 0.0101 0.0146 0.0468* -0.0105 0.0153
(0.0221) (0.0215) (0.0202) (0.0191) (0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0230)
Observations 20,353 20,353 20,421 20,421 20,352 20,352 20,341 20,341
R-squared 0.4524 0.6282 0.5454 0.6849 0.5778 0.7079 0.5311 0.6845
Adjusted R-squared 0.4513 0.5999 0.5445 0.6610 0.5770 0.6858 0.5301 0.6606
F-test in model specification 2
H0: Interaction terms between specialization and grade dummy variables are jointly equal to zero.
P-value (df  = 2) 0.1120 0.4803 0.0164 0.4213 0.8112 0.0301 0.0789 0.0606
Effects of specialization on average test scores in Tennessee's public elementary schools in school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012
Average test scores Mathematics Englissh/language arts Science Social studies
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value 
<0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Samples include schools with student test scores in grades 4 through 6 in nine school years 2003-
04 through 2011-2012. All models control for time-variant school characteristics and dummy variables for grades, school years, and interaction 
terms between grades and school years. The models labeled as "SCH-FE" control for school fixed effects. 
Subject specialization in 
grade 5
Subject specialization in 
grade 6
Model specification 2: Using all schools in grades 4 through 6 and interacting specialization with grade dummy 
variables
Model specification 1: Using all schools in grades 4 through 6
Subject specialization
Subject specialization in 
grade 4
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In the upper panel of Table 4, the results from the school fixed-effect model 
separately in each subject suggest that specialization has no effects on average test scores in 
mathematics, English/language arts, science, and social studies. In the lower panel of Table 
4, I report the marginal effects of subject specialization separately in each grade. The results 
of F-test statistics suggest that the difference between the pooled specialization effects across 
all grades and the ones separately in each grade is not statistically significant in mathematics 
and English/language arts, and social studies at p < 0.05. Instead, the F-test statistics in the 
science model rejects the null hypothesis in which the interaction terms between 
specialization and grade dummy variables are jointly equal to zero at p < 0.05. I find no 
effects of specialization on average science scores in grade 5. In the opposite, specialization 
by science teachers is statistically significant to predict the average science scores in grades 4 
(i.e., -0.08 at p < 0.1) and 6 (0.05 at p < 0.05).  
A plausible explanation for the negative effects in science in grade 4 is that 
specialization makes teachers less likely to know their students well, which is crucial to raise 
student science scores in grade 4. Science teaching in grade 4 is highly likely to focus on how 
effectively students can read and learn through a variety of science-related reading materials. 
Self-contained classrooms provide the opportunity where teachers can combine some 
learning activities across different subjects and be flexible about their teaching emphasis 
based on what they learn about their students’ strength and weakness.18  
18 The effect of specialization in social studies in grade 4 in the fixed-effect model is also negative and 
statistically significant, but the F-test statistics fails to reject the null hypothesis where none of the 
interaction terms between specialization and grade dummy variables is statistically different from 
zero at p < 0.05. As being said above, this may be due to the fact that self-contained classroom 
teachers are likely to response to specific needs for students with more flexibility while social studies 
specialists cannot. It is possible that students who read better perform well in the social studies test in 
grade 4 since teaching in elementary social studies centers on the knowledge of history. Students may 
score better in social studies if they have learned how to read effectively.   
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To the contrary, the advanced science skills are normally introduced in later grades 
where teaching science centers beyond how effectively students can read. Students may 
score higher in science if they have been taught by science specialists instead of self-contain 
classroom teachers who cannot provide enough subject-related teaching.  
2. Threats to Validity  
This study further examines the internal validity of the effects of subject 
specialization on average test performance. The threats to validity (i.e., an omitted variable 
bias) can be found if those estimates are changed after controlling for the factors that are 
correlated with specialization and test scores. I have controlled for dummy variables for one-
year lagged NCLB status levels in the school average performance models. Since test scores 
in science and social studies are not used to estimate school AYP results, any change is not 
expected in those subjects.  
Column (3) of Table 5 presents the effects of subject specialization on average test 
performance in the models that control for lagged NCLB dummy variables. Those analyses 
use five school years 2007-08 through 2011-2012 where the lagged NCLB data are available. 
In order to reveal changes on the effects of subject specialization, the column (1) reports the 
school fixed-effect findings from Table 4 using the samples in nine school years; and I also 
re-estimate those models in the column (2) using only five school years where lagged NCLB 
data are available for schools but not controlling for those dummy variables. Furthermore, I 
also estimate the grade-specific effects of subject specialization and report the marginal 
effects separately in each grade in the lower panel of Table 5.  
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Table 5
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
0.0109 0.0190 0.0185 0.0135 0.0150 0.0175 0.0199 0.0265 0.0284 -0.0077 0.0039 0.0058
(0.0173) (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0153) (0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0191) (0.0228) (0.0225) (0.0199) (0.0235) (0.0236)
-0.1427*** -0.1250*** -0.1678*** -0.1249***
(0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0253) (0.0197)
-0.0981*** -0.1035*** -0.1365*** -0.0997***
(0.0181) (0.0193) (0.0233) (0.0180)
-0.1773*** -0.1381*** -0.1562*** -0.1427***
(0.0366) (0.0358) (0.0411) (0.0367)
Observations 20,353 11,735 11,735 20,421 11,787 11,787 20,352 11,725 11,725 20,341 11,724 11,724
R-squared 0.6281 0.6375 0.6421 0.6848 0.6857 0.6892 0.7077 0.7137 0.7182 0.6842 0.7187 0.7211
Adjusted R-squared 0.6000 0.5893 0.5944 0.6610 0.6441 0.6479 0.6856 0.6756 0.6806 0.6602 0.6813 0.6839
0.0233 -0.0249 -0.0265 0.0427 -0.0095 -0.0060 -0.0822† -0.0857† -0.0806 -0.1670* -0.0926† -0.0889†
(0.0528) (0.0419) (0.0412) (0.0307) (0.0324) (0.0322) (0.0434) (0.0519) (0.0514) (0.0730) (0.0516) (0.0518)
-0.0080 0.0116 0.0108 0.0049 0.0116 0.0139 0.0092 -0.0068 -0.0037 -0.0059 0.0231 0.0260
(0.0226) (0.0257) (0.0250) (0.0189) (0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0285) (0.0294) (0.0290) (0.0293) (0.0312) (0.0312)
0.0198 0.0381 0.0381 0.0101 0.0276 0.0300 0.0468* 0.0680** 0.0687** 0.0153 0.0083 0.0093
(0.0215) (0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0191) (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0230) (0.0275) (0.0276)
Observations 20,353 11,735 11,735 20,421 11,787 11,787 20,352 11,725 11,725 20,341 11,724 11,724
R-squared 0.6282 0.6376 0.6422 0.6849 0.6857 0.6892 0.7079 0.7141 0.7186 0.6845 0.7189 0.7212
Adjusted R-squared 0.5999 0.5894 0.5945 0.6610 0.6441 0.6479 0.6858 0.6759 0.6809 0.6606 0.6814 0.6840
F-Test in model specification 2
H0: Interaction terms between specialization and grade dummy variables are joinly equal to zero.
P-Value (df  = 2) 0.4803 0.3893 0.3618 0.4213 0.5939 0.6092 0.0301 0.0081 0.0099 0.0606 0.0751 0.0779
Effects of specialization on average test scores in Tennessee's public elementary schools
Average test scores Mathematics English/language arts Science Social studies
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-
value <0.001. Samples in Column (1) include schools with student test scores in grades 4 through 6 or separately in each grade in nine school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012; and 
Columns (2) and (3) use the samples restricted to the school years 2007-08 through 2011-2012 where the lagged school NCLB data are available. All models control for time-variant 
school characteristics and dummy variables for school years. The pulled models using schools in grades 4 through 6 control for dummy variables for grades and interaction terms 
between grades and school years. All models control for school fixed effects. In column (3), additinal covariates include dummy variables for two NCLB status levels, good 
standing and target and a dummy variable that indicates schools with no NCLB status levels. The omitted category for NCLB status levels is the schools that were subject to NCLB 
sanctions. 
Subject specialization in 
grade 6
Model specification 1: Using all schools in grades 4 through 6
Model specification 2: Using all schools in grades 4 through 6 and interacting specialization with grade dummy variables
Subject specialization in 
grade 4
Subject specialization in 
grade 5
Subject specialization
Schools in good standing 
under NCLB in year t  - 1
Schools in target under 
NCLB in year t  - 1
Schools without NCLB 
status levels in year t  - 1
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There is no evidence that the effect of subject specialization is significantly changed 
before and after controlling for lagged NCLB status levels – comparing the coefficients 
between columns (2) and (3). This is also true when I examine the grade-specific effects. The 
pooled effects indicate that specialization has no effects on average test scores in any 
subjects in elementary schools in those five-year analyses. The results of F-test statistics 
show that the pooled results are not statistically different from the grade-specific effects in 
all subjects except science.  
An interesting finding in Table 5 is that all significant effects found in the column (1) 
are smaller than the ones in the column (2) and the direction of the relationship between 
specialization and test scores has remained the same. One fact that may be related to this 
difference is that specialization separately in each subject and each grade has been growing in 
elementary schools over time (See Panel 2 of Table 3). One speculation would be that 
schools have been learning how specialization could help improve school performance over 
time. In recent years, since more specialization has been observed in schools, there is a better 
opportunity for schools to learn how specialization needs to be done with the aim to raise 
student test scores.  
As worth noting, the effects of lagged school NCLB accountability status levels are 
negative and statistically significant to predict average test performance in all subjects and 
grades. Table 6 presents the number of schools with students in grades 4 through 6 by 
school NCLB accountability status. Over time, fewer schools have met the requirements for 
good standing from 1,115 in 2006-07 to 648 in 2010-2011; and more schools have been 
placed in target status and subject to NCLB sanctions.   
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NCLB status 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-2010 2010-2011
Good Standing 1,115 1,072 1,024 982 648
Target 66 116 141 157 426
School Improvement 1 25 28 49 83 112
School Improvement 2 10 6 12 27 68
Corrective Action 9 7 2 6 23
Restructuring 1 4 4 3 2 4
Restructuring 2 1 0 2 3 3
State/LEA Reconstitution 7 1 0 2 4
N<10 - Small School 1 0 0 0 0
Pending 0 0 0 2 2
Schools without NCLB status 6 12 23 29 17
Total 1,244 1,246 1,256 1,293 1,307
Table 6
NCLB accountability status for schools with students in grades 4 through 6 in school years 2006- 
07 through 2010-2011
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3. Why No Effects on Average Scores in Grades 4 through 6 
This study then explores four possible explanations why subject specialization may 
have differentiated effects or no effects on average test scores by subject and grade. 
Specialization would have little effects on average test scores if (1) the variation in teaching 
effectiveness in a subject is equal to zero or small within schools; (2) the factors used to 
make decisions on subject specialization are unrelated to student test scores; (3) 
specialization by teachers in a subject does not improve teaching effectiveness for those 
teachers in that subject; and (4) the relatively more effective teachers have not been selected 
to specialize within schools instead of the less effective teachers. The explanations (1), (3) 
and (4) are related to teaching effectiveness. When teachers are equally effective in teaching a 
subject within schools, specialization does not matter to student test scores. If teaching 
effectiveness are not improved through specialization, teaching a subject in multiple 
classrooms does not change average test scores. If the variation in teaching effectiveness is 
large, selecting the least effective teachers to specialize does not lead to better test scores. 
The explanation (2), instead, concerns the factors other than teaching effectiveness. It is 
clear that, if those factors are not strongly related to teaching effectiveness or unrelated to 
student test scores, specialization determined by those factors does not matter to student test 
scores.   
This study first examines whether the variation in teaching effectiveness in a subject 
is relatively small for teachers within schools and whether the variation is small within those 
highly specialized schools. Second, I present whether the factors other than teaching 
effectiveness determine teacher assignments. Third, I test whether teachers increase their 
own teaching effectiveness in a subject through specialization in that subject. Lastly, I 
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examine whether subject specialization based on teaching effectiveness has raised student 
test scores in Tennessee’s elementary schools. I elaborate each of those in turn.   
I first consider the variation in teacher value added within schools separately in each 
subject and each grade. If all teachers are equally effective in teaching a subject or all 
subjects, there is no need to manage teacher assignments. Instead, the larger the variation of 
teaching effectiveness in a subject, the more likely specialization will make an effect on 
average test scores.  
Table 7 reports descriptive statistics of standard deviations of teacher value added 
for teachers within schools by subject, grade, and school year. The average standard 
deviations for teachers separately in each subject and each grade vary from 0.11 through 
0.22. Teaching effectiveness in English/language arts within schools has the smallest 
variation among all subjects in all years separately in each grade with a few exceptions in the 
most recent two years.19 I also find that variations of value added have been declining over 
time separately in each subject mostly in grades 4 and 5. The largest decline was seen for 
specialization by mathematics teachers (35 percent) over six school years 2006-07 through 
2011-2012.20  
 
 
19 The average standard deviations in science in 2010-2011 in grade 6 and in 2011-2012 in grades 5 
and 6 are smaller than the ones in English/language arts.  
20 In grades 4 and 5, variations of value added for mathematics teachers dropped from 0.2 standard 
deviation in the 2006-07 school year to 0.13 standard deviation in 2011-2012.  
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Table 7
Grade 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012
Mathematics 4 0.2004 0.1949 0.1963 0.1797 0.1544 0.1277
(0.0875) (0.0824) (0.0924) (0.0821) (0.0723) (0.0712)
5 0.2004 0.2002 0.1930 0.1856 0.1611 0.1334
(0.0838) (0.0800) (0.0743) (0.1016) (0.0924) (0.0825)
6 0.1781 0.1746 0.1779 0.2171 0.1949 0.1718
(0.0755) (0.0754) (0.0816) (0.1732) (0.1701) (0.1480)
4 0.1508 0.1448 0.1456 0.1553 0.1345 0.1178
(0.0779) (0.0645) (0.0633) (0.0937) (0.0708) (0.0716)
5 0.1529 0.1485 0.1440 0.1607 0.1450 0.1241
(0.0687) (0.0626) (0.0596) (0.1165) (0.0983) (0.0865)
6 0.1413 0.1381 0.1416 0.1940 0.1906 0.1591
(0.0644) (0.0606) (0.0692) (0.1776) (0.1694) (0.1416)
Science 4 0.1858 0.1781 0.1783 0.1705 0.1446 0.1203
(0.0820) (0.0793) (0.0758) (0.0790) (0.0668) (0.0622)
5 0.1887 0.1831 0.1820 0.1747 0.1496 0.1201
(0.0803) (0.0778) (0.0719) (0.1007) (0.0808) (0.0646)
6 0.1880 0.1856 0.1800 0.1969 0.1597 0.1386
(0.0763) (0.0776) (0.0723) (0.1547) (0.1416) (0.1224)
Social studies 4 0.1953 0.1973 0.1954 0.2032 0.1912 0.1718
(0.0869) (0.0834) (0.0899) (0.0935) (0.0840) (0.0762)
5 0.1968 0.1986 0.1980 0.2055 0.1905 0.1708
(0.0831) (0.0785) (0.0781) (0.0902) (0.0877) (0.0820)
6 0.1880 0.1833 0.1806 0.2013 0.1836 0.1594
(0.0742) (0.0750) (0.0834) (0.1311) (0.1220) (0.1059)
School yearSubject
Notes: DOLS value-added estimates for teachers are estimated over a four-year window separately in 
each subject in grades 4 through 6. 
Descriptive statistics of standard deviations of teachers' history of value added for teachers within 
schools separately in each subject and each grade in Tennessee's public elementary schools in school 
years 2006-07 through 2011-2012
English/
language arts
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By and large, the variation in teaching effectiveness for teachers in the same subject 
within schools is considered as large enough to make substantial differences on student test 
performance. However, variations in teaching effectiveness vary across schools and grades. 
Figure 1 presents a set of histograms of variations in teaching effectiveness in mathematics 
in the 2011-2012 school year separately in each grade.21 The upper panel plots variations in 
teaching effectiveness in mathematics using all schools; and the lower panel only uses the 
schools where the percent of students taught in mathematics within schools is above its 
average within grades. Those graphics do not show a systematic pattern where the variation 
in teaching effectiveness is relatively small in schools with high specialization across grades 
or vice versa. This is also true in other subject separately in each grade. Therefore, little 
specialization effects on average test scores do not result from small or zero variations in 
teaching effectiveness within schools.   
21 The number of bins is set to 100 in all histograms. The high number of bins allows me to identify 
whether schools are clustered in any specific regions of the distribution of standard deviations of 
value added.  
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Figure 1 
Histograms of standard deviations of value added in mathematics within schools in the 2011-2012 school year separately in each grade 
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 This study then considers whether teacher credentials (i.e., education levels and years 
of teaching experience) influence teacher assignments.22 The analytical models in Essay 1 
control for teacher credentials and their interaction terms with lagged absolute advantages in 
teaching that subject. Those findings support this discussion. I first analyze how much of the 
variation in teacher assignments can be explained by teachers’ education level and teaching 
experience. I use teacher credentials to predict teacher assignments in school years 2009-
2010 through 2011-2012 and then report R-square in Table 8. All models separately in each 
subject and each grade only control for years of teaching experience in all schools and 
dummy variables for education levels. The reported R-squares vary across subjects and 
grades. The explained variation in teacher assignments by teacher credentials is extremely 
small (i.e., less than one percent). The highest R-square is seen in the assignments for science 
in grade 4 (i.e., 0.55 percent). These results suggest that teachers’ education levels and years 
of teaching experience are less likely to be influential in making teacher assignments and 
there are much greater unexplained variations in teacher assignments by factors other than 
teacher credentials.   
 
 
 
 
 
22 This study only considers two specific credentials for teachers due to the data availability 
constraints. Specifically, I have no information about the number of mathematics credits studied by 
teachers in college or whether they specialize in mathematics education. Certification is another 
concern. Since all elementary school teachers hold the same generalist certificate, there is little chance 
that the certificate will explain variation in assignments. The analyses in the following discussion are 
limited to two teacher credential variables.  
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Table 8
Variation in teacher assignments that can be explained by teacher charatersitics and value added
Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6
Teacher charactersitics 0.01% 0.03% 0.12% 0.29% 0.14% 0.12% 0.55% 0.16% 0.06% 0.09% 0.06% 0.09%
Observations 8,430 8,898 9,917 8,430 8,898 9,917 8,430 8,898 9,917 8,430 8,898 9,917
Value added 0.12% 0.61% 0.72% 0.10% 0.46% 0.30% 0.16% 0.38% 1.09% 0.16% 0.10% 0.18%
Observations 8,471 8,952 9,955 8,471 8,952 9,955 8,471 8,952 9,955 8,471 8,952 9,955
Social studiesScienceEnglish/language artsMathematics
Notes: Teacher charactersitics include years of teaching experience and dummy variables for education levels.Value-added measures include 
absolute advantages of teaching each of four subjects. The variables for teacher characteristics are also used in the regression analyses in 
Chapter II. Each model is preformed separately for each subject and each grade. Samples include teachers with value added at least in a subject 
in three school years 2009-2010 through 2011-2012. 
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Table 9 then presents marginal effects of both education levels and years of teaching 
experience on teacher assignments separately for each subject and each grade. Those 
estimates are obtained from the analyses in Chapter II. The effects of teacher credentials on 
teacher assignments vary with subjects and grades. The mathematics result shows that 
teaching experience is negative and statistically significant in predicting the percent of 
students taught in mathematics in grade 6. Similarly, negative effects are found for teacher 
assignments in science in grades 4 and 5. One possible explanation is that veteran teachers 
may have more influence over assignments especially in mathematics and science (i.e., two 
hard-to-staff positions). They may intend to teach fewer share of students in those subjects 
and more share in other subjects. In addition, I find positive and statistically significant 
effects of teaching experience for teachers in English/language arts in grades 4 and 6 and in 
social studies in grade 5. All those significant effects are very small varying from -0.12 to 0.08 
percent. The negative effect in mathematics assignments is the largest among all significant 
effects on specialization in mathematics. For example, teachers with 10 years of teaching 
experience higher have had 1.2 percent less of students taught in mathematics in grade 6.  
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Table 9
Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6
-0.0051 -0.8034 -0.9342 2.0375*** 1.835** 1.5408†
(0.3940) (0.5099) (0.7160) (0.5058) (0.6686) (0.8839)
-0.3631 -1.0887 1.2113 2.3765* 3.342* 0.8949
(0.9774) (1.0988) (1.4017) (1.1652) (1.4103) (1.7441)
-0.0057 -0.0401 -0.1194** 0.0791** 0.02501 0.0766†
(0.0226) (0.0335) (0.0377) (0.0293) (0.0373) (0.0463)
Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6
-1.0531** -0.9007† -0.3721 -1.0322** -0.1676 -0.1710
(0.3305) (0.4642) (0.7072) (0.3290) (0.4865) (0.7833)
-1.0081 -1.5571 -0.3634 -1.0504 -0.8325 -1.8627
(0.7677) (0.9924) (1.3431) (0.8423) (1.2435) (1.3042)
-0.0596** -0.0463† -0.0249 -0.0120 0.0646* 0.0626
(0.0202) (0.0278) (0.0372) (0.0215) (0.0327) (0.0394)
Science Social studies
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard 
errors at school level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-value 
<0.001. Models control for school fixed effects and dummy variables for school year and the 
number of years taught by subject. Additional teacher and school controls include dummy 
variables for education degree, school NCLB status in year t  - 1, and mobility status; years of 
teaching experience at all schools and dummy variables for the number of years taught at the 
current school; school size of tested students in grade 4; and their interaction terms with absolute 
advantages in the subject under study. Samples include teachers who are assigned to teach at 
least one subject to six and more students who have been to their teachers' classrooms for at 
least 150 calendar days in their current school years. Samples exclude four teachers from schools 
that were subject to "N<10 - Small School Review" under the NCLB accountability system (two 
teachers from the 2009-2010 school year and the other two from the 2010-2011 school year).  
Marginal effects of education levels and years of teaching experience on teacher assignments 
separately in each grade in Tennessee's public elementary schools in school years 2009-2010 
through 2011-2012
Education level (Omitted: Bachelors)
Years of teaching experience in all schools
Education level (Omitted: Bachelors)
Years of teaching experience in all schools
Percent of students
Percent of students
Masters
Education doctoral 
and above
Mathematics English/language arts
Masters
Education doctoral 
and above
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The significant effects of education levels are also small but larger than the ones 
found in teaching experience by subject and grade. In mathematics, there is no evidence that 
acquiring advanced education levels is statistically associated with specialization in any grade. 
In contrast, teachers with Master degree are likely to teach more percent of students in 
English/language arts than the ones with Bachelor degree in all grades. Those positive and 
statistically significant effects are slightly higher for teachers with Education Doctoral and 
above in grades 4 (2.4 percent at p < 0.05) and 5 (3.3 percent at p < 0.05) but not statistically 
significant in grade 6. Some negative and significant results are found for teachers with 
Master degree but not with Education Doctoral and above in science and social studies. The 
results show that teachers with Master degree has taught one percent less of students in 
science in grades 4 and 5 and in social studies in grade 4 than the ones with Bachelor degree.  
All findings from Tables 8 and 9 suggest that education levels and years of teaching 
experience are associated with teacher assignments but not in all subjects and grades. More 
important, their impact on teacher assignments is significant but trivial. The select teacher 
credentials only explain a very small portion of variation in teacher assignments. In addition, 
literature has found that education levels and years of teaching experience are not strongly 
correlated with student test performance (Goldhaber and Brewer, 2000; Hanushek, 1971 & 
1997; Wayne and Youngs, 2003).23 In other words, teacher assignments were based on the 
factors weakly related to student test scores. Overall, there is no evidence that the select 
teacher credentials explain why specialization has little effect on student test performance.  
In addition, in Chapter II, I have shown that teachers’ value added is correlated with 
teacher assignments. Table 8 presents the variation of teacher assignments that can be 
23 Some studies have found positive effects of teacher credentials, especially in teacher experience, on 
student test scores (Rivkin, et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004).  
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explained by teachers’ value added separately in each subject and each grade. I regress 
teacher assignments TA𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡+1𝑠𝑠  in subject s for teacher k in school year t + 1 on absolute 
advantages in teaching each of four subjects 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ, 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, and 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.24 The explained 
variation in teacher assignments across all models is small ranging from 0.1 to one percent 
across subjects and grades. Table 8 suggests that the explained variation in teacher 
assignments by teachers’ value added is much higher than the one due to teacher credentials. 
These results also suggest that a substantial amount of variation in teacher assignments may 
be explained by factors other than teachers’ value added.    
Now, I consider whether teachers improve their own teaching effectiveness through 
specialization. Some teachers may be asked to focus on teaching one or fewer subjects. 
Instead of spreading their efforts to all subjects, they have concentrated on one or select 
subjects and have been likely to teach multiple classrooms in those subjects over time. I test 
whether changes on teaching effectiveness in a subject result from changes on the number 
of other subjects taught by teachers. I estimate this relationship using a teacher-level model 
where changes on value added in two school years t and t – 1 is a function of dummy 
variables for changes on the number of other subjects taught by teachers in two school years 
t and t – 1, grades, and school years; and school fixed effects. The equation is presented 
below:  
 ∆𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)−𝑠𝑠 + 𝜋𝜋 + 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 + 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡,                                               (2) 
24 The superscript s separately indicates each subject, mathematics (MTH), English/language arts 
(ELA), science (SCI), and social studies (SOC). The absolute advantage in teaching a subject is set to 
zero if teachers did not have a value-added score in that subject.  
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where ∆𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑠𝑠  is the difference of teachers’ value added in subject s for teacher k in two 
school years t and t – 1 (i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 − 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠 );25 ∆𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)−𝑠𝑠  is a matrix of dummy variables for 
changes on the number of other subjects -s (s ≠ -s) taught by teacher k in two school years t 
and t – 1; 𝜋𝜋 is a matrix of dummy variables for grades and school years; 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 is school fixed 
effects for school m; and 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the error term clustered at school level.26  
Table 10 presents marginal effects of changes on teacher assignments in subjects -s 
on changes of value added in subject s. The key regression coefficients are dummy variables 
for teachers who taught fewer subjects in year t than in year t – 1. For those teachers, the 
differences in the number of subjects -s include -1, -2, and -3. Those numbers indicate the 
number of subjects teachers did not teach in year t, but they taught those subjects in year t – 
1. The omitted category for assignment dummy variables is the teachers who taught the 
same number of subjects in two school year.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠  and 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠  are the effectiveness measures in subject s for teacher k in years t and t – 1, 
respectively, using the Dynamic Ordinary Least Square model in Chapter II.  
26 The superscripts for grades are suppressed for notation simplicity.  
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Table 10
OLS SCH-FE OLS SCH-FE OLS SCH-FE OLS SCH-FE
0.0005 -0.0019 0.0084 0.0035 0.0039 0.0087 -0.0062 -0.0029
(0.0100) (0.0111) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0097) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0137)
0.0031 -0.0015 0.0116 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0047 0.0025 -0.0034
(0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0075) (0.0068) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0089)
0.0133 0.0203** 0.0088 0.0087 0.0006 0.0029 0.0148† 0.0089
(0.0080) (0.0071) (0.0084) (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0070) -0.0083 (0.0081)
0.0088 0.0155 0.0090 0.0113 0.0001 0.0041 0.0001 -0.0127
(0.0090) (0.0087) (0.0097) (0.0067) (0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0095)
0.0104 0.0133 0.0017 -0.0039 0.0010 0.0070 0.0228* 0.0213†
(0.0137) (0.0120) (0.0089) (0.0084) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0115)
0.0188 0.0109 -0.0038 -0.0124 -0.0192 -0.0077 -0.0020 -0.0080
(0.0118) (0.0136) (0.0072) (0.0080) (0.0119) (0.0147) (0.0104) (0.0161)
Observations 24,094 24,094 27,941 27,941 23,493 23,493 23,856 23,856
R-squared 0.0064 0.0983 0.0020 0.0864 0.0017 0.1006 0.0090 0.1046
Adjusted R-squared 0.0059 0.0459 0.0016 0.0409 0.0012 0.0468 0.0085 0.0519
-0.0322 -0.0467 -0.0124 -0.0199 -0.0041 0.0056 -0.0474 -0.0912
(0.0358) (0.0315) (0.0265) (0.0193) (0.0573) (0.0428) (0.0433) (0.0571)
-0.0205 -0.0171 -0.0005 -0.0056 -0.0325 -0.0263 -0.0120 -0.0253
(0.0272) (0.0251) (0.0126) (0.0134) (0.0226) (0.0313) (0.0265) (0.0351)
0.0106 0.0091 0.0147 0.0120 0.0105 0.0152 -0.0035 0.0070
(0.0105) (0.0133) (0.0074) (0.0084) (0.0101) (0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0153)
0.0171 0.0291 0.0248 0.0108 -0.0058 0.0008 -0.0210 -0.0362
(0.0288) (0.0229) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0337) (0.0227) (0.0236) (0.0227)
-0.0037 -0.0096 0.0012 -0.0138 0.0031 0.0090 0.0082 0.0017
(0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0129) (0.0137)
0.0039 -0.0057 0.0159 0.0117 -0.0013 0.0020 0.0045 0.0031
(0.0102) (0.0138) (0.0119) (0.0105) (0.0123) (0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0134)
0.0325 0.0478** 0.0526* 0.0458** 0.0069 0.0054 0.0439† 0.0359†
(0.0311) (0.0176) (0.0206) (0.0134) (0.0246) (0.0174) (0.0244) (0.0193)
0.0133 0.0213† 0.0096 0.0112 -0.0013 0.0055 0.0038 0.0003
(0.0101) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0101) (0.0110) (0.0117) (0.0140) (0.0134)
0.0072 0.0113 -0.0108 -0.0085 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0118 0.0059
(0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0112) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0116)
0.0503† 0.0551** 0.0253 0.0138 0.0083 0.0023 0.0020 -0.0227
(0.0222) (0.0200) (0.0215) (0.0151) (0.0225) (0.0210) (0.0199) (0.0219)
-0.0074 0.0017 0.0179 0.0206† 0.0035 0.0068 0.0093 0.0016
(0.0147) (0.0141) (0.0156) (0.0106) (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0156)
0.0052 0.0112 -0.0058 0.0026 -0.0048 0.0025 -0.0085 -0.0194
(0.0092) (0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0099) (0.0097) (0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0138)
-0.0081 0.0090 -0.0252 -0.0244 -0.0380 -0.0251 0.0529† 0.0379
(0.0322) (0.0283) (0.0255) (0.0212) (0.0438) (0.0327) (0.0302) (0.0313)
0.0271 0.0188 0.0012 -0.0107 0.0248 0.0305 0.0403* 0.0396*
(0.0249) (0.0212) (0.0158) (0.0147) (0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0190) (0.0198)
0.0062 0.0107 0.0090 0.0072 -0.0046 -0.0001 0.0050 0.0074
(0.0182) (0.0166) (0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0130) (0.0154)
0.0188 -0.0115 -0.0472 -0.0519 --- --- 0.0163 0.0112
(0.0401) (0.0524) (0.0271) (0.0224) --- --- (0.0463) (0.0725)
0.0458 0.0477 0.0071 -0.0046 -0.0094 -0.0050 0.0059 -0.0189
(0.0409) (0.0363) (0.0148) (0.0192) (0.0231) (0.0333) (0.0398) (0.0441)
0.0138 0.0074 0.0004 -0.0063 -0.0215 -0.0080 -0.0050 -0.0067
(0.0126) (0.0152) (0.0083) (0.0095) (0.0137) (0.0162) (0.0112) (0.0175)
Observations 24,094 24,094 27,941 27,941 23,493 23,493 23,856 23,856
R-squared 0.0069 0.0989 0.0032 0.0873 0.0019 0.1008 0.0094 0.1051
Adjusted R-squared 0.0059 0.0461 0.0023 0.0414 0.0010 0.0466 0.0084 0.0519
F-test in model specification 2
H0: Interaction terms between dummy variables for changes on the number of other subjects and grade dummy variables are jointly equal to zero.
P-value (df = 12) 0.5568 0.2450 0.0787 0.0115 0.8522 0.9543 0.7915 0.4456
Dummy variables for changes on the number of other subjects taught in year t  and t  - 1
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value 
<0.01, and ***p-value <0.001. Samples include teachers in five school years 2007-08 through 2011-2012. The omitted variable for changes on the number of other 
subjects taught by teachers in two years t  and t  - 1 is the teachers who taught the same number of other subjects in two years. All models control for dummy 
variables for grades and school years. The models labeled as "SCH-FE" control for school fixed effects. The degree of freedom for F-test statistics is equal to 11 in 
science analyses. 
DV#3
Model specification 2: Using all schools in grades 4 through 6 and interacting dummy variables for changes on the number of 
other subjects with grade dummy variables
DV#1 in grade 4
DV#1 in grade 5
DV#1 in grade 6
DV#2 in grade 4
DV#2 in grade 5
DV#3 in grade 5
DV#3 in grade 6
DV#-1 in grade 5
DV#2 in grade 6
DV#-1 in grade 4
DV#-3 in grade 4
DV#-3 in grade 5
DV#-3 in grade 6
DV#3 in grade 4
DV#-1 in grade 6
DV#-2 in grade 4
DV#-2 in grade 5
DV#-2 in grade 6
Social studies
Marginal effects of teacher assignments in a subject on effective teaching in that subject separately in each grade in Tennessee's public elementary schools
DV#2
DV#1
DV#-3
DV#-2
DV#-1
Dummy variables (DV) for changes on the number of other subjects taught in two years t  and t  - 1
Model specification 1: Using all schools in grades 4 through 6
Changes on teachers' value added 
in two years t  and t  - 1
Mathematics Englissh/language arts Science
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The significant effects of education levels are also small but larger than the ones 
found in teaching experience by subject and grade. In mathematics, there is no evidence that 
acquiring advanced education levels is statistically associated with specialization in any grade. 
In contrast, teachers with Master degree are likely to teach more percent of students in 
English/language arts than the ones with Bachelor degree in all grades. Those positive and 
statistically significant effects are slightly higher for teachers with Education Doctoral and 
above in grades 4 (2.4 percent at p < 0.05) and 5 (3.3 percent at p < 0.05) but not statistically 
significant in grade 6. Some negative and significant results are found for teachers with 
Master degree but not with Education Doctoral and above in science and social studies. The 
results show that teachers with Master degree has taught one percent less of students in 
science in grades 4 and 5 and in social studies in grade 4 than the ones with Bachelor degree.  
All findings from Tables 8 and 9 suggest that education levels and years of teaching 
experience are associated with teacher assignments but not in all subjects and grades. More 
important, their impact on teacher assignments is significant but trivial. The select teacher 
credentials only explain a very small portion of variation in teacher assignments. In addition, 
literature has found that education levels and years of teaching experience are not strongly 
correlated with student test performance (Goldhaber and Brewer, 2000; Hanushek, 1971 & 
1997; Wayne and Youngs, 2003).27 In other words, teacher assignments were based on the 
factors weakly related to student test scores. Overall, there is no evidence that the select 
teacher credentials explain why specialization has little effect on student test performance.  
In addition, in Chapter II, I have shown that teachers’ value added is correlated with 
teacher assignments. Table 8 presents the variation of teacher assignments that can be 
27 Some studies have found positive effects of teacher credentials, especially in teacher experience, on 
student test scores (Rivkin, et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004).  
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explained by teachers’ value added separately in each subject and each grade. I regress 
teacher assignments TA𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡+1𝑠𝑠  in subject s for teacher k in school year t + 1 on absolute 
advantages in teaching each of four subjects 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡ℎ, 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, and 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠.28 The explained 
variation in teacher assignments across all models is small ranging from 0.1 to one percent 
across subjects and grades. Table 8 suggests that the explained variation in teacher 
assignments by teachers’ value added is much higher than the one due to teacher credentials. 
These results also suggest that a substantial amount of variation in teacher assignments may 
be explained by factors other than teachers’ value added.    
Now, I consider whether teachers improve their own teaching effectiveness through 
specialization. Some teachers may be asked to focus on teaching one or fewer subjects. 
Instead of spreading their efforts to all subjects, they have concentrated on one or select 
subjects and have been likely to teach multiple classrooms in those subjects over time. I test 
whether changes on teaching effectiveness in a subject result from changes on the number 
of other subjects taught by teachers. I estimate this relationship using a teacher-level model 
where changes on value added in two school years t and t – 1 is a function of dummy 
variables for changes on the number of other subjects taught by teachers in two school years 
t and t – 1, grades, and school years; and school fixed effects. The equation is presented 
below:  
 ∆𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)−𝑠𝑠 + 𝜋𝜋 + 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 + 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡,                                               (2) 
28 The superscript s separately indicates each subject, mathematics (MTH), English/language arts 
(ELA), science (SCI), and social studies (SOC). The absolute advantage in teaching a subject is set to 
zero if teachers did not have a value-added score in that subject.  
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where ∆𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)𝑠𝑠  is the difference of teachers’ value added in subject s for teacher k in two 
school years t and t – 1 (i.e., 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 − 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠 );29 ∆𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)−𝑠𝑠  is a matrix of dummy variables for 
changes on the number of other subjects -s (s ≠ -s) taught by teacher k in two school years t 
and t – 1; 𝜋𝜋 is a matrix of dummy variables for grades and school years; 𝜙𝜙𝑚𝑚 is school fixed 
effects for school m; and 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the error term clustered at school level.30  
Table 10 presents marginal effects of changes on teacher assignments in subjects -s 
on changes of value added in subject s. The key regression coefficients are dummy variables 
for teachers who taught fewer subjects in year t than in year t – 1. For those teachers, the 
differences in the number of subjects -s include -1, -2, and -3. Those numbers indicate the 
number of subjects teachers did not teach in year t, but they taught those subjects in year t – 
1. The omitted category for assignment dummy variables is the teachers who taught the 
same number of subjects in two school year.  
These analyses show that teachers who taught two or three subjects fewer (i.e., -2 
and -3) in year t than in year t – 1 did not improve their own teaching effectiveness in the 
subject(s) they have taught for two years. However, I find that teachers’ value added in 
teaching mathematics is increased by 0.02 standard deviation (p < 0.01) in grades 4 through 
6 when they taught one non-mathematics subject fewer (i.e., -1) compared to the ones who 
taught the same number of non-mathematics subjects in two school years. This pooled 
effect across all grades is not statistically significant to predict changes in teaching 
effectiveness in any other subjects.  
29 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠  and 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−1𝑠𝑠  are the effectiveness measures in subject s for teacher k in years t and t – 1, 
respectively, using the Dynamic Ordinary Least Square model in Chapter II.  
30 The superscripts for grades are suppressed for notation simplicity.  
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I then estimate whether the effects of changes on teacher assignments in other 
subjects are independent of grade level. The F-test statistics fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that the pooled effects across all grades are the same as the grade-specific effects on teaching 
effectiveness in all subjects except English/language arts. Teachers in English/language arts 
in grade 4 increase their own teaching effectiveness by 0.05 standard deviation (p < 0.01) 
when they taught one subject fewer compared to the ones who taught the same number of 
other subjects in two years in grade 4.  
While these analyses find some significant results about the relationship between 
changes on teaching effectiveness and changes on the number of subjects taught by teachers 
in two years, there are more than 90 percent of the key regression coefficients that are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, these analyses do not provide strong evidence (or a 
consistent pattern) that specialization measured by changes on the number of subjects taught 
by teachers has significantly raised teachers’ value added. In addition, there is no evidence 
that teachers who taught more subjects in year t than in year t – 1 lower their own value 
added.    
Lastly, I turn to the discussion about how teachers’ value added has been used to 
make decisions on teacher assignments in grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee’s public 
elementary schools. This discussion becomes important since I find that subject 
specialization has no effects on average test scores in any subjects in upper elementary 
grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee.  
This study re-constructs the measure of subject specialization at the school-by-grade 
level as follows:31  
31 The subscripts for subject, grade, and school are omitted for notation simplicity.  
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 ?̅?𝜃𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ∗ 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 ,                                                                           (3)  
where ?̅?𝜃𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 is the specialization weighted by value added in a subject in a grade in a school 
in school year t; 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
 is the weight equal to the number of students taught by teacher k in a 
subject divided by the total number of students taught by all teachers in that subject in a grade in a 
school in school year t; 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠
 is the share of students in a subject for teacher k in school year 
t; 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 is teaching effectiveness in a subject for teacher k in school year t.32 This specialization 
weighted by value added is constructed separately in each subject in a grade within schools.  
 This subject specialization weighted by value added describes how students are 
distributed from more to less effective teachers in a subject in a grade in a school. The more 
students taught by specialist teachers in a subject, the more weights will be assigned to those 
teachers’ value added in teaching that subject. This measure in a subject is positive and large 
when the high-performing teachers specialize in that subject. In short, the variable ?̅?𝜃𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒,𝑡𝑡 
allows me to test whether the effect of specialization on student test performance depends 
on which teachers specialize, the high-performing or the low-performing ones.  
Using the school mathematics model as an example, I control for subject 
specialization weighted by value added for mathematics teachers, ?̅?𝜃𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒,𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, in school m in 
school year t in the equation (1) instead of ?̅?𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡. Table 11 presents the estimates of subject 
specialization, column (1), and subject specialization weighted by value added, columns (2) 
and (3), separately in each subject on average test performance. Instead of using nine school 
years, the analytical sample is restricted to six school years 2006-07 through 2011-2012 
where teachers’ average value added data are available. I also consider the grade-specific 
32 Teaching effectiveness is estimated in Chapter II using the DOLS model separately in each subject.  
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effects of specialization measures on average performance by adding the interaction terms 
between specialization measures and grade dummy variables.  
In column (1), all findings are consistent with the nine- and six-year analyses. In 
column (2), the pooled and grade-specific effects are positive and statistically significant in all 
models. The F-test statistics suggests that the positive effects vary across grades in all 
subjects except English/language arts. In three other subjects, the highest impact of 
specialization weighted by value added is found in grade 4; and this impact reduces as the 
grade level goes up.  
The interpretation of this specialization measure weighted by value added is not 
straightforward since this variable depends on the values of both the weighted specialization 
and teachers’ value added. To interpret the effects on average test score, I use the following 
hypothetical example that is presented in Appendix D. Suppose there are two schools with 
two mathematics teachers in each school in grade 4. Separately in each school, one of two 
teachers has a weighted specialization 0.6 and the second teacher has a weighted 
specialization 0.2. In school A, the teacher who specialized more has a value-added score 
equal to 0.1 and another teacher has that score equal to 0.2. In the opposite, in school B, the 
teacher who specialized more has a value-added score equal to 0.2 and another teacher has 
that score equal to 0.1. The specialization weighted by value added is 0.1 in school A and 
0.14 in school B. The difference of average mathematics achievement between two schools 
is 1.86 × 0.04 = 0.07 standard deviation.  
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Table 11
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
0.0164 1.2421*** 1.8127*** 0.0132 1.0422*** 2.3545*** 0.0094 1.2317*** 1.8223*** 0.0006 1.4203*** 2.0357***
(0.0191) (0.0474) (0.0692) (0.0162) (0.1152) (0.1007) (0.0220) (0.0552) (0.0814) (0.0214) (0.0551) (0.1000)
Observations 14,029 14,029 14,029 14,092 14,092 14,092 14,026 14,026 14,026 14,018 14,018 14,018
R-squared 0.6417 0.6997 0.6930 0.6925 0.7293 0.7285 0.7223 0.7628 0.7588 0.7170 0.7751 0.7684
Adjusted R-squared 0.6023 0.6666 0.6592 0.6588 0.6996 0.6987 0.6917 0.7367 0.7323 0.6859 0.7504 0.7429
Multiplied by value added No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
0.0039 1.8557*** 3.1532*** 0.0073 1.1937*** 4.2363*** -0.0973* 1.7527*** 3.4369*** -0.0958† 2.1240*** 4.0028***
(0.0427) (0.0947) (0.2098) (0.0312) (0.2563) (0.3483) (0.0443) (0.1057) (0.3661) (0.0499) (0.0936) (0.2301)
0.0075 1.4622*** 1.9767*** 0.0072 1.0385*** 2.4688*** -0.0248 1.4697*** 2.1362*** 0.0039 1.6018*** 2.0798***
(0.0249) (0.0826) (0.1402) (0.0205) (0.1654) (0.1560) (0.0294) (0.0897) (0.1546) (0.0305) (0.1130) (0.2370)
0.0261 0.8800*** 1.2066*** 0.0208 0.9556*** 1.7203*** 0.0495* 0.9255*** 1.2437*** 0.0131 1.0271*** 1.4124***
(0.0228) (0.0478) (0.0744) (0.0207) (0.0516) (0.0965) (0.0246) (0.0571) (0.0773) (0.0250) (0.0511) (0.0697)
Observations 14,029 14,029 14,029 14,092 14,092 14,092 14,026 14,026 14,026 14,018 14,018 14,018
R-squared 0.6418 0.7064 0.7010 0.6925 0.7296 0.7335 0.7227 0.7664 0.7652 0.7172 0.7812 0.7773
Adjusted R-squared 0.6023 0.6740 0.6680 0.6587 0.7000 0.7042 0.6921 0.7406 0.7393 0.6860 0.7571 0.7528
Multiplied by value added No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
F-test in model specification 2
P-value (df  = 2) 0.7904 0.0000 0.0000 0.8446 0.2972 0.0000 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.1072 0.0000 0.0000
Effects of specialization based on teaching effectivenesson average scores in Tennessee's public elementary schools
Average test scores Mathematics Social studiesScienceEnglish/language arts
Model specification 1: Using all schools in grades 4 through 6
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; significant levels based on clustered standard errors at school level; and †p-value <0.1, *p-value <0.05, **p-value <0.01, and ***p-
value <0.001. The columns (1) through (3) use the samples restricted to the six school years 2006-07 through 2011-2012 where the data on teaches' average value added are available. 
All models control for time-variant school characteristics, dummy variables for grades and school years, the interaction terms between grade and year dummy variables, and school 
fixed effects. In the columns (2) and (3), for a given subject, the weighted specialization for a teacher is multiplied by her/his teaching effectiveness, and then sum this measure over 
all teachers who taught that subject in a grade in a school to construct the subject specialization variable for that school in that grade. Teaching effectiveness is measured by DOLS in 
column (2) and by Empirical Bayesian (i.e., shrinakge estimates) in column (3). 
Subject specialization in 
grade 5
Subject specialization in 
grade 6
Subject specialization in 
grade 4
Subject specialization
H0: Interaction terms between specialization by teachers and grade dummy variables are jointly equal to zero. 
Model specification 2: Using all schools in grades 4 through 6 and interacting specialization by teachers and teachers' average value added in a subject 
with grade dummy variables
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In short, this section provides several analyses that attempt to explain why 
specialization by teachers in a subject has no positive effects on average student performance 
in that subject. I find that (1) there is a substantial amount of variation of teaching 
effectiveness in the same subject for teachers within schools, but no evidence that variations 
of teaching effectiveness are small in schools with high specialization; (2) teacher credentials 
and teacher value added explain a tiny percent of variation in specialization and a great deal 
of the variation in specialization remain unexplained; and (3) teaching effectiveness has not 
been changed as the number of subjects taught goes down. Most important, this study finds 
consistent, large, and positive effects of subject specialization weighted by teachers’ value 
added on average test performance in mathematics, English/language arts, science, and 
social studies. Those analyses provide strong empirical evidence that specialization matters 
to student test scores when the relatively more effective teachers have been assigned to 
specialize in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee.   
4. Additional Analyses Using Shrinkage Estimates 
I also perform a set of additional analyses using shrinkage teacher estimates instead 
of DOLS estimates. Those results are presented in column (3) of Table 11 using six school 
years. The effects of subject specialization weighted by shrinkage estimates are much 
stronger than the ones reported in column (2) in predicting average student scores separately 
in each subject. The magnitude of regression coefficients in column (3) varies from 1.8 to 2.4 
in the pooled analyses and from 0.9 to 4.2 in the grade-specific analyses. As a result, the 
difference in mathematics achievement is much higher when using the regression 
coefficients from column (3) of Table 11. In the above hypothetical example, the difference 
in mathematics achievement between two schools is 0.13 standard deviation.  
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Conclusion 
This study provides empirical evidence whether specialization by teachers in a 
subject influences average test performance in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in 
Tennessee. Subject specialization has no effects on average test scores in mathematics, 
English/language arts, and social studies; and have some small effects in grades 4 and 6 in 
science. This study then examines several reasons why the effects of specialization by 
teachers have no positive impacts on average school performance across subjects and grade. 
More important, I find that subject specialization based on teachers’ value added in all core 
academic subjects has a significant and positive effect on average test scores. These positive 
effects are much stronger when using the precise measure of teaching effectiveness (i.e., 
shrinkage estimates). In addition, this study shows that there is a great deal of potential in 
using teachers’ value added to make decisions on specialization in all subjects. The next 
chapter will discuss the maximum potential gains that could be achieved through 
specialization in upper elementary grades in Tennessee.    
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
Definition of terms on school organization structures 
 
The definitions of classroom structures used in this study are identical to the ones 
presented in the report Elementary School Organization: Self-Contained and Departmentalized 
Classroom Structure (1989).  
 
Self-contained: This elementary school organization structure with one teacher 
teaching a group of students for the majority of the day in all four academic subjects, math, 
reading/language arts, science, and social studies. Students in a self-contained classroom may 
receive art, music, and physical education from specialized teachers.  
 
Semi-departmentalized: This classroom structure with two or three teachers sharing 
the responsibility of teaching a group of students in all four academic subjects. Students may 
also receive art, music, and physical education from specialized teachers. 
 
Departmentalized: This classroom structure is most popular in middle and high 
schools. Teachers teach in their area of specialization, and students receive instruction from 
subject-area specialist teachers for all four academic subjects. Students may also receive art, 
music, and physical education from specialized teachers.  
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School year Grade Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social Studies
2003-04 4 660 2 1 0 1
2003-04 5 620 3 2 3 6
2003-04 6 397 3 1 3 1
2004-05 4 724 1 0 1 1
2004-05 5 685 4 2 2 5
2004-05 6 459 2 2 2 4
2005-06 4 904 2 1 1 1
2005-06 5 840 1 0 0 1
2005-06 6 546 4 1 4 10
2006-07 4 936 5 2 3 4
2006-07 5 879 3 1 2 3
2006-07 6 584 10 4 8 10
2007-08 4 943 5 1 5 3
2007-08 5 882 5 1 5 1
2007-08 6 583 3 1 3 4
2008-09 4 950 1 0 1 1
2008-09 5 884 13 0 13 11
2008-09 6 571 12 4 12 13
2009-2010 4 946 4 0 3 4
2009-2010 5 893 5 1 8 11
2009-2010 6 579 3 1 6 5
2010-2011 4 973 1 0 1 0
2010-2011 5 912 2 1 3 3
2010-2011 6 596 2 0 5 5
2011-2012 4 981 0 1 1 0
2011-2012 5 926 3 2 4 4
2011-2012 6 602 3 1 3 1
Total 20,455 102 31 102 113
Number of schools without student-teacher links
All 
schools
Appendix B
Table B - 1
Number of schools with no student-teacher links separately in each subject and each grade in 
school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012
Notes: Some schools do not have student-teacher links in more than one core subject. There is 
no systematic pattern in schools where student-teacher links are always not avialable in a grade 
over time. 
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School year Grade Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social Studies
2003-04 4 0.32% 0.22% 0.07% 0.15%
2003-04 5 1.96% 1.03% 0.96% 1.14%
2003-04 6 3.30% 2.21% 2.24% 2.58%
2004-05 4 0.37% 0.25% 0.05% 0.12%
2004-05 5 1.84% 1.33% 1.24% 1.72%
2004-05 6 4.30% 2.66% 2.37% 3.08%
2005-06 4 0.40% 0.15% 0.19% 0.21%
2005-06 5 1.19% 0.75% 0.56% 0.45%
2005-06 6 3.42% 1.92% 0.99% 2.29%
2006-07 4 0.29% 0.16% 0.20% 0.26%
2006-07 5 1.05% 0.35% 0.66% 0.64%
2006-07 6 3.82% 2.13% 1.87% 2.56%
2007-08 4 0.79% 0.26% 0.54% 0.55%
2007-08 5 1.38% 0.58% 1.05% 0.71%
2007-08 6 2.84% 2.00% 1.73% 2.53%
2008-09 4 0.88% 0.16% 0.83% 0.78%
2008-09 5 1.72% 1.05% 1.78% 1.24%
2008-09 6 3.70% 1.96% 2.56% 3.10%
2009-2010 4 0.99% 0.18% 0.84% 0.93%
2009-2010 5 2.04% 1.33% 1.72% 1.72%
2009-2010 6 3.64% 3.40% 2.68% 3.20%
2010-2011 4 0.87% 0.38% 0.64% 0.47%
2010-2011 5 0.69% 0.65% 0.97% 0.85%
2010-2011 6 3.15% 2.60% 1.96% 2.77%
2011-2012 4 0.27% 0.24% 0.18% 0.09%
2011-2012 5 1.25% 0.85% 0.45% 0.62%
2011-2012 6 1.88% 1.95% 1.03% 0.87%
Total 1.82% 1.16% 1.14% 1.34%
Appendix C
Table C - 1
Number of students excluded from analytical samples due to no student-teacher links 
separately in each grade in school years 2003-04 through 2011-2012
Percent of students excluded from analytical samples
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Appendix D
Table D - 1
Gains in mathematics achievement between two schools in a hypothetical example
Teachers (1) (2)
Weighted specialization 0.6 0.2
DOLS value added 0.1 0.2
Teachers (3) (4)
Weighted specialization 0.6 0.2
DOLS value added 0.2 0.1
Difference in mathematics specialization 0.040
Difference in average mathematics achievement 0.074
Teachers (1) (2)
Weighted specialization 0.6 0.2
EB value added 0.1 0.2
Teachers (3) (4)
Weighted specialization 0.6 0.2
EB value added 0.2 0.1
Difference in mathematics specialization 0.040
Difference in average mathematics achievement 0.126
Notes: The degree of mathematics specialization is equivalent in two schools, but the 
more effective teacher in school B specialized in teaching mathematics. 
School A
School B
School A
School B
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE MAXIMUM POTENTIAL GAINS IN MATHEMATICS ACHIEVEMENT THAT 
COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH SPECIALIZATION IN ELEMENTARY 
SCHOOLS 
 
 
Introduction 
Research on teacher value added on student achievement (Aaronson et al., 2007; 
Ballou, 2005; Braun et al., 2010; Koedel and Bett, 2007; Rockoff, 2004; Rothstein, 2009) has 
concluded that (1) some teachers are more effective than others at raising student test scores; 
and (2) teacher value-added estimates are subject to noise, arising from measurement error 
and other sources of imprecision, which results in a high level of instability in the estimated 
teacher effects. The first set of research findings suggests the possibility of using the 
estimated teacher effects to raise student test scores. This can simply be done by taking 
teachers with the highest value-added estimates and having them to teach. The second set of 
research findings, however, poses a major concern to the implementation of teaching 
effectiveness related policies. This concern is with making school personnel decisions (i.e., 
promotion, retention, salary, and assignment) on the basis of the noisy estimates of teacher 
effects.  
Given the growing interest on the potential of using teacher effectiveness measures, 
there is definitely a need for appropriate discussion to determine how to make the best 
school personnel decisions to raise student test scores with the information provided by the 
estimated teacher effects. The current research on policy use of the estimated teacher effects, 
instead, focuses on which school personnel decisions can be made on the basis of the 
estimated teacher effects. Several studies have explored the possibility of using teacher value-
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added estimates in making tenure decisions, promotion to administrative positions, and 
reassignments to high/low-stakes positions (Chingos and West, 2011; Goldhaber and 
Hansen, 2010a). Although those studies find the association between the estimated teacher 
effects and school personnel decisions, there is a lack of discussion about how to use teacher 
value-added estimates to make those personnel decisions.  
This study, to the best of my awareness, is the first to investigate how to use 
estimated teacher effects optimally in making school personnel decisions. The personnel 
decision discussed in this study refers to making teacher assignments for subject 
specialization in elementary schools. Other researchers have also paid attention to managing 
teacher assignments. Jacob and Rockoff (2011) suggests allowing teachers to specialize in 
teaching the subject where they are most effective can substantially raise student test scores. 
They have further proposed that the benefits for students could be sufficiently large relative 
to the cost of managing teacher assignments. My study takes this one step further by asking: 
what is the maximum gain in a subject that could be achieved through specialization.  
While many teachers teach self-contained classrooms in elementary schools, some 
are served as specialist teachers who have one or some subjects specialized to different 
classes of students. Research has shown that there have been an increasing number of 
content-specific specialist teachers in the core academic subjects at the upper grade levels in 
elementary schools. The variation of elementary school organization structures provides 
opportunities to have teacher effectiveness measures play an important role in managing 
teacher assignments.  
As noted above, this study focuses on how to use the estimated teacher effects to 
make decisions on teacher assignments in elementary schools. The objective of this study is 
to maximize the potential gains in mathematics achievement that could be achieved through 
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specialization in elementary schools if teacher value-added estimates are used to make 
assignment decisions. This study estimates teaching effectiveness for mathematics teachers 
using value added modeling.  
I focus on mathematics for the following reasons: (1) student mathematics 
performance is often a bigger problem for schools than performance in other subjects; and 
(2) the variation of value-added estimates for teachers is larger in mathematics than other 
subjects. If specialization is positively correlated with student achievement, potential gains 
are greater in mathematics than other subjects.   
This study determines the optimization-based selection of teachers to specialize in 
teaching mathematics within schools. The teachers with the highest absolute advantage in 
teaching mathematics within schools are assigned to fully specialize in teaching mathematics. 
I do not consider assignments that require teachers to change schools.    
Since teacher value-added estimates are always subject to imprecision, I implement 
the empirical Bayesian approach to adjust the estimated teacher effects. In the literature, this 
approach also refers to the Best Linear Unbiased Prediction (BLUP) first developed in Searle 
(1971). These shrinkage estimates are then used to determine who specializes in teaching 
mathematics within schools. I then calculate the expected gains in mathematics achievement. 
In addition, I estimate achievement changes in other subjects that would result from this 
policy if the students released from the new specialists’ classes were relocated among 
teachers of other subjects, holding teachers’ workloads the same before and after this 
hypothetical policy. While mathematics specialization can increase student achievement in 
mathematics, it is uncertain how such specialization would also affect student achievement in 
other subjects.   
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To demonstrate the assignment procedure and the maximum potential gains in 
mathematics achievement that could be achieved through specialization, I use data from the 
Tennessee’s public elementary schools. This study focuses on teachers in upper elementary 
grades 4 through 6 who taught mathematics in the 2010-2011 school year and who have 
stayed at the same schools for at least two years (i.e., the 2010-2011 school year and 
forward).1  
Under the hypothetical policy for mathematics specialization, the number of 
mathematics specialists is determined by the number of students divided by the average 
workload for teachers within schools. The reminder of this division is then rounded to the 
nearest whole number. When the number of students divided by the average workload for 
teachers is smaller than 1 in a school, there is one and only one mathematics specialist 
needed in that school. When one teacher specializes, that teacher is assigned to teach 
mathematics to all students. When there is more than one mathematics specialist, each 
teacher is assigned to teach the same number of students.2  
My hypothetical achievement gains in mathematics are always higher than the actual 
gains as long as the less effective mathematics teachers actually taught more students than 
the more effective mathematics teachers. The goal of this hypothetical policy for 
specialization is to allow the best mathematics teacher(s) to specialize in teaching 
mathematics. I assume this hypothetical policy always makes students move from less 
effective to more effective mathematics teachers; therefore, mathematics specialization can 
further improve student mathematics scores. If the relatively more effective teachers have 
1 To obtain the estimated teacher effects in a subject, a teacher has to teach that subject at the same 
school for at least two years prior to a new school year.  
2 The number of students assigned to each mathematics specialist could be somewhat either lower or 
higher than average teaching load within schools.  
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already taught more students, the reassignment of students to those teachers is not 
necessary. In the 2010-2011 school year, there are a total number of four schools with eight 
mathematics specialists (i.e., two teachers per school) where mathematics specialization is 
not necessary because the two teachers separately in each school taught the same number of 
students.  
This study simultaneously calculates achievement changes in other subjects. To do 
so, the students who were taught by the new mathematics specialist(s) in other subjects are 
reassigned to the non-mathematics specialists whose assignments are altered under the 
hypothetical policy for mathematics specialization. The reassignment between those students 
and teachers is random. This random assignment is neither ideal nor practical, but it is one 
of the assignment strategies that can be easily implemented with minimum administrative 
efforts within schools. In practice, the reassignments of students in other subjects can also 
follow the similar optimal process used for mathematics specialization within schools. This 
study does not discuss any sophisticated assignment process for those students and teachers 
in other subjects since the key focus is on the maximum potential gains in mathematics 
achievement through specialization.  
The achievement changes may or may not be positive under the random 
assignments. If the new mathematics specialists are relatively more effective in teaching non-
mathematics subjects in a school, student scores in those subjects are likely to be not as good 
as before the hypothetical assignments would have taken place. In the opposite, if the 
mathematics teachers who do not become mathematics specialists under the hypothetical 
policy are relatively more effective in teaching other subjects, student test scores in those 
subjects are likely to be higher.    
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This study reports achievement gains in mathematics and achievement changes in 
other subjects if this hypothetical policy for mathematics specialization would have taken 
place within schools in the 2010-2011 school year. The average of the maximum gains in 
mathematics achievement is about 0.16 standard deviation points in schools where 
mathematics can be fully specialized. In 75.9 percent of those schools, the maximum gains 
are greater than 0.1 standard deviation. The achievement changes in English/language arts 
and science are centered on -0.1. The average achievement change in social studies is equal 
to zero.   
This study further reports average maximum achievement gains in mathematics by 
school characteristics. The average gains through mathematics specialization are larger in 
schools with high poverty levels (i.e., the percent of students eligible for free/reduced-price 
school lunch) and low prior test performance compared to their counterparts. The schools 
in the lowest performance quintile of average prior test performance (quintile 1) and the 
ones with more than 87 percent of students eligible for free/reduced-price school lunch 
(quintile 5) can raise average test performance in mathematics by 0.17 and 0.18 standard 
deviation, respectively. I then report achievement gains in mathematics in schools grouped 
by school accountability status under NCLB and the Tennessee’s new school accountability 
system implemented in the 2011-2012 school year.3 Under either accountability system, 
schools are held for accountable for their performance in recent years instead of just one 
year prior. I find that the average of maximum achievement gains in mathematics and 
achievement changes in other subjects are not different across school groups based on 
3 For details on the exemplary districts, see Appendix A.  
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accountability indicators. The average achievement gains in priority and non-priority schools 
are 0.16 and 0.15, respectively.4   
This chapter is organized in the following fashion. In Section 2, I explain the 
possibility of generating postdecision surprises during the process of selecting the high-
performing teachers to specialize in mathematics and then discuss the way of using teacher 
value-added estimates to overcome the postdecision surprise when making teacher 
assignments. Section 3 states my research questions. Section 4 illustrates my method. Data 
used for this study are presented in Section 5. I display my findings in Section 6. This 
chapter concludes in Section 7.  
Literature Review 
It is obvious that teacher value-added estimates are always subject to random 
estimation error. Research has shown that not only teacher value-added estimates are not 
stable for a given teacher over time but also the differences on value-added estimates are not 
explained by observable teacher characteristics (Aaronson et al., 2007; Ballou, 2005; 
Goldhaber and Hansen, 2010b; Koedel and Betts, 2007; McCaffrey et al., 2008 and 2009). A 
teacher’s ranking of value-added estimates will not be always the same from one year to the 
next. This can be an important reason that teacher value-added estimates are less attractive 
to the educators and researchers who believe that true teaching effectiveness is stable over 
time. Particularly, concerns are raised when teacher value-added estimates are used to make 
decisions on teacher assignments.  
This study seeks to provide a mathematical solution to resolve postdecision surprises 
in an optimization-based selection process for subject specialization in schools. I consider 
4 Schools are placed on the priority list if they are in the bottom five percent of overall performance 
across tested grades and subjects.  
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two important issues in understanding the proposed strategy to assign the relatively more 
effective mathematics teachers to fully specialize in teaching mathematics. The first issue 
concerns the expected surprise built into the optimization-based selection process where 
selection is on the basis of some uncertain estimates of the true values. The second issue 
relates to the statistical technique to adjust teacher value-added estimates to overcome the 
postdecision surprise discussed in the first issue.  
1.  Postdecision Surprises 
Postdecision surprises refer to the difference between what a decision-maker expects 
and what actually happens after a decision is made. The hypothetical policy I am considering 
for subject specialization can result in such surprise when the value estimates used to make 
decisions are subject to error.  
Postdecision surprises can be observed in competitive situations. Several examples of 
auctions are often used to describe such surprise. According to Thaler (1998), an auction 
winner is unsatisfied (or perhaps even “cursed”) when the winning bid exceeds the value of 
the object for sale or when the profit the winner gains from winning the bid is less than the 
winner’s expectation. Postdecision surprises will occur when the estimates of the value of the 
object for sale from the bidders are subject to some random error (i.e., commonly associated 
with positive estimation errors during actions). The competition among auction bidders 
further amplifies the degree of surprises since the bidders have to bid aggressively to win the 
auction. The higher the bidders bid, the larger postdecision surprises will be if the estimates 
of the value of the object for sale are over what the value of that object truly is.  
 Marks (2008) and Smith and Winkler (2006) have also observed such surprise in an 
optimization-based selection process. Similar to the auction examples, choosing the best 
among the estimated values that are subject to some random error will result in 
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unsatisfactory results on average. In a simulation example, a researcher selects the maximum 
value from three estimates. Those estimates are independent and identically distributed with 
an identical true value of zero and a standard deviation of one. In each iteration, the 
researcher generates three random estimates and selects the highest value estimate 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 . Repeat 
that data simulation and selection process hundreds or thousands times. The researcher then 
compares the average of the maximum value estimates selected over all iterations to the 
average of the known true value 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . While the true value for each value estimate 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 is always 
known as zero, the average of the maximum value estimates over all iterations is 0.85. 
Therefore, the expected postdecision surprise 𝐸𝐸(𝑉𝑉�𝑖𝑖 − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) is 0.85.  
Smith and Winkler (2006) has further found that the expected surprise becomes 
larger as the number of the estimates for selection rises. The expected postdecision surprise 
𝐸𝐸(𝑉𝑉�𝑖𝑖 − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) will reach 1.54 when selecting the highest value estimate among 10 value 
estimates. Column 1 of Table 1 presents evidence of the expected surprise when selecting 
one and only one highest value estimates as the number of alternatives increases. I further 
extend this simulation analysis by asking whether the expected surprise will be varying when 
selecting multiple highest value estimates as the number of alternatives increases. I find that, 
holding the number of alternatives constant, the expected surprise decreases as the number 
of select highest value estimates increases. However, when holding the ratio of the number 
of select highest value estimates to the number of alternatives constant, the more 
alternatives, the higher is the expected surprise. For example, when this ratio is 1:4 (i.e., a 
quarter of alternatives is selected from each iteration), the expected surprise increases from 
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1.03 with four alternatives to 1.13 with eight alternatives (See the numbers highlighted in 
gray).5 Such increase disappears when the total number of alternatives reaches 24.  
This simulation example presented above closely mirrors subject specialization for 
teachers in my study. Assume that all mathematics teachers have an identical true value of 
teaching effectiveness in a given school, but their value-added estimates are different. 
Teachers with positive estimation error will look more effective than the ones with negative 
estimation error. While the optimization-based selection process determines the mathematics 
teacher with the highest value estimate to specialize in teaching mathematics, true 
effectiveness, by assumption, is the same across all mathematics teachers. The expected 
student test score gains from specialization are higher than what actually will be achieved. 
The difference between the two test score gains (expected versus actual) is the estimated 
postdecision surprise.  
 
5 A Stata program for this simulation analysis is available from the author by request.  
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Table 1
Expected surprise in a process of selecting the highest value estimate(s) as the number of alternatives increases
{1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {6} {7} {8} {9} {10} {11} {12} {13} {14} {15}
1 0.00
2 0.56 0.00
3 0.84 0.42 0.00
4 1.03 0.66 0.34 0.00
5 1.17 0.83 0.56 0.29 0.00
6 1.27 0.96 0.71 0.48 0.25 0.00
7 1.35 1.05 0.82 0.61 0.42 0.22 0.00
8 1.42 1.13 0.91 0.72 0.54 0.37 0.20 -0.01
9 1.48 1.21 1.00 0.82 0.65 0.50 0.34 0.18 0.00
10 1.54 1.27 1.06 0.89 0.74 0.59 0.46 0.32 0.17 0.00
11 1.59 1.32 1.12 0.96 0.81 0.68 0.55 0.42 0.29 0.16 0.00
12 1.63 1.37 1.18 1.02 0.87 0.75 0.62 0.51 0.39 0.27 0.15 0.00
13 1.67 1.42 1.23 1.07 0.94 0.81 0.70 0.58 0.48 0.37 0.26 0.14 0.00
14 1.70 1.45 1.27 1.12 0.98 0.86 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.45 0.34 0.24 0.13 0.00
15 1.73 1.49 1.31 1.16 1.03 0.91 0.81 0.71 0.61 0.51 0.42 0.33 0.23 0.12 0.00
16 1.76 1.52 1.35 1.20 1.07 0.96 0.86 0.76 0.67 0.58 0.49 0.40 0.31 0.22 0.12
17 1.79 1.55 1.38 1.23 1.11 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.71 0.63 0.54 0.46 0.38 0.29 0.20
18 1.82 1.59 1.41 1.27 1.15 1.04 0.94 0.85 0.77 0.68 0.60 0.52 0.44 0.36 0.28
19 1.85 1.61 1.44 1.30 1.18 1.08 0.98 0.89 0.81 0.73 0.65 0.57 0.50 0.42 0.35
20 1.87 1.64 1.47 1.33 1.22 1.11 1.02 0.93 0.85 0.77 0.69 0.62 0.55 0.48 0.41
21 1.89 1.66 1.49 1.36 1.24 1.14 1.05 0.96 0.88 0.80 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.52 0.46
22 1.91 1.68 1.51 1.38 1.27 1.17 1.08 0.99 0.91 0.84 0.77 0.70 0.63 0.57 0.50
23 1.93 1.71 1.54 1.41 1.30 1.20 1.11 1.02 0.95 0.87 0.81 0.74 0.67 0.61 0.55
24 1.95 1.73 1.57 1.44 1.32 1.23 1.14 1.06 0.98 0.91 0.84 0.77 0.71 0.65 0.59
25 1.97 1.75 1.58 1.46 1.35 1.25 1.16 1.08 1.01 0.94 0.87 0.80 0.74 0.68 0.62
26 1.98 1.77 1.61 1.48 1.37 1.27 1.19 1.11 1.04 0.97 0.90 0.84 0.78 0.72 0.66
27 2.00 1.78 1.62 1.49 1.39 1.29 1.21 1.13 1.06 0.99 0.92 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.69
28 2.02 1.80 1.64 1.52 1.41 1.32 1.23 1.15 1.08 1.01 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.72
29 2.03 1.82 1.66 1.53 1.43 1.33 1.25 1.18 1.11 1.04 0.98 0.92 0.86 0.81 0.75
30 2.05 1.83 1.68 1.55 1.45 1.35 1.27 1.20 1.13 1.06 1.00 0.94 0.88 0.83 0.78
Expected surprise when selecting {a number of} highest value estimate(s)
Notes: Value estimates are drawn from a normal distribution with mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Each row is simulated by 30,000 times. 
Averages of the expected surprise are reported as the number of highest value estimates increases for a given number of alternatives. 
Number of alternatives
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2.  Using Shrinkage Estimates in the Optimization-Based Selection Process 
There is an increasing interest of using shrinkage estimates to improve the prediction 
of regression parameters due to the noise in the process of regression estimation. The 
shrinkage estimate is the solution for the problem of postdecision surprises in this study. To 
show the proof, let 𝑘𝑘∗ be the teacher with the highest teacher estimate; and the optimal 
selection process chooses the teacher 𝑘𝑘∗ to fully specialize in teaching mathematics. When 
selecting teachers based on the estimated teacher effects 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 in school m, the expected 
postdecision surprise conditional on 𝑉𝑉 = (𝑉𝑉1, … , 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛) is 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘∗ − 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘∗|𝑉𝑉].6 Such 
postdecision surprise is not equal to zero based on the simulation analysis mentioned above. 
The key to overcome this postdecision surprise is to choose “proper conditioning” (Smith 
and Winkler, 2006). Using the empirical Bayesian approach, the shrinkage estimate for 
teacher k is the posterior means 𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘 = 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘|𝑉𝑉] for 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑛 from the posterior 
distribution for 𝜇𝜇|𝑉𝑉 where 𝜇𝜇 = (𝜇𝜇1, … , 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛). Now rank 𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘 for all teachers and choose the 
maximal posterior value estimate for mathematics specialization. Given teacher 𝑘𝑘∗ with the 
highest posterior value 𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘∗ , the conditional expectation of 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘∗ − 𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘∗ is  
𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘∗ − 𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘∗|𝑉𝑉] = 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘∗ − 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘∗|𝑉𝑉]|𝑉𝑉] =  𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘∗|𝑉𝑉] − 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘∗|𝑉𝑉] = 0.              (1) 
After integrating the conditional expectation over all estimated teacher effects in school m, 
the postdecision surprise 𝐸𝐸[𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘∗ − 𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘∗] is equal to zero.  
A generalized form of a shrinkage estimator is ?̂?𝛽 = 𝛼𝛼Β + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)?̅?𝛽 (Sander and 
Horn, 1994; Searle, 1971). The term 𝛼𝛼 refers to the reliability of parameter estimates, a ratio 
of signal to the overall variance. The shrinkage estimator ?̂?𝛽 depends on the reliability 𝛼𝛼, the 
6 There are a total number of 𝑛𝑛 mathematics teachers in school m. The subscript for school is 
omitted for notation simplicity.  
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parameter estimate Β, and the shrinking target ?̅?𝛽 which normally is the grant mean of all true 
parameters. When the reliability is equal to one, the shrinkage estimate is the same as the raw 
estimate. When the reliability is approaching to zero, the parameter estimate is shrunk 
toward the grant mean of the true parameters.  
To build shrinkage estimates for this study, consider my value-added estimates 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘, 
true teacher effects 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘, and average value-added estimates 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 in school m in the following 
equations:  
𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,                                                                                                (2) 
𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘,                                                                                                  (3) 
𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 = 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 + 𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘,                                                                                                      (4) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 is the average true teacher effects in school m; 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the difference between 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 
and 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 for teacher k in school m; 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 is the difference between 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 and the grand mean 
effects for all teachers which is set to zero (i.e., 𝜇𝜇 = 0).7 With some algebra, one can then 
decompose 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 into three components as follows:  
𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = (𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 − 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘) + (𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 − 𝑉𝑉�) + (𝑉𝑉� − 𝜇𝜇),                                                          (5) 
where the third component (𝑉𝑉� − 𝜇𝜇) is equal to zero since the true grand mean 𝜇𝜇 is equal to 
zero and the estimated grand mean 𝑉𝑉�  is approximately equal to zero. Quantitatively, 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is 
the sum of the first two components.   
The first two components are estimated with random error. I apply the generalized 
form for shrinkage estimator as mentioned above to calculate the shrinkage estimates for 
teacher k. The parameter estimate B is now replaced by the teacher-level component 
7 The grand mean of true teacher effects can be set to any number in a regression analysis. 
Conventionally, researchers estimate teachers’ value-added estimates that follow a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
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(𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 − 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘) and the school-level component (𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 − 𝑉𝑉�). The equation of my shrinkage 
estimator is presented below 
𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼1(𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 − 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘) + 𝛼𝛼2(𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘 − 𝑉𝑉�) + (1 − 𝛼𝛼1 − 𝛼𝛼2)𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘,                                   (6) 
where 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2 are two reliability coefficients; and 𝛼𝛼1 is not equal to 𝛼𝛼2. Prior research by 
Sander and his colleagues has also used a similar version of shrinkage estimator but with one 
distinction. Their shrinkage estimator allows 𝛼𝛼1 to be equal to 𝛼𝛼2.  
Instead, my shrinkage estimator in the equation (6) assumes that the amount of noise 
when estimating each of the first two components is different in this study. This assumption 
is true because the amount of noise comes from different sources separately for each 
component. The reliability of the teacher-level component depends on the amount of data 
used to estimate teachers’ value added. The more data on student test scores and the less 
measurement error on test scores, the more accurate teachers’ value-added estimates would 
be. Instead, for the school-level component, average value added depends on the number of 
teachers within schools. One teacher with an extremely high/low value-added estimate will 
largely influence average value added in small schools. Usually, the reliability coefficient in 
the teacher-level component is smaller than the one in the school-level component. It is 
easier to learn and more accurate to predict how effectively a school raises student test 
scores based on teaching effectiveness from individual teachers than how effectively 
individual teachers raise student test scores in that school based on student-level 
achievement data.  
In this study, my primary focus is on the teacher-level component. Within schools, I 
select the most effective teacher(s) to fully specialize in teaching mathematics based on 
teachers’ absolute advantage in teaching mathematics (i.e., 𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 − 𝑣𝑣�𝑘𝑘). The magnitude of 
these absolute advantages for individual teachers depends on the teacher-within-school 
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effect 𝛼𝛼1(𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 − 𝑉𝑉𝑘𝑘). The teacher-within school effects are then used to determine which 
mathematics teacher(s) will fully specialize in teaching mathematics in a school.  
Research Questions 
This study resolves a mathematical question of postdecision surprises to estimate 
achievement changes in each of four academic subjects in a school year if mathematics 
would have been fully specialized by the most effective mathematics teacher(s). I am asking 
two research questions:  
Research question 1: What would be the maximum gains in mathematics 
achievement that could be achieved through mathematics specialization in upper 
elementary grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee?  
 
Research question 2: What would be the achievement changes in other subjects while 
mathematics have been fully specialized in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in 
Tennessee?    
  
There are three things that need to be clear before calculating the achievement gains 
in mathematics or the achievement changes in other subjects. First, the number of 
mathematics specialists depends on the size of the school. When the school size is large, it 
might require the second and third best mathematics teachers to fully specialize in teaching 
mathematics. Second, this study uses a mixed-model equation to estimates the shrinkage of 
teaching effectiveness. Lastly, this study uses the shrinkage estimates to calculate absolute 
advantages in teaching mathematics among all mathematics teachers within schools. The 
decision on specialization by mathematics teachers is then based on within-school absolute 
advantages in teaching mathematics.  
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Empirical Methodology 
1.  Shrinkage Estimates for Teachers  
This study uses the same setup including variables and sample specifications as the 
DOLS model presented in Chapter II to estimate the shrinkage of value added for teachers. 
Instead of estimating teacher effects in the DOLS model, I use the mixed-model equation in 
this essay to estimate school and teacher random effects within a fixed time period. My 
estimation equation for the BLUP estimator of teacher value added is presented below:   
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜋𝜋 + 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 + 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                            (7) 
where 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘 is the random effects for school m; and 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the random effects for teacher k in 
school m; and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term clustered at the school level. According to Sander and 
Horn (1994) and Searle (1971), the BLUP estimator of random teacher effects is the 
shrinkage of value added.8 This study estimates the shrinkage of value added for teachers 
separately in each of six hybrid districts over a rolling four-year window. In the Tennessee’s 
value-added model, Sander and other researchers also pool schools with similar attributes 
from different districts to create a set of large hybrid districts and then estimate the 
shrinkage value added for teachers within each of those newly formed districts. I group 
schools based on school region and urbanicity categories.9  
Teachers’ shrinkage estimates are measured as teacher within school effects over a 
four-year period. I choose not to estimate teacher random effects using one year of data for 
two reasons. First, not all teachers have taught for four years. Even if one year of data on 
student test scores is missing, it is still possible to estimate teacher value added using data in 
other years available. Second, one year of data on student test scores is considered not being 
8 For detailed information on the mixed-model equation, see Sanders and Horn (1994) on page 305.  
9 For more information about the hybrid districts, see Chapter II on page 14.  
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sufficient to estimate teacher random effects that are used for making decisions on teacher 
assignments. My estimation method allows me to use as many years of data as are available 
up to four years. The more years of data on student test scores for individual teachers 
increase the precision of shrinkage estimates for teaching effectiveness.    
2.  Subject Specialization and Teacher Assignments  
In this analysis, teachers are regarded as eligible to fully specialize in teaching 
mathematics if they have shrinkage estimates in mathematics in schools where there were at 
least two mathematics teachers. The hypothetical policy for subject specialization targets on 
(1) self-contained classroom teachers and (2) teachers who were partially and/or fully 
specialized in teaching mathematics. Although two or more teachers have specialized in 
teaching mathematics in some schools, it is possible that previous specialization is not 
optimal. All eligible teachers at the same school are ranked based on their absolute 
advantages in teaching mathematics and the teacher with the highest absolute advantage is 
selected first for mathematics specialization. The teacher’s absolute advantage in teaching 
mathematics is the difference between the shrinkage estimate ?̂?𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 and the average of the 
shrinkage estimates ?̂?𝛿𝑘𝑘 among all mathematics teachers at the same school. Those teachers 
are selected from each school to fully specialize in teaching mathematics at their own 
schools.  
The number of mathematics specialists in a given school depends on the average 
teaching load within schools across all mathematics teachers. The teaching load is the total 
number of students in all subjects taught by a teacher in a school year. For example, a 
teacher taught three subjects, 25 students in mathematics and 20 in both English/language 
arts and science. The teaching load for that teacher is 25 + 20 + 20 = 65 students. The 
teaching loads for individual mathematics teachers are then averaged to the school level. The 
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number of mathematics specialist teachers is equal to the total number of students divided 
by the average teaching load and this number is then rounded to integers. For example, if 
this number is less than 1.5 in a school, there is one and only mathematics specialist teacher 
required in that school. If there are more than one mathematics specialists in a school, the 
teachers with the highest absolute advantages are chosen first for mathematics specialization. 
All selected teachers fully specialize in teaching mathematics. The number of students 
assigned to each specialist is equal to the total number of students divided by the number of 
mathematics specialists. The mathematics specialists not only teach the students they actually 
taught in the 2010-2011 school year but also some additional students from other 
mathematics teachers who no longer teach mathematics under the new assignments for 
mathematics specialization.  
The focus of the maximum gains in mathematics achievement is on those additional 
students taught by the mathematics specialists under the hypothetical policy for mathematics 
specialization since those students are reassigned to the mathematics specialists. The gains in 
mathematics are equal to the difference of the weighted average of teaching effectiveness 
before and after teacher assignments for mathematics specialization take place. The equation 
of estimating achievement gains in mathematics is as follows:  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 =  𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 −𝑊𝑊𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,                                                                           (8) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is a vertical vector of teacher shrinkage estimates for hypothetical mathematics 
specialists; 𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 is a vertical vector of teacher shrinkage estimates for the teachers who 
actually taught mathematics in the 2010-2011 school year;10 and the horizontal vectors of 
weights 𝑊𝑊𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 and 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 are the proportion of students taught by mathematics teachers within 
10 The subscripts 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 represent “after the reassignments for mathematics specialization” and 
“before the reassignments for mathematics specialization”, respectively.  
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schools before and after mathematics specialization, 𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘⁄  and 𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘⁄ , 
respectively.11 If there is one and only one mathematics specialist in a school, 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is a scalar 
vector of one and the weighted average of teaching effectiveness is the shrinkage estimate 
for that specialist teacher.  
The estimation of the maximum gains in mathematics is rather straightforward. A 
mathematical example is presented below. This example further emphasizes which groups of 
students actually receive the benefits from mathematics specialization. Assume there are 
eight self-contained classroom teachers with 20 students per teacher in each of four subjects. 
Two mathematics specialists are needed for a total number of 160 mathematics students (80 
student per specialist). When I estimate the maximum gains in mathematics, the target 
students are those 120 students who were taught by six other self-contained classroom 
teachers who no longer teach mathematics after the hypothetical policy for subject 
specialization takes place. The weights 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 for the mathematics specialists are equal to the 
ratio of 60 to 120 (i.e., each mathematics specialist teaches 60 more students who come from 
the other six teachers). The weights 𝑊𝑊𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 for the teachers who will no longer teach 
mathematics are equal to the ratio of 20 to 120 (i.e., each of those teachers taught 20 
students in mathematics and the total number of those students is 120).  
Those teachers who are eligible for reassignments also include the ones within 
schools where mathematics has already been fully specialized. It is not clear whether more 
effective specialist teachers have always been assigned to teach more students than other less 
effective specialist teachers in mathematics. In other words, if the existing assignments for 
mathematics specialization has not been optimal, there is a room to further improve the 
11 The subscript for subject and school is omitted for notation clarity.  
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average mathematics performance through mathematics specialization. Specifically, I allow 
the students from less effective specialist teachers to flow to more effective specialist 
teachers. For example, there are two specialists who taught one and only one subject, 
mathematics, in a schools. Teacher A taught 90 students with the highest value added; and 
teacher B taught 110 students. The average teaching load for mathematics teachers is 100 
students. Since the current assignment for mathematics teachers was not optimal, it is 
possible to raise average mathematics scores by letting teacher A teach 10 more students 
who originally were taught by teacher B. In this particular case, all specialist teachers 
continue teaching mathematics but the number of students assigned separately to each 
teacher is set to the average teaching load for mathematics teachers.   
After determining mathematics specialists and the maximum gains in mathematics, 
the number of students mathematics specialists who would have had in other subjects are 
randomly assigned to other non-mathematics specialist teachers who originally taught 
mathematics before mathematics specialization. The way to calculate the changes for those 
students in each of non-mathematics subjects is similar to the way I estimate the maximum 
gains in mathematics through specialization. In the equation (8), 𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 is the weighted 
average of teaching effectiveness in a non-mathematics subject after the random 
reassignment occurs; and 𝑊𝑊𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎 is the weighted average of teaching effectiveness in the 
same non-mathematics subject before the random reassignment occurs.12 In the above 
example, the achievement changes are centered on those 120 students who will be randomly 
reassigned to different teachers in each of three non-mathematics subjects after mathematics 
specialization.    
12 When the reassignments happen within schools where mathematics has already been fully 
specialized, the estimation of changes in achievement in other subjects is not available.  
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Data 
This study uses student and teacher longitudinal data to estimate the shrinkage of 
value added for teachers in grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee’s public elementary schools. 
Shrinkage estimates in the 2010-2011 school year are then used to make decisions on 
mathematics specialization within schools. I estimate the maximum gains in mathematics 
through specialization and the changes in achievement in other subjects.  
This study also considers school-level characteristics to understand the variation of 
the maximum gains in mathematics that could be achieved through specialization. I group 
schools based on school poverty level; the average test scores in schools and school NCLB 
accountability status levels in the 2009-2010 school year; and the Tennessee’s own 
accountability indicators in the 2011-2012 school year. I then compare achievement gains 
across different groups separately in each subject.  
In the 2011-2012 school year, Tennessee replaces the NCLB accountability system 
with its own accountability system; and focuses on growth of achievement for all students 
and on closing achievement gaps. Under this new system, the state of Tennessee will provide 
a list of schools/districts under different achievement categories. For this new school 
accountability, schools are placed in three categories, reward, priority, and focus. Each of 
those categories represents a group of schools. For example, the top 5 percent of high 
performing schools in Tennessee are listed on the reward school list. The bottom 5 percent 
of schools on overall achievement performance are placed on the priority school list. The 10 
percent of schools with the largest achievement gaps are placed on the focus school list. In 
addition to the school accountability, Tennessee further classifies districts in three categories, 
exemplary, in need of improvement, and need of subgroup improvement. Districts are 
placed on each category based on (1) the district overall proficiency levels; (2) progress on 
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closing achievement gaps; and (3) improvement for minority students, students with 
disabilities, limited English language learners, and socioeconomically disadvantaged students. 
In this study, I group schools based on the Tennessee’s own accountability measures in the 
2011-2012 school year in order to understand the variation of the maximum gains in 
mathematics across different school/district categories as well as the changes in achievement 
in other subjects.13    
Results 
 Previous Chapters II and III have shown that (1) there is a great deal of potential to 
increase the degree of specialization in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee 
and (2) the variation of teachers’ value added in mathematics is the highest among all other 
subjects. This section then presents the maximum gains in mathematics and the changes in 
achievement in other subjects after the hypothetical policy for mathematics specialization 
would have taken place in the 2010-2011 school year.  
There are a total number of 1,212 schools with mathematics teachers in grades 4 
through 6 in the 2010-2011 school year. The number of schools that meet the requirements 
to implement the hypothetical policy for mathematics specialization is 874. Those schools 
have a total number of 6,211 mathematics teachers. Among those teachers, there are 1,811 
mathematics specialists selected under the hypothetical policy holding their average teaching 
load constant within schools. Tables 2a and 2b presents the number of teachers separately in 
each grade by teacher assignments before and after mathematics specialization has taken 
place.  
13 The use of the Tennessee’s own accountability system starts in the 2011-2012 school year; 
therefore, the Tennessee’s school and district accountability statuses are not available in the 2010-
2011 school year. I use the estimated teaching effectiveness data in the 2010-2011 school year 
because the school poverty and NCLB data from TDOE report cards are only available in the 2010-
2011 school year for the public use.  
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Specifically, Table 2a shows the number of mathematics specialists by their actual 
assignments in the 2010-2011 school year. As expected, a large proportion of mathematics 
specialists (i.e., 96 percent in grade 4 and 86 percent in grade 5) taught self-contained 
classrooms in the 2010-2011 school year. In grade 6, there are 51 percent of mathematics 
specialists assigned to continue specializing in teaching mathematics and there are 22 percent 
of mathematics specialists who actually were self-contained classroom teachers in the 2010-
2011 school year.   
Instead, Table 2b indicates assignments for teachers who no longer teach 
mathematics due to the hypothetical policy for mathematics specialization. Most self-
contained classroom teachers now only teach three non-mathematics subjects. In addition, I 
find that some mathematics specialists (i.e., 112 in grades 4 through 6) in the 2010-2011 
school years do not teach any subject under the hypothetical policy for mathematics 
specialization while those teachers fully specialized in teaching mathematics in the 2010-2011 
school year.14 The number of mathematics specialists is small in grades 4 and 5 in schools, 
but not all of those teachers had high value added so that they can be chosen to continue 
specializing fully in teaching mathematics.  
 
14 Some of those teachers do not have value-added data in any non-mathematics subjects if they have 
specialized fully in teaching mathematics for at least three school years. This hypothetical policy for 
mathematics specialization does not mean to lay off this small group of teachers. Instead, there are 
several possible reassignments for those teachers within schools. They may teach in the lower 
elementary grades 1 and 2; teach non-academic subjects; and take non-instructional positions (e.g., 
student counselor). It is important to acknowledge that the policy for specialization does not intend 
to fire the less effective teachers in a subject within schools.      
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Table 2a
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
MTH 8 1.2% 35 5.1% 237 50.7%
MTH and ELA 6 0.9% 17 2.5% 51 10.9%
MTH and SCI 2 0.3% 8 1.2% 26 5.6%
MTH and SOC 3 0.5% 6 0.9% 22 4.7%
MTH, ELA, and SCI 4 0.6% 3 0.4% 4 0.9%
MTH, ELA, and SOC 3 0.5% 9 1.3% 9 1.9%
MTH, ELA, SCI, and SOC 636 96.1% 585 85.8% 101 21.6%
MTH, SCI, and SOC 0 0.0% 19 2.8% 17 3.6%
Total number of teachers
Table 2b
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Do NOT teach 13 0.7% 30 1.6% 69 12.1%
ELA 17 0.9% 24 1.3% 62 10.9%
ELA and SCI 12 0.6% 18 1.0% 9 1.6%
ELA and SOC 16 0.8% 14 0.8% 19 3.3%
ELA, SCI, and SOC 1,931 96.7% 1,672 91.1% 330 58.1%
SCI 3 0.2% 25 1.4% 25 4.4%
SCI and SOC 3 0.2% 46 2.5% 33 5.8%
SOC 1 0.1% 7 0.4% 21 3.7%
Total number of teachers 568
Number of mathematics teachers who no longer teach mathematics separately in each grade by their new 
assignments due to mathematics specialziation
Subject scheme
after reassignments
Grade level
4
1,996 1,836
Number of mathematics teachers who will specialize in teaching mathematics separately in each grade by 
their actual assignments in the 2010-2011 school year
Subject scheme
before reassignments
Grade level
Notes: Sample includes teachers who taught matheamtics in grades 4 through 6 and some teachers who 
taught more than one grade in schools. There are 874 schools (out of 1,212) eligible for this hypothetical 
policy for mathematics specialization. 
4 5 6
662 682 467
Notes: Sample includes teachers who taught matheamtics in grades 4 through 6 and some teachers who 
taught more than one grade in schools. There are 874 schools (out of 1,212) eligible for this hypothetical 
policy for mathematics specialization in the 2010-2011 school year. 
5 6
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Figures 1 through 4 display the achievement gains or losses for individual schools 
separately in each subject. On average, those figures suggest there are gains in mathematics, 
less than 0.1 losses in both English/language arts and science, and almost no changes in 
social studies.   
In mathematics, there are 24.1 percent (211) schools with the maximum gains less 
than 0.1 standard deviation; 51.8 percent (453) with the gains between 0.1 and 0.2; and 24 
percent (210) with the gains greater than 0.2. The average of the maximum gains in 
mathematics is about 0.155 standard deviation.  
The changes in achievement due to mathematics specialization could be either 
positive or negative in other subjects within schools. There are about 89 percent of schools 
(639) with the changes in achievement smaller than zero standard deviation in 
English/language arts, 89.6 percent (635) in science, and 50.7 percent (356) in social studies. 
The average changes in achievement is -0.086 in English/language arts, -0.097 in science, 
and 0.001 in social studies. The negative changes in achievement in both English/language 
arts and science may be due to the fact that the mathematics specialists were also relatively 
effective in teaching other non-mathematics subjects in the 2010-2011 school year compared 
to the ones who no longer teach mathematics but other non-mathematics subjects.   
In addition to reporting the gains/losses in achievement for individual schools, this 
study is also interesting in how school characteristics are associated with the maximum gains 
in mathematics through specialization and the changes in achievement in other subjects after 
reassignments. This is a policy-related concern regarding whether the potential maximum 
gains in mathematics and the changes in achievement in other subjects are substantially 
higher in one particular group than another.  
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Figure 1
Maximum achievement gains in mathematics that could be achieved through specialization in 
upper elementary grades 4 through 6
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Achievement changes in English/language arts in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 after 
reassignment
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Achievement changes in science in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 after reassignment
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Figure 4
Achievement changes in social studies in upper elementary grades 4 through 6 after reassignment
Table 3 presents the aggregated maximum gains in mathematics and the changes in 
achievement separately in each non-mathematics subject by school characteristics.15 I 
consider three types of school characteristics (i.e., percent of students eligible for 
free/reduced price school lunch – FRL, average of prior test performance – ATP, and 
school NCLB accountability statuses) and five school grouping strategies (i.e., priority, focus, 
reward, exemplary, and subgroup improvement classifications under Tennessee’s own 
accountability system).     
Average gains/losses in achievement are reported for schools within each of five 
FRL quintiles, each of five ATP quintiles, and three NCLB accountability status levels (i.e., 
good standing, target, and sanctions). Using Tennessee’s own accountability system, I also 
report average gains/losses in achievement based on a set of binary accountability status 
indicators (i.e., priority versus non-priority, focus versus non-focus, reward and non-reward, 
exemplary and non-exemplary, and subgroup improvement versus non-subgroup 
improvement).  
 
 
15 For the graphic illustration of average gains/losses in each subject separately by school 
characteristics, see Appendix B.  
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Table 3
Average 
gains
Number
of schools
Average 
changes
Number
of schools
Average 
changes
Number
of schools
Average 
changes
Number
of schools
Quintile 1 1.20 - 46.21% 0.1457 203 -0.0766 164 -0.0863 161 -0.0102 163
Quintile 2 46.24 - 61.68% 0.1537 151 -0.0714 120 -0.0839 113 -0.0074 112
Quintile 3 61.68 - 72.75% 0.1519 177 -0.0888 144 -0.1046 143 -0.0045 143
Quintile 4 72.81 - 87.14% 0.1531 178 -0.0902 151 -0.0941 146 0.0080 143
Quintile 5 87.15 - 100% 0.1748 156 -0.1009 135 -0.1138 142 0.0250 137
Total 0.1551 865 -0.0857 714 -0.0968 705 0.0021 698
Quintile 1 0.1846 135 -0.1054 119 -0.1227 128 0.0020 128
Quintile 2 0.1612 191 -0.1048 148 -0.1000 156 -0.0051 141
Quintile 3 0.1606 187 -0.0868 148 -0.0837 130 -0.0175 138
Quintile 4 0.1414 174 -0.0735 148 -0.0995 139 -0.0003 153
Quintile 5 0.1349 187 -0.0623 155 -0.0809 156 0.0279 142
Total 0.1551 874 -0.0856 718 -0.0968 709 0.0015 702
Good standing 0.1543 449 -0.0801 385 -0.0957 379 0.0009 379
Target 0.1587 282 -0.0907 235 -0.0999 230 -0.0057 226
Sanctions 0.1506 143 -0.0947 98 -0.0939 100 0.0203 97
Total 0.1551 874 -0.0856 718 -0.0968 709 0.0015 702
Non-priority 0.1549 842 -0.0851 691 -0.0965 681 0.0003 675
Priority 0.1601 32 -0.0969 27 -0.1039 28 0.0319 27
Total 0.1551 874 -0.0856 718 -0.0968 709 0.0015 702
Non-focus 0.1549 784 -0.0846 639 -0.0987 634 0.0036 626
Focus 0.1571 90 -0.0932 79 -0.0807 75 -0.0163 76
Total 0.1551 874 -0.0856 718 -0.0968 709 0.0015 702
Non-reward 0.1561 790 -0.0868 646 -0.1005 635 0.0015 630
Reward 0.1460 84 -0.0743 72 -0.0649 74 0.0010 72
Total 0.1551 874 -0.0856 718 -0.0968 709 0.0015 702
Non-exemplary 0.1547 782 -0.0855 640 -0.0973 636 0.0008 631
Exemplary 0.1589 92 -0.0863 78 -0.0926 73 0.0079 71
Total 0.1551 874 -0.0856 718 -0.0968 709 0.0015 702
Non-subgroup improvement 0.1548 555 -0.0868 445 -0.0981 443 0.0047 441
Subgroup improvement 0.1557 319 -0.0836 273 -0.0946 266 -0.0040 261
Total 0.1551 874 -0.0856 718 -0.0968 709 0.0015 702
Notes: Schools with the lowest average mathematics scores are grouped in the first quintile; and schools with the highest average 
mathematics scores are grouped in the fifth quintile. 
Achievement gains/losses in each subject separately through specialization and after reassignments in the 2010-2011 school year in 
upper elementary grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee
Mathematics
English/
language arts Science Social studies
Percent free/reduced price school lunch in schools
Average achievement score at school
Grouping schools (5)
Grouping schools (4)
Grouping schools (3)
Grouping schools (2)
Grouping schools (1)
School NCLB status
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Those results show that the proportional changes across school FRL and ATP 
groups are large but strikingly similar across accountability groups. In comparison of average 
gains in achievement between the first (< 46 percent) and the fifth (> 87 percent) FRL 
percent quintiles, schools with higher percent of FRL students achieve higher gains in 
mathematics (a 20 percent increase) and much greater gains in social studies (from – 0.1 to 
0.02 standard deviation). At the same time, average losses in achievement increase by 31.8 
percent in both English/language arts and science between the first and fifth FRL percent 
quintiles. These findings suggest that schools with more poverty students are likely to make 
much higher gains in mathematics through specialization compared to their counterparts. 
This may be due to the fact that the variation of value added for mathematics teachers is 
large in schools with more poverty students. While the losses in achievement become larger 
in schools with more poverty students in English/language arts and science, there are much 
higher gains in social studies in schools with more than 72.8 percent of FRL students.  
The proportional changes are even stronger across schools grouped by average of 
prior achievement performance. Comparing the lowest (quintile 1) to the highest (quintile 5) 
groups of average prior test performance, average gains in mathematics steadily decrease 
from 0.18 to 0.13 standard deviation. There is a 40.8 and 34 percent decrease in average 
losses in English/language arts and science, respectively. Average losses drop from -0.11 to -
0.06 standard deviation in English/language arts and from -0.12 to -0.08 in science. These 
findings suggest that average gains in mathematics through specialization are inversely 
associated with average prior test performance in schools. In other words, more achievement 
gains in mathematics can be achieved through specialization in schools with lower prior 
mathematics achievement. The higher prior achievement in English/language arts and 
science, the less achievement losses in those subjects. In the opposite, there is no systematic 
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pattern of the changes in social studies across ATP groups and the average gain is almost 
zero in social studies.   
Average gains in mathematics are not significantly different across accountability 
groups. This is also true about average achievement losses in English/language arts and 
science. However, the schools with poor accountability status have higher achievement gains 
in social studies. For example, those schools that were subject to NCLB sanctions and 
classified as priority schools have 0.02 and 0.03 standard deviation, respectively. While 
achievement changes in social studies are different across accountability groups based on 
each accountability indicator, average achievement changes in social studies are small less 
than 0.05 standard deviation. Over all, these findings suggest that the gains in mathematics 
and the changes in other subjects are not affected by school accountability status assessed 
one year before (2009-2010) and after (2011-2012).    
Conclusion 
This study estimates the shrinkage of value added for individual teachers. The 
shrinkage estimates are then used in the optimization-based selection process to determine 
mathematics specialist(s) within schools. I estimate the maximum gains in mathematics that 
could be achieved through specialization and the changes in achievement in other subjects. 
The results indicate that the gains in mathematics are higher in schools with higher poverty 
students and lower average prior test performance. At the same time, the gains in 
mathematics are not different across school groups defined by school accountability status 
under NCLB and the Tennessee’s new school/district accountability system.  
  
160 
 
References 
Aaronson, D., Barrow, L., and Sanders, W.L. (2007). Teachers and student achievement in 
the Chicago public high schools. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 95–135.  
 
Balassa, B. (1965). Trade liberalization and ‘revealed’ comparative advantage. The Manchester 
School of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 33, pp. 99-123.  
 
Ballou, D. (2005). Value-added assessment: Lessons from Tennessee. In Value added models in 
education: Theory and applications, edited by Robert Lissetz, pp. 272–303. Maple Grove, 
MN: JAM Press. 
 
Boyd, D., Grossman, P., Lankford, H., Loeb, S., and Wyckoff, J. (2008a). Measuring effect 
sizes: The effect of measurement error. Paper prepared for the National Conference 
on Value-Added Modeling at University of Wisconsin-Madison.   
 
Boyd, D., Lankford, H., Loeb, S., and Wyckoff, J. (2008b). The impact of assessment and 
accountability on teacher recruitment and retention: Are there unintended 
consequences? Public Finance Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 88-111.    
 
Braun, H., Chudowsky, N., and Koenig, J. (2010). Getting Value Out of Value-Added: 
Report of a Workshop. National Research Council and National Academy of 
Education. Committee on Value-Added Methodology for Instructional 
Improvement, Program Evaluation, and Educational Accountability, Henry Braun, 
Naomi Chudowsky, and Judith Koenig, Editors. Center for Education, Division of 
Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press. 
 
Chingos, M.M. and West, M.R. (2011). Promotion and reassignment in public school 
districts: How do schools respond to differences in teacher effectiveness? 
Economics of Education Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 419–433.  
 
Goldhaber, D. and Hansen, M. (2010a). Assessing the potential of using value-added 
estimates of teacher job performance for marking tenure decisions. Center for 
Reinventing Public Education, Working Paper 31.  
 
Goldhaber, D. and Hansen, M. (2010b). Is it just a bad class? Assessing the stability of 
measured teacher performance. Center for Reinventing Public Education, Working 
Paper 2010-3 
 
Henderson, C.R. (1973). Sire evaluation and genetic trends. In: Animal breeding and genetics 
symposium in Honor of Dr. Jay L. Lush, Champaign, IL. Pp. 10-41.  
 
Jacob, B.A. and Rockoff, J.E. (2011). Organizing schools to improve student achievement: 
Start times, grade configurations, and teacher assignments. The Hamilton Project. 
Brookings. Discussion paper, 2011-08.  
 
161 
 
Kane T.J. and Staiger, D.O. (2002a). The promise and pitfalls of using imprecise school 
accountability measures. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 91-114.  
 
Kane T.J. and Staiger, D.O. (2002b). Volatility in school test scores: Implications for test-
based accountability system, in Brookings Papers on Education Policy, 2002. Diane 
Ravitch, ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, pp. 235-83.  
 
Kane T.J. and Staiger, D.O. (2002c). Improving school accountability measures. National 
Bureau Economic Research, Working Paper 8156.  
 
Kane T.J. and Staiger, D.O. (2008). Estimating teacher impacts on student achievement: An 
experimental evaluation. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper 
14607. http://www.nber.org/papers/w14607 
 
Koedel, C. and Betts, J.R. (2007). Re-examining the role of teacher quality in the educational 
production function. Working Paper 07-08, University of Missouri, Columbia. 
 
McCaffrey, D.F. and Lockwood, J.R. (2008). Value-added models: Analytic issues. A paper 
prepared for the National Research Council and the National Academy of 
Education, Board on Testing and Accountability Workshop on Value-Added 
Modeling, Nover 13 and 14, 2008, Washington, D.C.   
 
McCaffrey, D.F., Sass, T.R., Lockwood, J.R., and Mihaly, K. (2009). The intertemporal 
stability of teacher effect estimates. Education Finance and Policy, 4, pp. 572–606. 
 
Marks, R.E. (2008). The satisficer’s curse. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136039.  
 
Rockoff, J.E. (2004). The impact of individual teachers on student achievement: Evidence 
from panel data. The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, pp. 247-252.  
 
Rothstein, J. (2009). Student sorting and bias in value-added estimation: Selection on 
observables and unobservables. Education Finance and Policy, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 537-
571.  
 
Sanders, W.L. and Horn, S.P. (1994). The Tennessee value-added assessment system 
(TVAAS): Mixed-model methodology in educational assessment. Journal of Personnel 
Evaluation in Education, Vol. 8, pp. 299-311.   
 
Searle, S.R. (1971). Linear models. New York: Wiley.  
 
Smith J.E. and Winkler, R.L. (2006). The optimizer’s curse: Skepticism and postdecision 
surprise in decision analysis. Management Science, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 311-322.  
 
Thaler, R.H. (1998) Anomalies: The winner’s curse. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 2, No. 
1, pp. 191-202.  
 
 
162 
 
Appendix A
Table A - 1
Tennessee's district accountability results in the 2011-2012 school year
Exemplary Need
of improvement
(1) (1) (1) (2)
Blount County Schools Alamo City Anderson County Huntingdon
Claiborne County Schools Richard City Bedford County Kingsport
Fayette County Schools    Union County Bradley County Lawrence County
Fayetteville Schools Campbell County Lebanon
Henry County Schools Carter County Lenoir City
Hollow Rock-Bruceton
School District 
Cheatham County Lexington
Franklin Special
School District 
Cleveland Macon County
Loudon County Schools Cocke County Madison County
Marshall County Schools Coffee County Manchester
McKenzie Special
School District 
Crockett County Maryville
Milan Special
School District 
Cumberland County Meigs County
Newport City Schools Decatur County Memphis
Rogersville City Schools Dekalb County Monroe County
Rutherford County Schools Dyersburg Murfreesboro
Sequatchie County Schools Etowah Oak Ridge
Sevier County Schools Fentress County Oneida
Smith County Schools Gibson County SSD Paris
South Carroll County
Special School District 
Greene County Pickett County
Sweetwater City Schools Greeneville Polk County
Trousdale County Schools Grundy County Scott County
Union City Schools Hamblen County Stewart County
Hancock County Trenton
Hardeman County Van Buren County
Hardin County Washington County
Hawkins County Wayne County
Houston County Weakley County
Humboldt Wilson County
Source: Data retrived from http://www.tn.gov/education/accountability/ on September 10, 2013. 
Need of subgroup
improvement
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Appendix B
Figure B - 1
Average achievement changes in each subject separately by percent quintile of free/reduced price 
school lunch 
165
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Achievement
Quintile 1
Achievement
Quintile 2
Achievement
Quintile 3
Achievement
Quintile 4
Achievement
Quintile 5
MTH ELA SCI SOC
Figure B - 2
Average achievement changes in each subject separately by average achievement quintile 
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Figure B - 3
Average achievement changes in each subject separately by school NCLB status
167
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Non-priority
schools
Priority
schools
MTH ELA SCI SOC
Figure B - 4
Average achievement changes in each subject separately between priority and non-priority schools
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Figure B - 5
Average achievement changes in each subject separately between focus and non-focus schools
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Figure B - 6
Average achievement changes in each subject separately between reward and non-reward schools
170
-0.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Non-exemplary
schools
Exemplary
schools
MTH ELA SCI SOC
Figure B - 7
Average achievement changes in each subject separately between exemplary and non-exemplary 
schools
CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLSION 
 
This dissertation seeks to inform educators, researchers, and policy-makers who 
intent to use teacher value-added data to make decisions on teacher assignments in 
elementary schools. A particular focus is on subject specialization and its impact on average 
test performance. I develop models to provide evidence that teaching effectiveness 
measured by teacher value added is positively correlated with subject specialization and 
specialization based on teaching effectiveness raises average student scores in upper 
elementary grades 4 through 6 in Tennessee. I further estimate the maximum gains in 
mathematics that could be achieved through specialization.  
The three essays in this dissertation are linked by three different focuses on teaching 
effectiveness measured by teacher value added, but they all connected to teacher 
assignments. This dissertation contributes to the line of research on improving student 
learning measured by test scores in the core academic subjects. Specifically, I focus on 
changes in teacher assignments and school organization structure in elementary schools.  
 The first essay centers on the relationship between teaching effectiveness and 
teacher assignments. It concludes that high value added in a subject increases the proportion 
of students taught by individual teachers in that subject. This evidence can be interpreted by 
the arguments that either teacher value added has been used to assign teachers to their area 
of specialty or the criteria used to make decisions on teacher assignments are correlated with 
the estimated teacher effects using value added modeling (i.e., DOLS and DOLS with 
teacher-within school effects). While this correlation between teacher assignments and 
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teacher effectiveness is positive and statistically significant, there is a great deal of variation in 
teacher assignments explained by factors other than teaching effectiveness. This finding has 
raised the interest in measuring the impact of subject specialization on student test scores in 
elementary schools.   
The second essay asks whether specialization assignments raise average student 
performance in elementary schools. This essay is interested in the consequence of subject 
specialization that has been growing in elementary schools over time. My findings suggest 
that specialization has not raised student test scores in all subjects except science in grade 6. 
Those findings are then followed by several analyses on why specialization does not matter 
to student achievement across subject and grades. I then conclude that specialization based 
on teacher value added has substantially raised average student scores. Combining the first 
two essays, I show that not only teacher value added is correlated with teacher assignments, 
but also the use of teacher value added to make teacher assignments has a strong and 
positive influence to school performance. Now, a new question arises what benefits can be 
achieved through specialization especially when specialization is optimally operated in 
elementary schools.    
The third essay asks what maximum gains in mathematics could be achieved through 
specialization. Based on how specialization has been done in the past, the third essay asks 
how much gains a school can achieve if an optimal selection procedure is implemented to 
select the most effective teacher(s) to fully specialize in teaching mathematics within schools. 
To accurately estimate the maximum gains in mathematics, this study uses the BLUP 
estimator, also as known as shrinkage estimates, to quantify teaching effectiveness. The gains 
in mathematics are more substantial in schools with more students eligible for free/reduced-
price school lunch and lower prior test scores.  
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I then pay attention to the changes in achievement in other subjects. The approach I 
take to assign students to teachers in non-mathematics subjects is not optimal. Clearly, taking 
the random assignment approach generates losses in achievement in English/language arts 
and science. This suggests that there is a need for a more sophisticated approach to further 
take the advantages of subject specialization.     
Overall, this dissertation will raise more studies on the use of teacher value added 
and the practice of teacher assignments that aim to raise student test scores in the future. It 
would be very interesting to conduct a similar study based this dissertation in different 
States, especially the ones where schools and districts are less likely to favor teacher value 
added. In addition, taking a different approach, future studies may focus on experimental 
evidence for the use of teacher value added and the impact of subject specialization in 
elementary schools.1 The goal of these future studies is to (1) help design the rigorous 
guidelines for school administrators to follow when they use value-added data to make 
teacher assignments; (2) evaluate the impact of subject specialization based on the proposed 
guidelines; (3) use the responses from teachers and administrators about the use of value 
added data to make teacher assignments to further develop better plans for school 
administrators; and (4) examine teacher mobility, retention, and recruitment under the 
influence of the new assignment policy that involves the use of value added data.      
  
1 Appendix B presents the patterns of teacher assignments based on the Schools and Staffing Survey 
data collected from different states. Those descriptive statistics of teacher assignments serve a 
standing point for the purpose to replicate this dissertation in a different state.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
List of abbreviations and acronyms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
MTH Mathematics 
RLA Reading/Language Arts 
SCI Science 
SOC Social Studies 
    
AYP Adequate Yearly Progress 
NCLB No Child Left Behind 
EVAAS Educational Value-added Assessment System 
TVAAS Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System 
    
MNPS Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools 
POINT Project on Incentives in Teaching 
    
SASS Schools and Staffing Survey 
TCAP Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program 
PIRS Personnel Information Reporting System  
TSLA Tennessee State Library and Archives  
    
SUR Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
DOLS Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares 
RCA “Revealed” Comparative Advantage  
174 
 
Appendix B 
Patterns of Assignments for Public Upper Elementary Grade Level Teachers: Evidence 
from the 2003-04 Schools and Staffing Survey 
May 2012 
 
B – TABLE OF CONTENTS 
B – I.  INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................176 
B – II.   DATA AND VARIABLES.................................................................................178 
B – III.  FINDINGS............................................................................................................179 
B – REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................184 
B – APPENDIX  
B – A. List of the 2003-04 SASS public school teacher survey questions  
used in this section..............................................................................................................185 
B – B. Codes for major field of study............................................................................................186 
  
175 
 
B – LIST OF TABLES 
Table                                                                                                                               Page 
B – 1.  Number and percentages of public elementary school-level teachers  
by subject and  number of grade taught in the United States in  
2003-04..................................................................................................................................180 
B – 2.  Number and percentages of public elementary school-level teachers  
by subject, grade, and combinations of grades taught in the United  
States in 2003-04..................................................................................................................182 
B – 3.  Number and percentages of public elementary school-level teachers  
in the South region by subject, grade, and combinations of grades  
taught in the United States in 2003-04.............................................................................183 
 
B – INTRODUCATION 
We use data from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) to demonstrate patterns of 
teacher assignments at upper elementary grades at public schools. The tables provided in this 
section examine how many subject(s) and grade(s) were taught by public elementary school-
level teachers at grades 4 to 6. Our intention is to show whether the patterns of teacher 
assignments in Tennessee are generalizable across all other states in the United States. We 
address the following areas:  
• The number of state-tested subject areas (i.e., mathematics, reading/language arts, 
science, and social studies) taught by public elementary school-level teachers in a 
selection of grades; 
• The number of grades taught by public elementary school-level teachers in four 
state-tested subject areas;  
• The percentage of public elementary school-level teachers by varying combinations 
of course subject areas.    
Teachers’ course subject areas are measured by teaching assignment and subject 
matter codes. All the surveyed teachers first answer a filter question in which they describe 
the way their classes are organized. For teachers who instruct the same group of students all 
or most of the day in multiple subjects (self-contained class), they reported how many hours 
they spent teaching each of four state-test subject areas during their most recent full week of 
teaching. The criterion to determine a subject taught by a teacher is whether the reported 
hours of teaching that subject are greater than zero. For teachers who instruct several classes 
of different students most or all of the day in one or more subjects (departmentalized 
instruction), they were asked to report subject matter and grade level codes for each class (or 
section) they currently taught. They were allowed to report no more than ten classes (or 
sections). We use the subject matter codes the teachers reported to determine which 
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subject(s) they taught. The reported subject matter codes can then be grouped in one of four 
state-tested subject areas.  
The grade(s) taught are also measured differently for the teachers teaching self-
contained classes and the ones teaching departmental courses. The self-contained classroom 
teachers only reported in which grades students were taught by them while the teachers 
teaching departmental courses reported at what grade they taught a specific subject. For the 
latter, teachers’ subject(s) and grade(s) taught are explicitly connected; therefore, we know 
what teachers taught at a grade.  
The survey does not provide the information about what grades are taught in a 
specific subject by self-contained classroom teachers. The link between subject(s) and 
grade(s) might not be necessary if we assume that the self-contained classroom teachers 
always taught all four subject areas at most or all weeks at the same grade. However, it is 
possible that those teachers do not teach all four subject areas for some weeks or at the same 
grade (e.g., they taught two subjects at one grade and taught two other subjects at another 
grade). If they reported teaching multiple grades, we assert that they taught all subjects 
during their most recent full week of teaching in those grades. Alternatively, we may simply 
assume that the self-contained classroom teachers taught all four state-test subject areas to 
the same group of students all or most of the day in all grades the teachers reported.  
To capture the number of grades taught, we measure whether teachers taught in 
multiple grades regardless of the subjects they taught. Some teachers reported teaching all 
subjects in multiple grades.  Other teachers reported teaching some of the subjects in 
multiple grades, but teaching other subjects in one grade. Using a selection of three 
elementary grades, we create four grade combinations to classify teachers who taught in 
multiple grades in each of those groups (i.e., 4 and 5; 5 and 6; 4 and 6; and 4 to 6).  
In the findings of this section, we show teacher assignments at public elementary 
school upper grade levels (i.e., 4 to 6) and the percentage of those teachers by different 
combinations of state-test subject areas and/or the number of grades taught. We then 
compare these findings with the ones described in our proposal, in which we use data from 
Tennessee public elementary school-level teachers. Table 1 presents the number and 
percentages of teachers who taught at grades 4 to 6 in public schools with varying 
combinations of subject areas taught by the number of grades. Table 2 further details the 
number and percentages of those teachers who taught at only one grade (i.e., 4, 5, and 6) and 
at multiple grades (i.e., with varying combinations of those grades). Finally, table 3 details the 
number and percentages of the teachers in the South region only by grades and subjects 
taught. Additional tables reported at national, regional, and state levels for patterns of 
teacher assignments can be found in detail in Appendix B – A.   
  
177 
 
B – DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data used in this section come from the 2003-04 Schools and Staffing Survey 
Restricted-Used Public School Teacher Data File. We provide the details on the measure of 
four state-tested subject areas and indicators for groupings on various geographic (e.g., 
regions) characteristics. Additional information about the SASS data will be provided in 
detail in Appendix B – B.  
Subject areas taught: Groupings of assignment and subject matter codes 
Teacher assignments are considered as they self-reported subjects taught. For 
purposes of our analysis, we intend to identify the subjects taught in self-contained 
classrooms. While self-contained classroom teachers could teach all subjects to the same 
class of students at public elementary schools, this does not necessarily mean that they 
taught all state-tested subjects. In the SASS teacher questionnaire, each self-contained 
classroom teacher reported hours of teaching each of four subject areas (i.e., 
English/reading/language arts, arithmetic/mathematics, social studies/history, and science) 
during the most recent full week. Although the subjects taught in that full week again does 
not necessarily mean the subjects those teachers were actually assigned to teach in a school 
year, especially to the teachers who only reported teaching one or two of those subjects, this 
could be the best approximate assignments for the self-contained teachers in a school year. 
One possibility for the self-contained teachers who did not teach four state-tested subjects 
would be that those teachers instructed the same group of students in multiple subjects, but 
not all of the subjects taught were asked to report the number of hours of teaching during 
that week. We prefer using the hours for each subject reported by self-contained classroom 
teachers to determine whether they instruct the same class of students in multiple subjects. 
We argue that although teachers teach in self-contained classrooms at a school, it is not 
certain that they have to teach any or all subjects in mathematics, reading/language arts, 
science, and social studies. The SASS teacher data show that some of those teachers taught 
less than four state-tested subjects; and a few of those teachers only taught one subject 
during their most recent full week of teaching.  
This analysis also includes teachers who instruct multiple classes of different students 
in one subject and/or multiple subjects. Each teacher self-reported subject matter codes for 
the classes (or sections). Since we are interested in four state-tested subject areas, the 
subjects within each broad subject area listed in the table 1 of the SASS teacher 
questionnaire are collapsed to mathematics, reading/language arts, science, and social 
studies. Addition information on the subjects used to form the four main subject areas can 
be found in Appendix B - C.  
Groupings: Geographic variation and the state in South 
This section addresses the patterns of teacher assignments by geographic variation. 
The surveyed schools are stratified in each of four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and 
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West. The region variable indicates where a district is located. We also present data on 
teacher assignments by state. To describe the patterns of teacher assignments by state, the 
indicator for Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) state codes can be found at 
the first two digits of the teacher control number. Tennessee with a FIPS code equal to 47 is 
one of the states in the South region.        
B – FINDINGS 
Findings for teacher assignments are presented below. This analysis uses the term 
“elementary school-level teachers” in all tables. Those teachers include traditional public and 
public charter school teachers who instructed at grades 4 to 6 at elementary schools and 
combined K-12 schools. The counts for those teachers by varying combinations of subjects 
and grades in all tables represent the target survey population. To adjust the sample totals to 
the population totals, the teacher final weight, TFNLWGT, is used for all analyses. The 
percentages reported in all tables represent the frequency of elementary school-level teachers 
at a given assignment at a given grade (or a combination of multiple grades) across all 
teachers. A Chi-square statistic is reported for tables 1, 2, and 3 that tests whether the 
distributions of teacher assignments across two samples of public elementary school-level 
teachers are equivalent. We present the patterns of teacher assignments in three samples. 
The samples of teachers include all teachers in the population, the teachers from the South 
region, and the teachers from Tennessee.  
As shown in Table B – 1, the most frequently reported assignments for public 
elementary school-level teachers in 2003-04 was to teaching four subjects at only one grade 
with 223,700 teachers (41.18%). Among the assignments where teachers taught three 
subjects, the most frequently reported assignment was to teaching three subjects, 
mathematics, reading/language art, and social studies, at only one grade with 43,300 teachers 
(7.97%). Among the assignments where teachers taught two subjects, the most frequently 
reported assignment was to teaching reading/language arts and social studies at only one 
grade with 31,100 teachers (5.72%). Teaching reading/language arts (47,600 teachers or 
8.76%) was the most frequently reported assignment when teaching one and only one 
subject at one grade. Across all subject-specific assignments, there were 482,000 teachers 
(88.76%) teaching one and only one grade, 48,500 teachers (8.94%) teaching two grades, and 
12,500 teachers (2.31%) teaching three grades.  
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Table B – 1 
Number and percentages of public elementary school-level teachers by subject and number of grades taught in the United States in the 
2003-04 school year 
Subject(s) Taught Number of Grades Taught Grade Levels 4 
through 6 
Tennessee 
1 2 3 
MTH, RLA, SCI, and SOC 223,651 41.18% 22,987 4.23% 6,100 1.12% 46.54% 36.12% 
MTH 20,379 3.75% 1,548 0.29% 447 0.08% 4.12% 7.37% 
MTH and RLA 17,641 3.25% 3,841 0.71% 1,750 0.32% 4.28% 3.38% 
MTH and SCI 11,464 2.11% 357 0.07% 41 0.01% 2.18% 2.36% 
MTH and SOC 2,253 0.41% 763 0.14% 811 0.15% 0.70% 1.95% 
MTH, RLA, and SCI 24,842 4.57% 2,593 0.48% 1,455 0.27% 5.32% 3.91% 
MTH, RLA, and SOC 43,300 7.97% 3,473 0.64% 591 0.11% 8.72% 4.00% 
MTH, SCI, and SOC 4,599 0.85% 1,031 0.19% 11 0.00% 1.04% 2.77% 
RLA 47,600 8.76% 4,937 0.91% 731 0.13% 9.81% 14.14% 
RLA and SCI 11,178 2.06% 1,485 0.27% 187 0.03% 2.37% 3.14% 
RLA and SOC 31,077 5.72% 1,883 0.35% 100 0.02% 6.09% 6.41% 
RLA, SCI, and SOC 4,522 0.83% 1,251 0.23% 147 0.03% 1.09% 1.38% 
SCI 18,631 3.43% 1,327 0.24% 168 0.03% 3.71% 5.26% 
SOC 14,681 2.70% 742 0.14% --- --- 2.84% 5.05% 
SCI and SOC 6,215 1.14% 309 0.06% --- --- 1.20% 2.75% 
Total number of teachers 482,033 88.76% 48,528 8.94% 12,538 2.31% 100.00%   
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Table B – 2 and B – 3 further expands the patterns of teacher assignments by grades 
and varying combinations of grades. As shown in table 2, the number of public elementary 
school-level teachers who taught four subjects decreased from 108,700 (20.01%) at grade 4 
to 81,100 (14.93%) at grade 5. This number dropped sharply to 33,900 teachers (6.24%) at 
grade 6. There were about 34,000 teachers (6.26%) teaching at grades 4 and 5; 13,000 
teachers (2.47%) teaching grades 5 and 6; and 1,100 teachers (.21%) teaching grades 4 and 6.  
Table B – 3 focuses on the patterns of teacher assignments for teachers only in the 
South region. Compared to the data reported for all teachers, the percentage of teachers who 
taught four subjects in the South region was lower (46.54 vs. 39.76), but the percentages for 
teachers who taught one and only one subject in the South region were always higher (4.12 
vs. 6.20 in mathematics; 9.81 vs. 15.51 in reading/language arts; 3.71 vs. 4.78 in science; and 
2.84 vs. 3.89 in social studies).    
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Table B – 2 
Number and percentages of public elementary school-level teachers by subject, grade, and combinations of grades taught in the United 
States in the 2003-04 school year  
Subject(s) Taught 
Grade Levels and Combination of Grades Taught Grade 
Levels 4 
through 6 
Tennessee 
4 5 6 4 and 5 5 and 6 4 and 6 4, 5, and 6 
MTH, RLA, SCI, and SOC 108,695 20.01% 81,076 14.93% 33,880 6.24% 19,142 3.52% 3,509 0.65% 336 0.06% 6,100 1.12% 46.54% 36.12% 
MTH 1,579 0.29% 1,913 0.35% 16,887 3.11% 635 0.12% 866 0.16% 47 0.01% 447 0.08% 4.12% 7.37% 
MTH and RLA 4,902 0.90% 4,212 0.78% 8,527 1.57% 2,501 0.46% 1,271 0.23% 69 0.01% 1,750 0.32% 4.28% 3.38% 
MTH and SCI 1,464 0.27% 3,679 0.68% 6,321 1.16% 205 0.04% 152 0.03% --- --- 41 0.01% 2.18% 2.36% 
MTH and SOC 327 0.06% 22 0.00% 1,904 0.35% 269 0.05% 494 0.09% --- --- 811 0.15% 0.70% 1.95% 
MTH, RLA, and SCI 9,988 1.84% 8,606 1.58% 6,249 1.15% 2,096 0.39% 436 0.08% 61 0.01% 1,455 0.27% 5.32% 3.91% 
MTH, RLA, and SOC 19,761 3.64% 15,242 2.81% 8,297 1.53% 3,211 0.59% 213 0.04% 50 0.01% 591 0.11% 8.72% 4.00% 
MTH, SCI, and SOC 1,170 0.22% 1,451 0.27% 1,978 0.36% 985 0.18% 45 0.01% --- --- 11 0.00% 1.04% 2.77% 
RLA 7,445 1.37% 7,521 1.38% 32,634 6.01% 1,716 0.32% 2,708 0.50% 513 0.09% 731 0.13% 9.81% 14.14% 
RLA and SCI 1,850 0.34% 3,846 0.71% 5,481 1.01% 669 0.12% 795 0.15% 21 0.00% 187 0.03% 2.37% 3.14% 
RLA and SOC 5,224 0.96% 7,469 1.38% 18,384 3.39% 826 0.15% 1,057 0.19% --- --- 100 0.02% 6.09% 6.41% 
RLA, SCI, and SOC 1,451 0.27% 1,407 0.26% 1,664 0.31% 1,207 0.22% 44 0.01% --- --- 147 0.03% 1.09% 1.38% 
SCI 283 0.05% 2,503 0.46% 15,845 2.92% 347 0.06% 973 0.18% 8 0.00% 168 0.03% 3.71% 5.26% 
SOC 214 0.04% 818 0.15% 13,649 2.51% 59 0.01% 662 0.12% 21 0.00% --- --- 2.84% 5.05% 
SCI and SOC 1,231 0.23% 1,195 0.22% 3,789 0.70% 105 0.02% 204 0.04% --- --- --- --- 1.20% 2.75% 
Total number of teachers 165,584 30.49% 140,960 25.95% 175,489 32.31% 33,974 6.26% 13,428 2.47% 1,125 0.21% 12,538 2.31% 100%   
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Table B – 3 
Number and percentages of public elementary school-level teachers in the South region by subject, grade, and combinations of grades 
taught in the United States in the 2003-04 school year  
Subject(s) Taught 
Grade Levels and Combination of Grades Taught Grade Levels 
4 through 6 Tennessee 4 5 6 4 and 5 5 and 6 4 and 6 4, 5, and 6 
MTH, RLA, SCI, and SOC 34,741 17.12% 29,281 14.43% 9,538 4.70% 5,166 2.55% 704 0.35% 219 0.11% 1,032 0.51% 39.76% 36.12% 
MTH 1,045 0.51% 1,332 0.66% 9,388 4.63% 348 0.17% 369 0.18% --- --- 103 0.05% 6.20% 7.37% 
MTH and RLA 1,160 0.57% 1,026 0.51% 2,417 1.19% 1,023 0.50% 442 0.22% 26 0.01% 64 0.03% 3.03% 3.38% 
MTH and SCI 1,235 0.61% 2,537 1.25% 2,831 1.40% 111 0.05% 107 0.05% --- --- 41 0.02% 3.38% 2.36% 
MTH and SOC 327 0.16% 22 0.01% 758 0.37% 269 0.13% 80 0.04% --- --- 7 0.00% 0.72% 1.95% 
MTH, RLA, and SCI 2,622 1.29% 2,345 1.16% 1,566 0.77% 234 0.12% --- --- --- --- 149 0.07% 3.41% 3.91% 
MTH, RLA, and SOC 4,095 2.02% 4,910 2.42% 1,101 0.54% 59 0.03% 67 0.03% --- --- 73 0.04% 5.08% 4.00% 
MTH, SCI, and SOC 608 0.30% 516 0.25% 1,264 0.62% 924 0.46% --- --- --- --- 11 0.01% 1.64% 2.77% 
RLA 5,147 2.54% 5,472 2.70% 17,200 8.48% 1,659 0.82% 1,110 0.55% 484 0.24% 407 0.20% 15.51% 14.14% 
RLA and SCI 789 0.39% 1,990 0.98% 1,458 0.72% 378 0.19% 151 0.07% --- --- 7 0.00% 2.35% 3.14% 
RLA and SOC 4,242 2.09% 4,330 2.13% 4,708 2.32% 567 0.28% 272 0.13% --- --- 83 0.04% 7.00% 6.41% 
RLA, SCI, and SOC 820 0.40% 151 0.07% 51 0.02% 993 0.49% --- --- --- --- 45 0.02% 1.01% 1.38% 
SCI 275 0.14% 1,667 0.82% 7,129 3.51% --- --- 525 0.26% --- --- 112 0.06% 4.78% 5.26% 
SOC 48 0.02% 159 0.08% 7,318 3.61% 53 0.03% 285 0.14% 21 0.01% --- --- 3.89% 5.05% 
SCI and SOC 819 0.40% 996 0.49% 2,587 1.27% --- --- 137 0.07% --- --- --- --- 2.24% 2.75% 
Total number of teachers 57,973 28.57% 56,734 27.96% 69,314 34.16% 11,784 5.81% 4,246 2.09% 751 0.37% 2,135 1.05% 100%   
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 Appendix B – A 
List of the 2003-04 SASS public school teacher questionnaire used in this section. 
Survey Section II: Class Organization 
11. In which grades are the STUDENTS you currently teacher at THIS school?  
12. Which statement best describes the way YOUR classes at this school are 
organized?  
16. During your most recent FULL WEEK of teaching, approximately how many 
hours did you spend teaching each of the following subjects at THIS school?  
19. For each class (or section) that you currently teach at THIS school, complete a 
row/line of information.  
 
  
185 
 
 Appendix B – B 
Codes for major field of study (Not all the codes listed below are used) 
English and Language Arts (RLA) 
  
151 Communications 
152 Composition 
153 English 
154 Journalism 
155 Language arts 
158 Reading 
159 Speech 
 
Mathematics and Computer Science (MTH) 
  
191 Algebra, elementary 
192 Algebra, intermediate 
193 Algebra, advanced 
194 Basic and general mathematics 
195 Business and applied math 
196 Calculus and pre-calculus 
197 Computer science 
198 Geometry 
199 Pre-algebra 
200 Statistics and probability 
201 Trigonometry 
  
Natural Sciences (SCI) 
  
210 Science, general 
211 Biology/Life sciences 
212 Chemistry 
213 Earth sciences 
215 Integrated science 
216 Physical science 
217 Physics 
 
Social Sciences (SOC) 
  
220 Social studies, general 
221 Anthropology 
225 Economics 
226 Geography 
227 Government/Civics 
228 History 
231 Native American studies 
233 Psychology 
234 Sociology 
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